No Piecemeal Adjudication in Section 11 Petitions : Supreme Court

Justice Lodha
Supreme Court of India

The Supreme Court in Hindustan Copper Ltd. Vs. Monarch Gold Mining Co. Ltd. was called upon to adjudicate on the procedure adopted by the Calcutta High Court while dealing with a petition under Section 11 of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996. The Supreme Court has held that there can be no piecemeal adjudication of the existence of arbitrable disputes under Section 11, and once an arbitral dispute is found to be existent, the same Court ought to appoint an arbitrator. The Supreme Court while dealing with this situation has held as under:

2. These appeals have raised the question about the procedure that is being followed by Calcutta High Court in consideration of the applications under Section 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (for short, ‘1996 Act’). 

3. When the special leave petition filed by M/s. Choudhury Construction came up for consideration before the Bench, the learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the procedure adopted by the Designate Judge while hearing petition under Section 11 of 1996 Act was unknown in law and not sanctioned by Section 11 inasmuch as although the Designate Judge has held that there are live disputes between the parties which have to be resolved through arbitration, yet the matter has been ordered to be placed before the Chief Justice for appointment of the arbitrator. In light of the submission made by the learned counsel, Registrar General, Calcutta High Court was ordered to be impleaded as party respondent. 

4. In the matter of Hindustan Copper Limited, by an order dated 18.7.2012 this Court felt that the views of the Registrar General, Calcutta High Court were necessary as the issue involved was whether an application under Section 11(6) of the 1996 Act for appointment of an arbitrator could be considered in piecemeal by two Designate Judges. 

5. In the matter of Hindustan Copper Limited, one Designate Judge first passed the order on 9.6.2011 holding that the request for appointment of the arbitrator was proper and then ordered that the application should be referred to Hon’ble Delegate of the Chief Justice for appointment of an arbitrator. The relevant part of the order dated 9.6.2011 reads as under : 

“Therefore, the request for appointment of arbitrator was proper. There is an arbitral dispute between the parties, as held above. 

I also notice that the petitioner have not appointed their arbitrator, which they ought to have done by this time. Therefore, in the circumstances, I think this application should be referred to the Hon’ble delegate of the Hon’ble the Chief Justice for appointment of an arbitrator/arbitrators to adjudicate the disputes between the parties as mentioned in the letter of the petitioner dated 28th December, 2009. I order accordingly.” 

6. In pursuance of the order dated 9.6.2011, the matter came up before another Designate Judge and he appointed the arbitrator by an order dated 8.7.2011. The following order reads as under : 

“It appears from the order dated 9th June, 2011 passed by a learned Judge of this Court that His Lordship has already found that there exists an arbitration agreement between the parties and the dispute involved herein is covered by the said agreement. In view of such fact, I, in exercise of power conferred under section 11(6) of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996 appoint Sri Rudrendra Nath Banerjee, a retired Judge of this Court as the Arbitrator on the fees of Rs. 15,000/- for each sitting.” 

7. In the appeal of M/s. Choudhury Construction, the Designate Judge on 6.9.2011 passed the following order : “The State does not dispute the existence of the arbitration agreement but says that matters specifically excepted by the agreement cannot be made the subject matter of any arbitral reference. If there is any excepted matter which is raised by the petitioner as claimant, it will be open to the State to object thereto, inter alia, under Section 16 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. Since it appears that there are live disputes to go to arbitration and the parties have failed to agree in the composition of the arbitral tribunal, AP No. 394 of 2009 is directed to be placed before the Hon’ble Designate of the Hon’ble The Chief Justice for constitution of an arbitral tribunal in accordance with the agreement between the parties to adjudicate upon the disputes covered thereby. There will be no order as to costs. 

10. Section 11 of 1996 Act provides for the appointment of arbitrators. It reads as under: “S. 11. Appointment of arbitrators.— 

(1) A person of any nationality may be an arbitrator, unless otherwise agreed by the parties. 

(2) Subject to sub-section (6), the parties are free to agree on a procedure for appointing the arbitrator or arbitrators. 

(3) Failing any agreement referred to in sub-section (2), in an arbitration with three arbitrators, each party shall appoint one arbitrator, and the two appointed arbitrators, shall appoint the third arbitrator who shall act as the presiding arbitrator. 

