India to Get First Sikh Chief Justice of India

Justice Khehar Singh
Supreme Court of India

Three new judges will be administered oath on Tuesday pursuant to their elevation to the Supreme Court of India. Justice Khehar Singh, who is at present the Chief Justice of the Karnataka High Court would be sworn in ahead of Justice Ranjana Desai and Justice S.J. Mukhopadhyaya in Court Room No. 1 on Tuesday.

The elevation of Justice Khehar Singh means India will get its first Sikh Chief Justice of India, after the retirement of Justice T.S. Thakur in 2017. The Chart below indicates the dates of appointment and retirement of judges in the Supreme Court. The names highlighted in Red are in line to be appointed Chief Justices and the ones in Green are due to retire this year.

Sl. No.	Name of the Judge S/Shri Justice	Date of appointment	Date of Retirement	REMARKS [Parent High Court]
1	S. H. KAPADIA	18/12/2003	29/09/2012	CJI W.E.F. 12.5.2010 [BOMBAY]
2	ALTAMAS KABIR	09/09/2005	19/07/2013	CALCUTTA
3	R.V.RAVEENDRAN	09/09/2005	15/10/2011	KARNATAKA
4	DALVEER CHAND BHANDARI	28/10/2005	01/10/2012	DELHI
5	DEVINDER KUMAR JAIN	10/04/2006	25/01/2013	DELHI
6	MARKANDEYA KATJU	10/04/2006	20/09/2011	ALLAHABAD
7	P.SATHASIVAM	21/08/2007	27/04/2014	MADRAS
8	GANPAT SINGH SINGHVI	12/11/2007	12/12/2013	RAJASTHAN
9	AFTAB ALAM	12/11/2007	19/04/2013	PATNA
10	JAGDISH MADHURLAL PANCHAL	12/11/2007	06/10/2011	GUJARAT
11	Dr. M.K. SHARMA	09/04/2008	18/09/2011	GAUHATI
12	CYRIAC JOSEPH	07/07/2008	28/01/2012	KERALA
13	A.K. GANGULY	17/12/2008	03/02/2012	CALCUTTA
14	R.M. LODHA	17/12/2008	28/09/2014	RAJASTHAN
15	H.L. DATTU	17/12/2008	03/12/2015	KARNATAKA
16	DEEPAK VERMA	11/05/2009	28/08/2012	MADHYA PRADESH
17	DR. BALBIR SINGH CHAUHAN	11/05/2009	02/07/2014	ALLAHABAD
18	ANANGA KUMAR PATNAIK	17/11/2009	03/06/2014	ORISSA
19	TIRATH SINGH THAKUR	17/11/2009	04/01/2017	JAMMU & KASHMIR
20	K.S.P. RADHAKRISHNAN	17/11/2009	15/05/2014	KERALA
21	SURINDER SINGH NIJJAR	17/11/2009	07/06/2014	PUNJAB & HARYANA
22	SWATANTER KUMAR	18/12/2009	31/12/2012	DELHI
23	CHANDRAMAULI KUMAR PRASAD	08/02/2010	15/07/2014	PATNA
24	HEMANT LAXMAN GOKHALE	30/04/2010	10/03/2014	BOMBAY
25	SMT. GYAN SUDHA MISRA	30/04/2010	28/04/2014	PATNA
26	ANIL RAMESH DAVE	30/04/2010	19/11/2016	GUJARAT
27	J.S.KHEHAR	13/09/2011	28/08/2017	PUNJAB & HARYANA
28	SMT.R.P.DESAI	13/09/2011	30/10/2014	BOMBAY
29	S. J. MUKHOPADHAYA	13/09/2011	15/03/2015	JHARKHAND

Counter Claim under the Code of Civil Procedure Code - Stage of Filing : Supreme Court

Justice S.S. Nijjar
Supreme Court of India

The Supreme Court in Gayathri Womens Welfare Association Vs. Gowramma was called upon to decide the appropriate stage in a proceeding at which a Counter Claim may be preferred by a Defendant. In the case in hand, the High Court had allowed the Defendant to raise a counter claim at the stage of appeal. The Supreme Court while examining the provisions relating to Counter Claim held as under;

27. In Nanduri Yogananda Lakshminarasimhachari Vs. Sri Agastheswaraswamivaru AIR 1960 SC 622, this Court observed that the amendment could be permitted in a plaint as there was no new fact to be alleged and the parties were alive to the real nature of the dispute. 

