Seat / Venue of Arbitration not a determinative factor in attracting jurisdiction of a Writ Court: Delhi High Court

The Delhi High Court in Durgapur Freight Terminal P. Ltd. v. Union of India has recently held that an arbitration clause providing for seat / venue would not be a determinate factor for conferring jurisdiction on a writ court, if the court otherwise does not have jurisdiction in the traditional sense. The bench analysed the provisions of Article 226 of the Constitution of India, 1950 and also the concept of forum convenience, to hold that the courts at Delhi would not have jurisdiction as no part of cause of action has arisen in Delhi. The relevant observations of the bench, as as under:

11. In the writ petition, the petitioners have claimed jurisdiction of this Court in the following terms:-

"59. The present petition is maintainable before this Hon'ble Court inasmuch as the concerned respondents viz. respondent nos. 1 to 4 who took the decisions impugned are located within the territorial jurisdiction of this Hon'ble Court. Moreover the essential part of cause of action viz. decisions leading to the acts and/or omission including non- consideration of the petitioner's representation dated December 28, 2022 have taken place within the territorial jurisdiction of this Hon'ble Court."

12. Before proceeding further, it is deemed apposite to advert to clauses (1) and (2) of Article 226 of the Constitution of India, which read as under:-

"226. Power of High Courts to issue certain writs.--(1) Notwithstanding anything in Article 32, every High Court shall have power, throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction, to issue to any person or authority, including in appropriate cases, any Government, within those territories directions, orders or writs, including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari, or any of them, for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III and for any other purpose. 

(2) The power conferred by clause (1) to issue directions, orders or writs to any Government, authority or person may also be exercised by any High Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to the territories within which the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises for the exercise of such power, notwithstanding that the seat of such Government or authority or the residence of such person is not within those territories."

13. A reading of Clauses (1) and (2) of Article 226 of the Constitution of India would show that a High Court has territorial jurisdiction to issue writs under two situations: one, where the person/authority to whom the writ is to be issued is situated within the territory over which the High Court exercises jurisdiction, and two, where the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises for issuance of a writ within such territory. For the sake of convenience, the first may be referred to as 'jurisdiction by virtue of situs' and the other as 'jurisdiction by virtue of cause of action'.

14. In the instant case, the petitioners have claimed jurisdiction of this Court under both clauses of Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The tests to determine whether this Court has jurisdiction under these Clauses are well-defined. While before exercising jurisdiction by virtue of situs, this Court is required to arrive at a positive finding that the authority/person to whom the writ has to be issued lies within the territory over which the Court exercises jurisdiction; in order to exercise jurisdiction by virtue of cause of action, the Court shall be of the opinion that cause of action, wholly or in part, has arisen within the jurisdiction over which it exercises jurisdiction.

15. The Supreme Court in Utpal Kumar Basu and Others (Supra) has observed that the question as to whether the High Court has territorial jurisdiction to entertain a writ petition has to be decided on the basis of facts pleaded in the petition, the truth or otherwise thereof being immaterial. Relevant excerpt from the decision is extracted hereunder:-

"6. ...Therefore, in determining the objection of lack of territorial jurisdiction the court must take all the facts pleaded in support of the cause of action into consideration albeit without embarking upon an enquiry as to the correctness or otherwise of the said facts. In other words the question whether a High Court has territorial jurisdiction to entertain a writ petition must be answered on the basis of the averments made in the petition, the truth or otherwise whereof being immaterial. To put it differently, the question of territorial jurisdiction must be decided on the facts pleaded in the petition. Therefore, the question whether in the instant case the Calcutta High Court had jurisdiction to entertain and decide the writ petition in question even on the facts alleged must depend upon whether the averments made in paragraphs 5, 7, 18, 22, 26 and 43 are sufficient in law to establish that a part of the cause of action had arisen within the jurisdiction of the Calcutta High Court."

16. The scope of Article 226(2) of the Constitution of India came to be analysed in depth in Kusum Ingots & Alloys Ltd. v. Union of India and Another reported as (2004) 6 SCC 254, where the Supreme Court observed thus:-

"9. Although in view of Section 141 of the Code of Civil Procedure the provisions thereof would not apply to writ proceedings, the phraseology used in Section 20(c) of the Code of Civil Procedure and clause (2) of Article 226, being in pari materia, the decisions of this Court rendered on interpretation of Section 20(c) CPC shall apply to the writ proceedings also. Before proceeding to discuss the matter further it may be pointed out that the entire bundle of facts pleaded need not constitute a cause of action as what is necessary to be proved before the petitioner can obtain a decree is the material facts. The expression material facts is also known as integral facts.