(4) If the appointment procedure in sub-section (3) applies and— 

(a) a party fails to appoint an arbitrator within thirty days from the receipt of a request to do so from the other party; or 

(b) the two appointed arbitrators fail to agree on the third arbitrator within thirty days from the date of their appointment, 

the appointment shall be made, upon request of a party, by the Chief Justice or any person or institution designated by him. 

(5) Failing any agreement referred to in sub-section (2), in an arbitration with a sole arbitrator, if the parties fail to agree on the arbitrator within thirty days from receipt of a request by one party from the other party to so agree the appointment shall be made, upon request of a party, by the Chief Justice or any person or institution designated by him. (6) Where, under an appointment procedure agreed upon by the parties, – 

(a) a party fails to act as required under that procedure; or (b) the parties, or the two appointed arbitrators, fail to reach an agreement expected of them under that procedure; or (c) a person, including an institution, fails to perform any function entrusted to him or it under that procedure, 

a party may request the Chief Justice or any person or institution designated by him to take the necessary measure, unless the agreement on the appointment procedure provides other means for securing the appointment. 

(7) A decision on a matter entrusted by sub-section (4) or sub- section (5) or sub section (6) to the Chief Justice or the person or institution designated by him is final. 

(8) The Chief' Justice or the person or institution designated by him, in appointing an arbitrator, shall have due regard to – 

(a) any qualifications required of the arbitrator by the agreement of the parties; and 

(b) other considerations as are likely to secure the appointment of an independent and impartial arbitrator. 

(9) In the case of appointment of sole or third arbitrator in an international commercial arbitration, the Chief Justice of India or the person or institution designated by him may appoint an arbitrator of a nationality other than the nationalities of the parties where the parties belong to different nationalities. 

(10) The Chief Justice may make such scheme as he may deem appropriate for dealing with matters entrusted by sub- section (4) or sub-section (5) or sub-section (6) to him. 

(11) Where more than one request has been made under sub-section (4) or sub-section (5) or sub-section (6) to the Chief Justices of different High Courts or their designates, the Chief Justice or his designate to whom the request has been first made under the relevant sub-section shall alone be competent to decide on the request. 

(12) (a) Where the matters referred to in sub-sections (4), (5), (6), (7), (8) and (10) arise in an international commercial arbitration, the reference to "Chief Justice" in those sub- sections shall he construed as a reference to the "Chief Justice of India." (b) Where the matters referred to in sub-sections (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), and (10) arise in any other arbitration, the reference to "Chief Justice" in those sub-sections shall be construed as a reference to the Chief Justice of the High Court within whose local limits the principal Civil Court referred to in clause (e) of sub-section (1) of section 2 is situate and, where the High Court itself is the Court referred to in that clause, to the Chief Justice of that High Court.” 

11. The Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court in Modi Korea Telecommunication Ltd. was concerned with the question of the jurisdiction of a Single Judge who has been given the power for determination to entertain, hear and dispose of arbitration matters under Section 11 of the 1996 Act. The Division Bench dealt with the scheme of the 1996 Act, particularly, with reference to Sections 5,8,11,16 and 37(1). In the opinion of the Division Bench, Section 11 makes a distinction between the procedure for appointment of arbitrator and the actual appointment of the arbitrator. Keeping that distinction in mind, the Division Bench proceeded to consider the matter thus: 

“48. .....Under section 11(2) parties can agree on the procedure for appointing the arbitrator. If there is no such agreement on the procedure section 11(3) prescribes the procedure to be followed. When the arbitration is to be of three arbitrators, section 11(3) provides that “each party shall appoint one arbitrator and the two appointed arbitrators shall appoint a third arbitrator who shall act as the presiding arbitrator”. 

If a party fails to appoint an arbitrator within 30 days from the receipt of request to do so from the other party or the two appointed arbitrators fail to agree on the third arbitrator within 30 days from the date of their appointment, the appointment shall be made, upon request of a party, by the Chief Justice or any person or institute designated by him under sub- section (4) of section 11. 

49. Section 11(5) similarly provides that in the case of the arbitration with a sole arbitrator if the parties fail to agree on the arbitrator within 30 days from the receipt of the request by one party from the other to do so, the appointment shall be made, upon request of a party by the Chief Justice or any person or institute designated by him. Section 11(6) deals with a situation where the appointment procedure has been agreed upon but there is non compliance of the agreed procedure. In this case also any party may request “the Chief Justice or any person or institute designated by him” to take the necessary measures unless the agreement on the appointment provides other means for securing the appointment. 