28. In the case of Pandit Ishwardas (supra), it has been observed as follows :- 

"There is no impediment or bar against an appellate Court permitting amendment of pleadings so as to enable a party to raise a new plea. All that is necessary is that the appellate Court should observe the well known principles subject to which amendments of pleadings are usually granted. Naturally one of the circumstances which will be taken into consideration before an amendment is granted is the delay in making the application seeking such amendment and, if made at the appellate stage, the reason why it was not sought in the trial court. If the necessary material on which the plea arising from the amendment may be decided is already there, the amendment may be more readily granted than otherwise. But, there is no prohibition against an appellate Court permitting an amendment at the appellate stage merely because the necessary material is not already before the Court." 

These observations clearly indicate that one of the circumstances which will be taken into consideration before an amendment is granted is the delay in making the application seeking such amendment and, if made at the appellate sage, the reason why it was not sought in the trial court. In the present case, not only there is wholly untenable delay in the application but the appellants had a decree for permanent injunction in their favour. 

29. In the case of Jagmohan Chawla (supra), this Court considered the scope of Rule 6A to 6G of Order VIII CPC and observed as follows:- 

"It is true that in money suits, decree must be conformable to Order 20, Rule 18, CPC but the object of the amendments introduced by Rules 6-A to 6-G are conferment of a statutory right on the defendant to set up a counter-claim independent of the claim on the basis of which the appellant laid the suit, on his own cause of action. In sub-rule (1) of Rule 6-A, the language is so couched with words of wide width as to enable the parties to bring his own independent cause of action in respect of any claim that would be the subject-matter of an independent suit. Thereby, it is no longer confined to money claim or to cause of action of the same nature as original action of the plaintiff. It need not relate to or be connected with the original cause of action or matter pleaded by the plaintiff. The words "any right or claim in respect of a cause of action accruing with the defendant" would show that the cause of action from which the counter- claim arises need not necessarily arise from or have any nexus with the cause of action of the plaintiff that occasioned to lay the suit. The only limitation is that the cause of action should arise before the time fixed for filing the written statement expires." 

The aforesaid observations, in our opinion, have no relevance to the controversy in the present case, as the claim of the respondent has been rejected by the trial court on the ground that the cause of action arose a long time ago. 

30. In the case of Revajeetu Builders (supra), this Court reiterated the very wide discretion the Courts have in the matter of amendment of pleadings. These observations were in the context of an application filed by the appellant, seeking amendment of the original plaint including the prayer clause being rejected by the High Court upon coming to a definite conclusion that the appellant while seeking permission to amend the plaint is trying to introduce a new case, which was not his case in the original plaint and the proposed amendment, if allowed, would certainly affect the rights of the respondents adversely. It was also held that any such amendment, which changes the entire character of the plaint, can not be permitted and that too, after a lapse of four years and after the institution of the suit. This Court, upon a detailed consideration of the historical background of Order VI Rule 17 and upon a comprehensive survey of the case law, concluded that the amendment can be permitted, if it was necessary for the determination of the real question in controversy. If that condition is not satisfied, the amendment can not be allowed. It was also observed as follows:- 

"22. .... The power to allow an amendment is undoubtedly wide and may at any stage be appropriately exercised in the interest of justice, the law of limitation notwithstanding. But the exercise of such far-reaching discretionary powers is governed by judicial considerations and wider the discretion, greater ought to be the care and circumspection on the part of the court." 