Jurisdiction Clause vis-a-vis Venue and Seat of Arbitration: Delhi High Court answers

Justice Yashwant Varma

The Delhi High Court in Inland Waterways Authority of India v. Reach Dredging Ltd. and Gayatri Projects P. Ltd. has examined the interplay between the jurisdiction clause in the arbitration agreement vis a vis the venue / seat prescribed under the agreement. The High Court held as under:

3. For the purposes of evaluating the correctness of the preliminary objection which stands raised, it would be apposite to extract the two competing clauses in the backdrop of which the question itself stands raised. Under the General Conditions of Contract2, Clause 22 while dealing with the laws governing the contract made the following provisions: -

―CLAUSE - 22: LAWS GOVERNING THE CONTRACT The Courts at Noida only shall have the jurisdiction for filing the award of the arbitration and for any other judicial proceedings. GCC 

4. The arbitration agreement stood comprised in Clause 47 titled ―Settlement of Disputes and Arbitration‖. Clause 47.11 which alone would have some bearing is extracted hereinbelow: -

―47.11 The parties to the agreement hereby undertake to have recourse only to arbitration proceedings under for Arbitration Act 1996 and the venue of the arbitration proceeding shall be Noida/ New Delhi and the parties will not have recourse to Civil Court to settle any of their disputes arising out of this agreement except through arbitration.‖

5. On facts it was admitted that the hearings in connection with the arbitral proceedings took place in Delhi. The award dated 28 July 2022 is stated to have been drawn and published at Noida, District Gautambudh Nagar falling in the State of Uttar Pradesh. It is also stated to have been duly stamped in that State.

6. Learned counsel appearing for the respondent contended that Clause 47.11 of the GCC merely designates the venue of arbitration to be either Noida or New Delhi. However, according to learned counsel, the venue restriction clause as comprised in Clause 22 would clearly establish that the seat of arbitration must be understood to be Noida only. Apart from the above, learned counsel would urge that since the award itself had been declared, published and dated at Noida, it is that place which must be recognised as being the seat of arbitration. Learned counsel also sought to draw sustenance from the fact that the respondent had invited tenders which were to be submitted at Noida. In view of the aforesaid and in light of Clause 22, it was urged that the present petitions are liable to be dismissed with the Court leaving it open to the petitioner to approach the competent court in District Gautambudh Nagar.

7. Countering the aforesaid submissions, learned counsel for the petitioner contended that Clause 47.11 is irrefutable evidence of both Noida or New Delhi constituting the seat where proceedings pertaining to the award could be initiated. It was further contended that the fact that all the proceedings of the Arbitral Tribunal were held at Delhi would further buttress the submission that it was that location which was ultimately chosen to be the seat of arbitration.

8. While learned counsel for the respondent contended that the issue that arises stands conclusively settled in light of the judgment rendered by the Supreme Court in BGS SGS SOMA JV v. NHPC3, learned counsel for the petitioner relied upon the judgment rendered by the Supreme Court in Inox Renewables Ltd. vs. Jayesh Electricals Ltd.4 to contend that the Section 34 petitions had been correctly filed and presented before this Court.

9. The answer to the question which stands posited would revolve upon the construction liable to be placed upon Clause 22 read with Clause 47.11. The Court notes that Clause 47.11 specifies Noida/New Delhi to be the venue of the arbitration proceedings. Clause 22, on the other hand, in categorical terms prescribes that the courts at Noida alone would be liable to be recognised for the purposes of filing of the award and for any other judicial proceedings. It is the perceived conflict between the aforenoted two clauses that has given rise to the controversy which stands raised.

10. On a plain reading of Clause 47.11, the Court notes that while (2020) 4 SCC 234 2021 SCC OnLine SC 448  stipulating Noida/New Delhi as the place for arbitration proceedings, parties appear to have essentially agreed to either of those two locations as being the acceptable venues for the holding of arbitral proceedings. Clause 47.11 thus appears to have granted the option to parties to convene arbitration proceedings either at Noida or New Delhi. Viewed in that light it would be manifest that Noida and New Delhi could have been interchangeably utilised as venues for the arbitration proceedings.