50. A decision on the matter entrusted by sub-sections (4),(5) and (6) to the Chief Justice or any person or institute designated by him is final by virtue of section 11(7). Section 11(8) provides for considerations to which regard should be had before such power of appointment is exercised. Section 11(9) deals with International Commercial Arbitrations where the Chief Justice of India or any person or institute designated by him is given the powers of appointment. Section 11(11) deals with a situation where several requests are made to the Chief Justices of different High Courts or their designates. Section 11(12)(a) extends the operation of sub-sections (4), (5), (6), (7), (8) and (10) to International Commercial Arbitrations giving power of appointment to the Chief Justice of India in place of Chief Justice of the High Court. Section 11(12)(b) clarifies that the reference to Chief Justice means the Chief Justice of the appropriate High Court. 

51. What does “appointment” mean—is it only limited to naming or does it include the adjudicatory process as to whether appointment should be made? 

52. It is clear from a reading of section 11 that the word “appoint” has been used in section 11 to mean nomination or designation. Thus parties may appoint or name their arbitrator under Section 11(2), (3) and (4). The parties do not, in appointing an arbitrator, do more than name or designate him. 

53. The power which has been conferred exclusively under section 11 on the Chief Justice is the power of appointment or the power to name an arbitrator. The Chief Justice may, if he so chooses, designate some other person or institute to exercise this power. 

54. This power is to be distinguished from the general power of a court to determine whether the pre-conditions for the exercise of that power have been fulfilled. This is a judicial act. The bifurcation between the two powers has been recognized in the unreported decision of Harihar Yadav v. Durgapur Projects Ltd. (supra) when it was said: 

“Undoubtedly the appointment of an arbitrator, on an application made by one of the parties involves a decision making process comprising the twin vital components and elements of consideration with regard to the points in issue, or the points of controversy between the parties and the actual act of appointment of the arbitrator. The act of actual appointment of an arbitrator has always to be preceded by a consideration as to whether in the facts and circumstances of the case the arbitrator in fact is required to be appointed or not. It is not only after this issue is resolved that the question of appointment of an arbitrator arises.” 

55. Given the definition of the word ‘appointment’, in our view, section 11 does not say that the Chief Justice could alone exercise the general power of judicially determining whether the pre- conditions for such appointment have been fulfilled. To hold otherwise would, not only be contrary to the express language of the section, but it would also mean that the Chief Justice could by designation clothe any person or institution with the power to discharge judicial functions. 

56. Besides the legislature could not have intended to burden either the Chief Justice of India (in connection with all international arbitrations) or the Chief Justice of a High Court (in connection with all domestic arbitrations) to be saddled with the impracticable task of determining the existence of the preconditions for appointment of an arbitrator/arbitrators in all cases nor to empower the Chief Justice with the power to clothe any person or authority of his choice with the discharge of judicial functions exercisable by Courts. In facts section 11 does not say anything on the matter. 

57. In our view such judicial determination is to be exercised only by a Court. A Court has been defined in section 2(e) of the Act as : 

“(e) ‘Court’ means the principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction in a district, and includes the High Court in exercise of its ordinary Civil Jurisdiction, having jurisdiction to decide the question forming the subject- matter of the reference if the same had been the subject matter of a suit, but does not include any Civil Court of a grade inferior to such principal Civil Court, or any Court of Small Causes.” 

12. The Division Bench then considered Section 14 of the High Court Act, 1861, Clause 36 of the Letters Patent, Chapter V Rule 1 of the Original Side Rules and Article 225 of the Constitution of India and in paragraph 64 of the Report concluded as under : 

“64. Pursuant to this power the Chief Justice has allocated the business of hearing matters pertaining to arbitrations to a Learned Single Judge. It is for that Learned Single Judge to exercise the general power referred to earlier, leaving the power of naming the arbitrator under section 11 to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Chief Justice.” 

13. We find merit in the submission of Mr. Gourab Banerji, learned senior counsel for one of the appellants that the view taken by the Division Bench of Calcutta High Court in Modi Korea Telecommunication Ltd.1 is completely knocked out by a majority decision of this Court in SBP & Co. v. Patel Engineering Ltd. and another [(2005) 8 SCC 618]. 