31. In our opinion, the decision of the trial court is in conformity with the aforesaid principles. The trial court has clearly held that the cause of action for the relief of possession arose to the respondents many years ago. They may, therefore, have a cause of action, if any, for an independent suit. In the aforesaid case, the Court further reiterated the principle in Ganga Bai Vs. Vijay Kumar 1974 2 SCC 393 wherein it was rightly observed : 

"The power to allow an amendment is undoubtedly wide and may at any stage be appropriately exercised in the interest of justice, the law of limitation notwithstanding. But the exercise of such far-reaching discretionary powers is governed by judicial considerations and wider the discretion, greater ought to be the care and circumspection on the part of the Court." 

32. Similarly in Dhanpal Balu (supra), this Court permitted the amendment in the facts and circumstances of that case. Thus the judgment would not advance the case of the appellant in any manner. 

33. We may notice here the observations made by this Court in the case of Ramesh Chand (supra) which may be of some relevance. Upon considering the ratio of earlier cases in the case of Sangaram Singh Vs. Election Tribunal, Kotah AIR 1955 SC 425, Arjun Singh Vs. Mohindra Kumar AIR 1964 SC 993 and Laxmidas Dayabhai Kabrawala Vs. Nanabhai Chunilal Kabrawala AIR 1964 SC 11, it was held that a right to make a counter claim is statutory and a counter claim is not admissible in a case which is admittedly not within the statutory provisions. It is further observed that : 

"Looking to the scheme of Order 8 as amended by Act 104 of 1976, we are of the opinion, that there are three modes of pleading or setting up a counter-claim in a civil suit. Firstly, the written statement filed under Rule 1 may itself contain a counter-claim which in the light of Rule 1 read with Rule 6-A would be a counter- claim against the claim of the appellant preferred in exercise of legal right conferred by Rule 6-A. Secondly, a counter-claim may be preferred by way of amendment incorporated subject to the leave of the court in a written statement already filed. Thirdly, a counter- claim may be filed by way of a subsequent pleading under Rule 9. In the latter two cases the counter-claim though referable to Rule 6-A cannot be brought on record as of right but shall be governed by the discretion vesting in the court, either under Order 6 Rule 17 CPC if sought to be introduced by way of amendment, or, subject to exercise of discretion conferred on the court under Order 8 Rule 9 CPC if sought to be placed on record by way of subsequent pleading. The purpose of the provision enabling filing of a counter-claim is to avoid multiplicity of judicial proceedings and save upon the court's time as also to exclude the inconvenience to the parties by enabling claims and counter- claims, that is, all disputes between the same parties being decided in the course of the same proceedings. If the consequence of permitting a counter- claim either by way of amendment or by way of subsequent pleading would be prolonging of the trial, complicating the otherwise smooth flow of proceedings or causing a delay in the progress of the suit by forcing a retreat on the steps already taken by the court, the court would be justified in exercising its discretion not in favour of permitting a belated counter- claim. The framers of the law never intended the pleading by way of counter-claim being utilized as an instrument for forcing upon a reopening of the trial or pushing back the progress of proceeding. Generally speaking, a counter-claim not contained in the original written statement may be refused to be taken on record if the issues have already been framed and the case set down for trial, and more so when the trial has already commenced." 

These observations make it clear that generally speaking the counter claim not contained in the original written statement may be refused to be taken on record, especially if issues have already been framed. In the present case, the counter claim is sought to be introduced at the stage of appeal before the High Court. 

34. In such circumstances, we are unable to accept the conclusions of the High Court that the discretion exercised by the trial court was in any manner, illegal or arbitrary in rejecting the counter claim of the respondents. We may notice here the observations of this Court in the case of Rohit Singh (supra) which are as follows :- 

"A counterclaim, no doubt, could be filed even after the written statement is filed, but that does not mean that a counterclaim can be raised after issues are framed and the evidence is closed. Therefore, the entertaining of the so- called counterclaim of Respondents 3 to 17 by the trial court, after the framing of issues for trial, was clearly illegal and without jurisdiction." 

These observations would show that the dismissal of the counter claim by the trial court was neither illegal nor without jurisdiction. In fact the direction issued by the High Court would clearly run counter to the aforesaid observations. In the aforesaid case, this Court was considering a situation where the evidence had been closed, arguments on behalf of the respondents had been concluded, the suit was adjourned for arguments of the appellants, the suit was dismissed for default. Subsequently, it was restored. Thereafter the respondents filed an application for amending the written statement. The counter claim was filed by the intervener. In these circumstances, it was observed that at this stage no counter claim could be entertained. 