Grant of Pre-Publication Injunction : Principles Discussed

Justice Varma

Justice Yashwant Varma recently in Sushil Ansal v. Endemol India P. Ltd. & Ors. [2023/DHC/000205] had occasion to examine the law in relation to grant of pre-publication injunction in relation to a web series concerning the Uphaar tragedy. While considering various Indian and international precedents on the subject, Justice Varma rejected the plea of Sushil Ansal to injunct the publication of the web series. The operative part of the decision reads as under:

18. At the outset, it would be apposite to recall the fundamental precepts which govern the grant of ad interim injunctive relief. Apart from the often repeated trinity test of prima facie case, balance of convenience and irreparable injury, courts are also bound to weigh in consideration whether the issuance of the injunction would cause greater harm and perpetuate injustice, the time when the plaintiff first derived knowledge of the offending material, whether the plaintiff, if not having acquiesced, remained inert or failed to take proactive action for protection of its rights and whether it has approached the Court in good faith. These aspects assume greater significance when what is sought is a pre-publication or broadcast injunction.

19. A pre-publication or broadcast injunction would essentially be sought at a stage when the offending material is either unavailable to be comprehensively reviewed and assessed or where it is alleged that there is a grave, imminent and immediate possibility of violation of rights. In such a situation the following factors would clearly be entitled to be accorded primacy- the promptitude with which the plaintiff approaches the Court, its obligation to establish, at least prima facie, that the impending publication/broadcast is completely divorced from the truth, replete with falsehood, or evidences an imminent vilification of the individual.

20. If the Court finds that the plaintiff has either failed to initiate action with promptitude or approached the court at the first available opportunity, that would be a circumstance which would weigh heavily against the grant of an ad interim injunction. Further, if the court were to find that the material which is likely to be broadcast or published already exists in the public domain and has existed as such for a considerable period of time without an objection having been raised, that too would detract from the right of the plaintiff to seek ad interim injunctive relief.

21. On a more fundamental plane, the Court would also take into consideration the imperatives of striking a balance between the aspects of freedom of speech and expression, the dissemination of information amongst the public at large on the one hand and the injury likely to be caused to the individual. It is in the above context that courts have formulated the ―high pedestal‖ test when it comes to the grant of a pre-publication or broadcast injunction. Courts have deliberately formulated the high threshold test because the injunction would essentially be sought at a stage when the offending material is either not available to be evaluated and examined or where it is impracticable to arrive at even a prima facie conclusion whether the content is defamatory or libelous. Courts at that stage are essentially left to grapple at straws, called to base their decisions on unsubstantiated and unproven allegations and essentially asked to issue a restraint on the assumption that what would be published or broadcast would be defamatory, slanderous or amounting to libel. Such a tenuous approach cannot possibly be countenanced when a court of law is called upon to grant injunctive or equitable relief.

Non Est Filing and Condonation of Delay in challenge to Arbitral Awards : Delhi High Court answers

The Division Bench of the Delhi High Court in Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Ltd. v. Joint Venture of M/s Sai Rama Engineering Enterprises (SREE) & Megha Engineering & Infrastructure Ltd. (MEIL) has answered as to what would constitute a non est filing vis-a-vis a petition under S. 34 of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996 ("Act"). 

The Division Bench was called upon to examine the validity of a judgment rendered by a Single Judge, where the Petition filed under S. 34 of the Act was termed as a non est filing and the plea for condonation of delay in filing the Petition was rejected. While disagreeing with the view of the Single Judge, the Division Bench has held as under:

The Impugned Judgement

13. The learned Single Judge whilst analysing the matter, observed that the following three crucial issues arose for consideration.

"a) Whether the petition is filed within the statutory period of 3 months prescribed under section 34 (3) of the Act.

b) In the alternate; whether the petition was filed within the extended period of 30 days under the Proviso.

c) Whether the filing in the first or the second instance is a 'non est' filing."