14. In SBP & Co., a seven-Judge Bench of this Court was concerned with the question in relation to the nature of function of Chief Justice or his designate under Section 11 of the 1996 Act. The necessity to consider the said question arose as a three-Judge Bench of this Court in Konkan Railway Corporation Limited & Ors. v. Mehul Construction Company [(2000) 7 SCC 201], as approved by a five-Judge Bench of this Court in Konkan Railway Corporation Limited & Anr. v. Rani Construction (P) Ltd., [(2002) 2 SCC 388] had taken the view that the function of the Chief Justice or his Designate under Section 11 was purely an administrative function; it was neither judicial nor quasi judicial and the Chief Justice or his nominee performing the function under Section 11(6) cannot decide any contentious issues between the parties. 

15. The majority in SBP & Co. held that looking at the scheme of the 1996 Act as a whole and the object with which it was enacted, it seemed proper to view the conferment of power on the chief justice as a conferment of judicial power to decide on the existence of the conditions justifying the constitution of an arbitral tribunal. In the majority judgment, it was also observed that the power had been conferred under Section 11(6) on the highest judicial authority in their capacities as Chief Justices to pass an order contemplated under Section 11 of the Act. In paragraphs 42 to 44 of the Report (pg. 662- 663), the majority in SBP & Co.2 held as under : 

“42. In our dispensation of justice, especially in respect of matters entrusted to the ordinary hierarchy of courts or judicial authorities, the duty would normally be performed by a judicial authority according to the normal procedure of that court or of that authority. When the Chief Justice of the High Court is entrusted with the power, he would be entitled to designate another Judge of the High Court for exercising that power. Similarly, the Chief Justice of India would be in a position to designate another Judge of the Supreme Court to exercise the power under Section 11(6) of the Act. When so entrusted with the right to exercise such a power, the Judge of the High Court and the Judge of the Supreme Court would be exercising the power vested in the Chief Justice of the High Court or in the Chief Justice of India. Therefore, we clarify that the Chief Justice of a High Court can delegate the function under Section 11(6) of the Act to a Judge of that Court and he would actually exercise the power of the Chief Justice conferred under Section 11(6) of the Act. The position would be the same when the Chief Justice of India delegates the power to another Judge of the Supreme Court and he exercises that power as designated by the Chief Justice of India. 

43. In this context, it has also to be noticed that there is an ocean of difference between an institution which has no judicial functions and an authority or person who is already exercising judicial power in his capacity as a judicial authority. Therefore, only a Judge of the Supreme Court or a Judge of the High Court could respectively be equated with the Chief Justice of India or the Chief Justice of the High Court while exercising power under Section 11(6) of the Act as designated by the Chief Justice. A non-judicial body or institution cannot be equated with a Judge of the High Court or a Judge of the Supreme Court and it has to be held that the designation contemplated by Section 11(6) of the Act is not a designation to an institution that is incompetent to perform judicial functions. Under our dispensation a non-judicial authority cannot exercise judicial powers. 

44. Once we arrive at the conclusion that the proceeding before the Chief Justice while entertaining an application under Section 11(6) of the Act is adjudicatory, then obviously, the outcome of that adjudication is a judicial order. Once it is a judicial order, the same, as far as the High Court is concerned would be final and the only avenue open to a party feeling aggrieved by the order of the Chief Justice would be to approach the Supreme Court under Article 136 of the Constitution. If it were an order by the Chief Justice of India, the party will not have any further remedy in respect of the matters covered by the order of the Chief Justice of India or the Judge of the Supreme Court designated by him and he will have to participate in the arbitration before the Tribunal only on the merits of the claim. Obviously, the dispensation in our country, does not contemplate any further appeal from the decision of the Supreme Court and there appears to be nothing objectionable in taking the view that the order of the Chief Justice of India would be final on the matters which are within his purview, while called upon to exercise his jurisdiction under Section 11 of the Act. It is also necessary to notice in this context that this conclusion of ours would really be in aid of quick disposal of arbitration claims and would avoid considerable delay in the process, an object that is sought to be achieved by the Act.” 

16. In paragraph 47 (pg. 663) of the Report, this Court in SBP & Co. summed up its conclusions. To the extent they are relevant, the conclusions read as under : 

“47. (i) The power exercised by the Chief Justice of the High Court or the Chief Justice of India under Section 11(6) of the Act is not an administrative power. It is a judicial power. 

(ii) The power under Section 11(6) of the Act, in its entirety, could be delegated, by the Chief Justice of the High Court only to another Judge of that Court and by the Chief Justice of India to another Judge of the Supreme Court. 