35. In the present case, after the matter had been remanded back, the trial court again decreed the suit of the appellants, the counter claim was dismissed for the reasons stated in the judgment of the trial court. We may restate here that the prayer in the original counter claim was only for a mandatory injunction to demolish the illegal structures in Sy.No.110/1. It was only when the Regular First Appeal was filed for challenging the original decree that the respondents made an application under Order VI Rule 17 for amendment of the original written statement to incorporate the counter claim with a prayer for possession of the land in dispute in Survey No.110/1. In such circumstances, the High Court erred in disturbing the findings recorded by the trial court. 

36. The matter herein symbolizes the concern highlighted by this Court in the case of Ramesh Chand (supra). Permitting a counter claim at this stage would be to reopen a decree which has been granted in favour of the appellants by the trial court. The respondents have failed to establish any factual or legal basis for modification/nullifying the decree of the trial court.

No Relief Unless Claimed : Supreme Court

Justice A.K. Ganguly
Supreme Court of India

The Supreme Court in Shehla Burney Vs. Syed Ali Mossa Raza has reiterated that no relief can be granted against a party unless it has been specifically claimed in the suit or petition, as mandated by Order VII Rule(s) 5 & 7 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The Supreme Court while relying on judicial authorities has held as under;

18. It is clear that in the amended plaint the prayer is against the defendant, therefore, the prayer is only against defendant no.1 and not against defendant no.2. In a case where prayer is not made against a particular defendant, no relief possibly can be granted against him. Reference in this connection can be made to the provisions of Order VII of the Code of Civil Procedure. In this connection, Order VII, Rule 5 is relevant and is set out below:- 

"5. Defendant's interest and liability to be shown. - The plaint shall show that the defendant is or claims to be interested in subject-matter, and that he is liable to be called upon to answer the plaintiff's demand." 

19. Order VII, Rule 7 of CPC is also relevant and which is also set out below:- 

"7. Relief to be specifically stated.- Every plaint shall state specifically the relief which the plaintiff claims either simply or in the alternative, and it shall not be necessary to ask for general or other relief which may always be given as the Court may think just to the same extent as if it had been asked for. And the same rule shall apply to any relief claimed by the defendant in his written statement." 

20. In Sheikh Abdul Kayum and others v. Mulla Alibhai and others [AIR 1963 SC 309] it has been held by this Court that it does not lie within the jurisdiction of a Court to grant relief against defendant against whom no reliefs have been claimed [See paragraph 13, page 313 of the report]. 

21. Same propositions have been reiterated recently by a judgment of this Court in Scotts Engineering, Bangalore v. Rajesh P. Surana and others [(2008) 4 SCC 256]. In paragraph 10 at page 258 of the report this Court found that even after the appellant was arrayed as defendant 6, the plaintiff did not care to amend the plaint except making the appellant as defendant 6. No relief was claimed against defendant 6. If we follow the said principle in the facts of this case we have to hold that no relief having been claimed against defendant 2, who is the predecessor-in- title of the present appellant, no relief can be granted against the present appellant. 

22. The objection of the respondent that such point is taken only before this Court and not at an earlier stage of the proceeding cannot be countenanced since this point goes to the root of the matter and for consideration of this point no further investigation in the facts of the case is necessary. This point actually appears from the admitted records of the case and this point is based on the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure. 

23. In this connection principles which have been laid down by Lord Sumner in Surajmull Nagoremull v. Triton Insurance Co. Ltd., [52 Indian Appeals 126] are very pertinent. The learned Law Lord summarized the proposition so lucidly that we should do nothing more than quote it: 

"...No court can enforce as valid that which competent enactments have declared shall not be valid, nor is obedience to such an enactment a thing from which a court can be dispensed by the consent of the parties, or by a failure to plead or to argue the point at the outset:" 

24. The aforesaid propositions have been quoted with approval by this Court in Badri Prasad and others v. Nagarmal and others reported in AIR 1959 SC 559 at page 562. 