14. The learned Single Judge relied on the decision in Union of India v Popular Construction Co.: 2001 (8) SCC 470, wherein the Supreme Court of India held that the legislative intent in providing a strict and non-flexible limitation period should not be defeated by condoning the delay, without "sufficient cause". The court noted that in Simplex Infrastructure Limited v. Union of India: 2019 (2) SCC 455, which cites Union of India v. Popular Construction Co. (supra), the Supreme Court had emphasized the importance of limitation in filing an application under Section 34 of the A&C Act.

15. The learned Single Judge found that the period of delay in filing the application to set aside the impugned award under Section 34 of the A&C Act was beyond the period of thirty days that could be condoned in terms of the proviso to Section 34(3) of the A&C Act. The Court, thus, held that it had no jurisdiction to condone the delay. The said conclusion of the learned Single Judge is premised on the finding that the application filed by the appellant prior to 25.02.2019, was not proper and did not qualify to be considered as an application under Section 34 of the A&C Act. According to the learned Single Judge, the filings done on 20.02.2019 or on 22.02.2019 could not be considered as valid and were required to be treated as non est. Reasons and Conclusion

16. The only questions that fall for consideration of this Court are whether the filings done by the appellant prior to 25.02.2019 are required to be considered as non est; and if not, whether the delay in filing the petition ought to be condoned.

17. At the outset, it is relevant to state that there is no cavil with the proposition that this Court does not have the jurisdiction to condone the delay in filing of the application to set aside an arbitral award beyond the period of thirty days, as specified under the proviso to Section 34(3) of the A&C Act. As noted above, the impugned judgement is premised on the basis that the appellant had failed to file any such application within the period of three months and a further thirty days, from the receipt of the impugned award.

18. The appellant states that it received the impugned award on 23.10.2018. Therefore, the period of three months available to the appellant to assail the impugned award expired on 23.01.2019. The further period of thirty days - being the period that could be condoned by the Court - expired on 22.02.2019. It was the appellant's case that it had filed the petition on 23.01.2019, within the specified period of limitation.

19. As a matter of fact, the appellant had uploaded certain documents on 23.01.2019 at 03:45 p.m. The Registry of this Court had acknowledged the said filing by an e-mail sent at 03:49 p.m. on 23.01.2019. The appellant claims that it was subsequently discovered that an incorrect file had been electronically uploaded on 23.01.2019. The file that was uploaded related to a case captioned "Reliance Infrastructure v. Aravali Power Co. Pvt. Ltd.". Thus, it is not in dispute that the said filing cannot be considered as filing of an application under Section 34 of the A&C Act, assailing the impugned award. Admittedly, no such application was filed on 23.01.2019.

20. The appellant, thereafter, uploaded another file at 3.10. p.m on 04.02.2019. The record indicates that this filing was also not an application under Section 34 of the A&C Act, seeking to set aside the impugned award. Admittedly, the application filed on 04.02.2019 was one under Section 14 of the A&C Act and related to another dispute, which had no bearing on the appellant's challenge to the impugned award. The said application under Section 14 of the A&C Act was defective. The defects were cured and that application under Section 14 of the A&C Act was registered as OMP(T)(COMM) 15/2019. The said application was, thereafter, disposed of by an order dated 14.02.2019. Thus, undisputedly, the appellant had not filed any application under Section 34 of the A&C Act to set aside the impugned award on 04.02.2019.

21. The appellant filed an application assailing the impugned award for the first time on 20.02.2019 at 11:39 a.m. The application and other documents uploaded on the said date, comprised of 6,313 pages. The said filing was acknowledged by the Registry of this Court by an e-mail sent at 11.40 a.m. on 20.02.2019.

22. The said application was defective and this was communicated by the Registry of this Court to the appellant on 21.02.2019. The soft copy of the application, as filed by the appellant on 20.02.2019, has been retrieved and placed on record by the Registry of this Court. The appellant had uploaded two files on 20.02.2019. The first comprised of an Index running into ten pages. The said Index was dated 19.02.2019 and was signed by the advocate of the appellant. The second file uploaded was a comprehensive file, which included an Index, an application under Section 34 of the A&C Act, statement of truth, affidavits supporting the application, other applications, impugned award, and documents. The file uploaded comprised of 6,313 pages. The Index was duly singed on behalf of the appellant by one Sudhir Kumar, DGM (Mech.) Onshore Engineering, ONGC, as well as the appellant's advocate. Both, the authorised representative of the appellant as well as the appellant's advocate had also signed other documents such as the urgent application and the memo of parties. The application under Section 34 of the A&C Act was signed on each page by the authorised representative of the appellant. The said petition clearly set out the grounds on which the impugned award is assailed. It is material to note that the said petition was also accompanied by an affidavit, which was signed by the deponent and also duly verified. However, the said affidavit was not attested. The authorised representative had also filed a duly signed statement of truth by way of an affidavit. However, the said affidavit was not attested. It was also accompanied by a vakalatnama, which was signed by the authorised representative of the appellant.