25. Similar views have been expressed by this Court again in Tarinikamal Pandit and others v. Perfulla Kumar Chatterjee (dead) by L.Rs. [AIR 1979 SC 1165]. After considering several decisions, including the one rendered in Badri Prasad (supra) this Court held as follows:- 

"...As the point raised is a pure question of law not involving any investigation of the facts, we permitted the learned counsel to raise the question...." 

(para 15 at page 1172) 

26. In our view this point is sufficient to hold that the judgment of the Hon'ble High Court is not sustainable in law.

Relinquishment of Claim under Order II Rule 2 & 'Res Judicata' : The Law

Justice R.V. Raveendran
Supreme Court of India

The Supreme Court in Alka Gupta Vs. Narender Kumar Gupta dealt with the provisions of Order II Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 while also dealing with the concept of 'Res Judicata'. The Court further held that a suit cannot be dismissed by the Courts simply because they are dissatisfied with the conduct of the Plaintiff. The relevant extracts from this judgment are reproduced hereinbelow;

I. A suit cannot be dismissed as barred by Order 2 Rule 2 of the Code in the absence of a plea by the defendant to that effect and in the absence of an issue thereon. 

8. We may extract Order 2 Rules 1 and 2 of the Code for ready reference: 

"1. Frame of suit: Every suit shall as far as practicable be framed so as to afford ground for final decision upon the subjects in dispute and to prevent further litigation concerning them. 2. Suit to include the whole claim: 

(1) Every suit shall include the whole of the claim which the plaintiff is entitled to make in respect of the cause of action; but a plaintiff may relinquish any portion of his claim in order to bring the suit within the jurisdiction of any Court. 

(2) Relinquishment of part of claim: Where a plaintiff omits to sue in respect of, or intentionally relinquishes, any portion of his claim, he shall not afterwards sue in respect of the portion so omitted or relinquished. 

(3) Omission to sue for one of several reliefs: A person entitled to more than one relief in respect of the same cause of action may sue for all or any of such reliefs; but if he omits, except with the leave of the court, to sue for all such reliefs, he shall not afterwards sue for any relief so omitted." 

The object of Order 2 Rule 2 of the Code is two-fold. First is to ensure that no defendant is sued and vexed twice in regard to the same cause of action. Second is to prevent a plaintiff from splitting of claims and remedies based on the same cause of action. The effect of Order 2 Rule 2 of the Code is to bar a plaintiff who had earlier claimed certain remedies in regard to a cause of action, from filing a second suit in regard to other reliefs based on the same cause of action. It does not however bar a second suit based on a different and distinct cause of action. 

9. This Court in Gurbux Singh v. Bhoora Lal [AIR 1964 SC 1810] held : 

"In order that a plea of a bar under O. 2, R. 2(3), Civil Procedure Code should succeed the defendant who raises the plea must make out (1) that the second suit was in respect of the same cause of action as that on which the previous suit was based; (2) that in respect of that cause of action the plaintiff was entitled to more than one relief; (3) that being thus entitled to more than one relief the plaintiff without leave obtained from the Court omitted to sue for the relief for which the second suit had been filed. From this analysis it would be seen that the defendant would have to establish primarily and to start with, the precise cause of action upon which the previous suit was filed for unless there is identity between the cause of action on which the earlier suit was filed and that on which the claim in the latter suit is based there would be no scope for the application of the bar." 

Unless the defendant pleads the bar under Order 2 Rule 2 of the Code and an issue is framed focusing the parties on that bar to the suit, obviously the court can not examine or reject a suit on that ground. The pleadings in the earlier suit should be exhibited or marked by consent or at least admitted by both parties. The plaintiff should have an opportunity to explain or demonstrate that the second suit was based on a different cause of action. In this case, the respondent did not contend that the suit was barred by Order 2 Rule 2 of the Code. No issue was framed as to whether the suit was barred by Order 2 Rule 2 of the Code. But the High Court (both the trial bench and appellate bench) have erroneously assumed that a plea of res judicata would include a plea of bar under Order 2 Rule 2 of the Code. Res judicata relates to the plaintiff's duty to put forth all the grounds of attack in support of his claim, whereas Order 2 Rule 2 of the Code requires the plaintiff to claim all reliefs flowing from the same cause of action in a single suit. The two pleas are different and one will not include the other. The dismissal of the suit by the High Court under Order 2 Rule 2 of the Code, in the absence of any plea by the defendant and in the absence of an issue in that behalf, is unsustainable.

xxx

14. Res judicata means `a thing adjudicated' that is an issue that is finally settled by judicial decision. The Code deals with res judicata in section 11, relevant portion of which is extracted below (excluding Explanations I to VIII): 

"11. Res judicata.--No Court shall try any suit or issue in which the matter directly and substantially in issue has been directly and substantially in issue in a former suit between the same parties, or between parties under whom they or any of them claim, litigating under the same title, in a Court competent to try such subsequent suit or the suit in which such issue has been subsequently raised, and has been heard and finally decided by such Court" 

Section 11 of the Code, on an analysis requires the following essential requirements to be fulfilled, to apply the bar of res judicata to any suit or issue: 

(i) The matter must be directly and substantially in issue in the former suit and in the later suit. 

(ii) The prior suit should be between the same parties or persons claiming under them. 

(iii) Parties should have litigated under the same title in the earlier suit. 

(iv) The matter in issue in the subsequent suit must have been heard and finally decided in the first suit. 

(v) The court trying the former suit must have been competent to try particular issue in question. To define and clarify the principle contained in Section 11 of the Code, eight Explanations have been provided. Explanation I states that the expression `former suit' refers to a suit which had been decided prior to the suit in question whether or not it was instituted prior thereto. Explanation II states that the competence of a court shall be determined irrespective of whether any provisions as to a right of appeal from the decision of such court. 

Explanation III states that the matter directly and substantially in issue in the former suit, must have been alleged by one party or either denied or admitted expressly or impliedly by the other party. Explanation IV provides that any matter which might and ought to have been made a ground of defence or attack in such former suit shall be deemed to have been a matter directly and substantially in issue in such suit. The principle of constructive res judicata emerges from Explanation IV when read with Explanation III both of which explain the concept of "matter directly and substantially in issue". 

15. Explanation III clarifies that a matter is directly and substantially in issue, when it is alleged by one party and denied or admitted (expressly or impliedly) by the other. Explanation IV provides that where any matter which might and ought to have been made a ground of defence or attack in the former suit, even if was not actually set up as a ground of attack or defence, shall be deemed and regarded as having been constructively in issue directly and substantially in the earlier suit. Therefore, even though a particular ground of defence or attack was not actually taken in the earlier suit, if it was capable of being taken in the earlier suit, it became a bar in regard to the said issue being taken in the second suit in view of the principle of constructive res judicata. Constructive res judicata deals with grounds of attack and defence which ought to have been raised, but not raised, whereas Order 2 Rule 2 of the Code relates to reliefs which ought to have been claimed on the same cause of action but not claimed. The principle underlying Explanation IV to Section 11 becomes clear from Greenhalgh v. Mallard [1947 (2) All ER 257] thus: 

"....it would be accurate to say that res judicata for this purpose is not confined to the issues which the court is actually asked to decide, but that it covers issues or facts which are so clearly part of the subject matter of the litigation and so clearly could have been raised that it would be an abuse of the process of the court to allow a new proceeding to be started in respect of them. (emphasis supplied) In Direct Recruit Class II Engineering Officers' Association v. State of Maharashtra [1990 (2) SCC 715], a Constitution Bench of this Court reiterated the principle of constructive res judicata after referring to Forward Construction Co. v. Prabhat Mandal [1986 (1) SCC 100) thus: "an adjudication is conclusive and final not only as to the actual matter determined but as to every other matter which the parties might and ought to have litigated and have had decided as incidental to or essentially connected with subject matter of the litigation and every matter coming into the legitimate purview of the original action both in respect of the matters of claim and defence." 

In this case the High Court has not stated what was the ground of attack that plaintiff-appellant ought to have raised in the first suit but had failed to raise, which she raised in the second suit, to attract the principle of constructive res judicata. The second suit is not barred by constructive res judicata.