23. The aforesaid filing was found to be defective, inter alia, because the affidavits and the statement of truth by way of an affidavit were not attested and the vakalatnama was not stamped. In addition to the aforesaid defects, there were other minor defects, which were duly notified to the appellant.

24. The appellant re-filed the application on 22.02.2019. However, the filing done on that date is of no consequence. It comprised of only ten pages of Index.

25. The appellant again re-filed the application on 23.02.2019. Some of the defects were cured. The affidavits were attested and the date of 20.02.2019 was stamped on the affidavits. However, the body of the affidavits continued to reflect that they were affirmed on 19.02.2019. The vakalatnama was also stamped. However, this filing was also marked as defective as there were various other defects. The application was returned for re-filing.

26. The appellant cured all defects and re-filed the petition on 25.02.2019.

27. The learned Single Judge found that the period of delay in filing the application under Section 34 of the A&C Act was beyond the period of thirty days that could be condoned in terms of the proviso to Section 34(3) of the A&C Act. The Court, thus, held that it had no jurisdiction to condone the delay. The conclusion of the learned Single Judge is premised on the finding that prior to 25.02.2019, the appellant had not filed a proper application, which could qualify to be considered as an application under Section 34 of the A&C Act. The Court held that the filings done on 20.02.2019 or on 22.02.2019 were required to be treated as non est. 

28. At this stage, it is relevant to refer to the reasons that persuaded the learned Single Judge to hold that the applications filed on 20.02.2019 and on 23.02.2019, were non est. Paragraph 43, 44, 45 and 46 of the impugned judgement reads as under:-

"43. The common thread that runs in the aforesaid judgments is that 'non-est' filing cannot stop limitation and cannot be a ground to condone delay. Thus, for a petition, filed, under Section 34 of the Act to be termed as a 'properly' filed petition must fulfill certain basic parameters such as:

a) Each page of the Petition as well as the last page should be signed by the party and the Advocate;

b) Vakalatnama should be signed by the party and the Advocate and the signatures of the party must be identified by the Advocate;

c) Statement of Truth/Affidavit should be signed by the party and attested by the Oath Commissioner;

44. This in my view is the minimum threshold that should be crossed before the petition is filed and can be treated as a petition in the eyes of law. The rationale behind insisting on these fundamental compliances to be observed while filing a petition, is not far to seek. Vakalatnama is an authority which authorizes an Advocate to act on behalf of a party as a power of attorney and to carry out certain acts on his behalf.

Therefore, the vakalatnama is the first step and a precursor to the preparation of a petition. The Statement of Truth accompanying a petition or an application is sworn by the deponent who states on oath that the contents of the accompanying petition have been drafted under his instructions and are true and correct to his knowledge or belief. Surely, this affidavit must be signed after the petition is made and the attestation must also be done on the affidavit when the petition is filed. This is also a requirement under the Commercial Courts Act, 2015. The petition needs to be signed by the Advocate as well as the party before the same is filed as this would indicate that both have read the petition and there is authenticity attached to the pages filed in the Registry. If these basic documents are not annexed or the signatures as required are absent, one can only term the documents which are filed as a 'bunch of papers' and not a petition.

45. In several cases, of course, the defects may only be perfunctory and may not affect the filing of the petition, e.g. the documents may be illegible or the margins may not be as per the required standards etc. These defects are certainly curable and if the petition is filed with such like defects, it cannot be termed as a non-est petition.

46. Examined in the light of the above-mentioned judgments and the provisions of Section 34(3) of the Act, the filing of the petition on 20.02.2019 was a non-est filing and cannot stop limitation as clearly even the affidavits were not signed and not attested besides a few other objections."