IV. A suit cannot be dismissed without trial merely because the court feels dissatisfied with the conduct of the plaintiff. 

16. Code of Civil Procedure is nothing but an exhaustive compilation- cum-enumeration of the principles of natural justice with reference to a proceeding in a court of law. The entire object of the Code is to ensure that an adjudication is conducted by a court of law with appropriate opportunities at appropriate stages. A civil proceeding governed by the Code will have to be proceeded with and decided in accordance with law and the provisions of the Code, and not on the whims of the court. There are no short-cuts in the trial of suits, unless they are provided by law. A civil suit has to be decided after framing issues and trial permitting the parties to lead evidence on the issues, except in cases where the Code or any other law makes an exception or provides any exemption. 

17. The Code enumerates the circumstances in which a civil suit can be dismissed without trial. We may refer to them (not exhaustive): 

(a) Dismissal as a consequence of rejection of plaint under Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code in the following grounds : 

(i) where it does not disclose a cause of action; 

(ii) where the relief in the plaint is undervalued and plaintiff fails to correct the valuation within the time fixed; 

(iii) where the court fee paid is insufficient and plaintiff fails to make good the deficit within the time fixed by court: 

(iv) where the suit appears from the statement in the plaint to be barred by law; 

(v) where it is not filed in duplicate and where the plaintiff fails to comply with the provisions of Order 7 Rule 9 of the Code. 

(b) Dismissal under Order 9 Rule 2 or Rule 3 or Rule 5 or Rule 8 for non- service of summary or non-appearance or failure to apply for fresh summons. 

(c) Dismissal under Order 11 Rule 21 for non-compliance with an order to answer interrogatories, or for discovery or inspection of documents. 

(d) Dismissal under Order 14 Rule 2(2) where issues both of law and fact arise in the same suit and the court is of opinion that the case or any part thereof may be disposed of on an issue of law only and it tries such issue relating to jurisdiction of the court or a bar to a suit created by any law for the time being in force first and dismisses the suit if the decision on such preliminary issue warrants the same. 

(e) Dismissal under Order 15 Rule 1 of the Code when at the first hearing of the suit it appears that the parties are not at issue on any question of law or fact. 

(f) Dismissal under Order 15 Rule 4 of the Code for failure to produce evidence. 

(g) Dismissal under Order 23 Rules 1 and 3 of the Code when a suit is withdrawn or settled out of court. 

18. The following provisions provide for expeditious disposal in a summary manner : 

(i) Order V Rule 5 of the Code requires the court to determine, at the time of issuing the summons, whether it shall be for the settlement of issues only, or for the final disposal of the suit (and the summons shall have to contain a direction accordingly). In suits to be heard by a court of small causes, the summons shall be for the final disposal of the suit. 

(ii) Order 15 Rule 3 of the Code provides where the parties are at issue on some question of law or of fact, and issues have been framed by the court as hereinbefore provided, if the court is satisfied that no further argument or evidence than the parties can at once adduce is required upon such of the issues as may be sufficient for the decision of the suit, and that no injustice will result from proceeding with the suit forthwith, the court may proceed to determine such issues, and, if the finding thereon is sufficient for the decision, may pronounce judgment accordingly, whether the summons has been issued for the settlement of issues only or for the final disposal of the suit. (But where the summons has been issued for the settlement of issues only, such a summary course could be adopted only where the parties or their pleaders are present and none of them objects to such a course). 

(iii) Order 37 Rule 1 read with Rules 2& 3 of the relating to summary suits.

19. But where the summons have been issued for settlement of issues, and a suit is listed for consideration of a preliminary issue, the court cannot make a roving enquiry into the alleged conduct of the plaintiff, tenability of the claim, the strength and validity and contents of documents, without a trial and on that basis dismiss a suit. A suit cannot be shortcircuited by deciding issues of fact merely on pleadings and documents produced without a trial. In this case, the learned Single Judge has adjudicated and decided questions of fact and rendered a judgment, without evidence tested by cross- examination.