29. We may, at this stage, point out a factual error, although it is not of much relevance. The applications under Section 34 of the A&C Act filed on 20.02.2019 and 23.02.2019 were accompanied by signed affidavits. However, the affidavits supporting the application filed on 20.02.2019 were not attested. Then the finding that the affidavits accompanying the application filed on 20.02.2019 was not signed is erroneous.

30. We concur with the learned Single Judge that certain defects are curable and do not render the application as non est. However, the nature of certain defects is such that it would not be apposite to consider the defective application as an application under Section 34 of the A&C Act, to set aside an arbitral award. Undisputedly, every improper filling is not non est.

31. We are unable to concur with the view that the minimum threshold requirement for an application to be considered as an application under Section 34 of the A&C Act is that, each page of the application should be signed by the party, as well as the advocate; the vakalatnama should be signed by the party and the advocate; and it must be accompanied by a statement of truth. And, in the absence of any of these requirements, the filing must be considered as non est. It is essential to understand that for an application to be considered as non est, the Court must come to the conclusion that it cannot be considered as an application for setting aside the arbitral award.

32. It is material to note that Section 34 of the A&C Act does not specify any particular procedure for filing an application to set aside the arbitral award. However, it does set out the grounds on which such an application can be made. Thus, the first and foremost requirement for an application under Section 34 of the A&C Act is that it should set out the grounds on which the applicant seeks setting aside of the arbitral award. It is also necessary that the application be accompanied by a copy of the award as without a copy of the award, which is challenged, it would be impossible to appreciate the grounds to set aside the award. In addition to the above, the application must state the name of the parties and the bare facts in the context of which the applicants seek setting aside of the arbitral award.

33. It is also necessary that the application be signed by the party or its authorised representative. The affixing of signatures signify that the applicant is making the application. In the absence of such signatures, it would be difficult to accept that the application is moved by the applicant.

34. In addition to the above, other material requirements are such as, the application is to be supported by an affidavit and a statement of truth by virtue of Order XI, Section 1 of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015. It is also necessary that the filing be accompanied by a duly executed vakalatnama. This would be necessary for an advocate to move the application before the court. Although these requirements are material and necessary, we are unable to accept that in absence of these requirements, the application is required to be treated as non est. The application to set aside an award does not cease to be an application merely because the applicant has not complied with certain procedural requirements.

35. It is well settled that filing an affidavit in support of an application is a procedural requirement. The statement of truth by way of an affidavit is also a procedural matter. As stated above, it would be necessary to comply with these procedural requirements. Failure to do so would render an application under Section 34 of the A&C Act to be defective but it would not render it non est. 

36. In Vidyawati Gupta & Ors. v. Bhakti Hari Nayak & Ors.: (2006) 2 SCC 777, the Supreme Court set aside the order of the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court treating the suit instituted as non est for want of compliance with the requirements of Order 6 Rule 15(4) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, which requires a person verifying the pleadings to furnish an affidavit in support of the pleadings. The Supreme Court after noting various decisions held as under :-

"49. In this regard we are inclined to agree with the consistent view of the three Chartered High Courts in the different decisions cited by Mr Mitra that the requirements of Order 6 and Order 7 of the Code, being procedural in nature, any omission in respect thereof will not render the plaint invalid and that such defect or omission will not only be curable but will also date back to the presentation of the plaint. We are also of the view that the reference to the provisions of the Code in Rule 1 of Chapter 7 of the Original Side Rules cannot be interpreted to limit the scope of such reference to only the provisions of the Code as were existing on the date of such incorporation. It was clearly the intention of the High Court when it framed the Original Side Rules that the plaint should be in conformity with the provisions of Order 6 and Order 7 of the Code. By necessary implication reference will also have to be made to Section 26 and Order 4 of the Code which, along with Order 6 and Order 7, concerns the institution of suits. We are ad idem with Mr Pradip Ghosh (sic) on this score. The provisions of sub-rule (3) of Rule 1 Order 4 of the Code, upon which the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court had placed strong reliance, will also have to be read and understood in that context. The expression "duly"

used in sub-rule (3) of Rule 1 Order 4 of the Code implies that the plaint must be filed in accordance with law. In our view, as has been repeatedly expressed by this Court in various decisions, rules of procedure are made to further the cause of justice and not to prove a hindrance thereto. Both in Khayumsab [(2006) 1 SCC 46 : JT (2005) 10 SC 1] and Kailash [(2005) 4 SCC 480] although dealing with the amended provisions of Order 8 Rule 1 of the Code, this Court gave expression to the salubrious principle that procedural enactments ought not to be construed in a manner which would prevent the Court from meeting the ends of justice in different situations.

50. The intention of the legislature in bringing about the various amendments in the Code with effect from 1- 7-2002 were aimed at eliminating the procedural delays in the disposal of civil matters. The amendments effected to Section 26, Order 4 and Order 6 Rule 15, are also geared to achieve such object, but being procedural in nature, they are directory in nature and non-compliance therewith would not automatically render the plaint non est, as has been held by the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court.

51. In our view, such a stand would be too pedantic and would be contrary to the accepted principles involving interpretation of statutes. Except for the objection taken that the plaint had not been accompanied by an affidavit in support of the pleadings, it is nobody's case that the plaint had not been otherwise verified in keeping with the unamended provisions of the Code and Rule 1 of Chapter 7 of the Original Side Rules. In fact, as has been submitted at the Bar, the plaint was accepted, after due scrutiny and duly registered and only during the hearing of the appeal was such an objection raised.

54. We have, therefore, no hesitation in holding that the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court took a view which is neither supported by the provisions of the Original Side Rules or the Code nor by the various decisions of this Court on the subject. The views expressed by the Calcutta High Court, being contrary to the established legal position, must give way and are hereby set aside."

37. It is, thus, necessary to bear in mind the distinction between the procedural requirements that can be cured and those defects that are so fundamental that the application cannot be considered as an application under Section 34 of the A&C Act, at all.

38. In the facts of the present case, the application filed on 23.01.2019 was not an application assailing the impugned award. That filing was clearly non est. Similarly, as the application filed on 04.02.2019 also related to another matter, which could not be considered as an application assailing the impugned award. The filing on 22.02.2019 was only 10 pages of an Index. This too could not be construed as an application; however, the application filed on 20.02.2019 and 23.02.2019 cannot be construed to be non est.

39. The defects as noted by the Registry in the filing log relating to the application filed on 20.02.2019 reads as under: -

"TOTAL 6313 PAGES FILED. CAVEAT REPORT BE OBTAINED. COURT FEE BE PAID. AFFIDAVITS NOT ATTESTED NOT SIGNED. PLEASE CORRECT THE BOOKMARKING. VOLUMNS OF DOUCMENTS BE MADE. IN ADDITION TO THE E-FILING, IT IS MANDANTORY TO FILE HARD COPIES OF THE FRESH MATTERS FILED UNDER SECTION 9, 11 AND 34 OF THE ARB. ACT. 1996 WITH EFFECT FROM 22.10.2018. ORIENTATION OF DOCUMENTS BE CORRECT. PLEASE CORRECT THE BOOKMAKRING. ALL INDEXES BE PAGINATED."

40. It is relevant to note that the affidavits accompanying the application filed on 20.02.2019 were signed but not attested and to that extent, the defects as pointed out are not accurate. It is clear from the above, that none of the defects are fundamental as to render the application as non est in the eyes of law. All the defects, as pointed out, are curable defects. It is settled law that any defect in an affidavit supporting pleadings can be cured. It is seen from the record that the filing was also accompanied by an executed vakalatnama, however, the same was not stamped. It is also settled law that filing of a court fee is necessary, however, the defect in not filing the court fee along with the application can be cured. In view of above, we are unable to accept that the application, as filed on 20.02.2019 or thereafter on 23.02.2019, was non est.

41. We may also add that in given cases there may be a multitude of defects. Each of the defects considered separately may be insufficient to render the filing as non est. However, if these defects are considered cumulatively, it may lead to the conclusion that the filing is non est. In order to consider the question whether a filing is non est, the court must address the question whether the application, as filed, is intelligible, its filing has been authorised; it is accompanied by an award; and the contents set out the material particulars including the names of the parties and the grounds for impugning the award.

42. In the given facts, the first question - whether the application filed on 20.02.2019 and 23.02.2019 can be considered as non est - is answered in the negative.