(iii) In case of designation of a Judge of the High Court or of the Supreme Court, the power that is exercised by the designated Judge would be that of the Chief Justice as conferred by the statute. 

(iv) The Chief Justice or the designated Judge will have the right to decide the preliminary aspects as indicated in the earlier part of this judgment. These will be his own jurisdiction to entertain the request, the existence of a valid arbitration agreement, the existence or otherwise of a live claim, the existence of the condition for the exercise of his power and on the qualifications of the arbitrator or arbitrators. The Chief Justice or the designated Judge would be entitled to seek the opinion of an institution in the matter of nominating an arbitrator qualified in terms of Section 11(8) of the Act if the need arises but the order appointing the arbitrator could only be that of the Chief Justice or the designated Judge.” 

17. The exposition of law by a seven-Judge Bench of this Court in SBP & Co. , leaves no manner of doubt that the procedure that is being followed by the Calcutta High Court with regard to the consideration of the applications under Section 11 of the 1996 Act is legally impermissible. The piecemeal consideration of the application under Section 11 by the Designate Judge and another Designate Judge or the Chief Justice, as the case may be, is not contemplated by Section 11. The function of the Chief Justice or Designate Judge in consideration of the application under Section 11 is judicial and such application has to be dealt with in its entirety by either Chief Justice himself or the Designate Judge and not by both by making it a two-tier procedure as held in Modi Korea Telecommunications Ltd.1. The distinction drawn by the Division Bench of Calcutta High Court in Modi Korea Telecommunications Ltd.1 between the procedure for appointment of arbitrator and the actual appointment of the arbitrator is not at all well founded. Modi Korea Telecommunications Ltd. to the extent it is inconsistent with SBP & Co. stands overruled. 

18. In view of the above, the impugned orders are set aside. The arbitration petitions are restored to the file of the High Court for appropriate consideration, as noted above. The appeals are allowed to the above extent. No order as to costs.

Law Relating to Juvenility Summarised : Supreme Court

Justice Lodha
Supreme Court of India

The Supreme Court in Abuzar Hossain @ Gulam Hossain Vs. State of West Bengal has discussed the law relating to Juveniles. The matter was placed before the Bench comprising J. Lodha, J. Dave and J. Thakur, on a reference by another Bench, owing to the substantial discordance in the approach of the matter on the question of juvenility in Gopinath Ghosh on the one hand and the two decisions of this Court in Akbar Sheikh and Hari Ram v. State of Rajasthan and Another [(2009) 13 SCC 211]. While answering the reference, the Supreme Court has summarised the legal position as under;

 

Delinquent juveniles need to be dealt with differently from adults. International covenants and domestic laws in various countries have prescribed minimum standards for delinquent juveniles and juveniles in conflict with law. These standards provide what orders may be passed regarding delinquent juveniles and the orders that may not be passed against them. This group of matters raises the question of when should a claim of juvenility be recognised and sent for determination when it is raised for the first time in appeal or before this Court or raised in trial and appeal but not pressed and then pressed for the first time before this Court or even raised for the first time after final disposal of the case. 

2. It so happened that when criminal appeal preferred by Abuzar Hossain @ Gulam Hossain came up for consideration before a two-Judge Bench (Harjit Singh Bedi and J.M. Panchal, JJ) on 10.11.2009, on behalf of the appellant, a plea of juvenility on the date of incident was raised. In support of the contention that the appellant was juvenile on the date of incident and as such he could not have been tried in a normal criminal court, reliance was placed on a decision of this Court in Gopinath Ghosh v. State of West Bengal [1984 (Supp) SCC 228]. On the other hand, on behalf of the respondent, State of West Bengal, in opposition to that plea, reliance was placed on a later decision of this Court in Akbar Sheikh and others v. State of West Bengal [(2009) 7 SCC 415]. The Bench found that there was substantial discordance in the approach of the matter on the question of juvenility in Gopinath Ghosh on the one hand and the two decisions of this Court in Akbar Sheikh and Hari Ram v. State of Rajasthan and Another [(2009) 13 SCC 211]. The Bench was of the opinion that as the issue would arise in a very large number of cases, it was required to be referred to a larger Bench as the judgment in Akbar Sheikh and Gopinath Ghosh had been rendered by co-ordinate Benches of this Court. This is how these matters have come up before us. 

3. The Parliament felt it necessary that uniform juvenile justice system should be available throughout the country which should make adequate provision for dealing with all aspects in the changing social, cultural and economic situation in the country and there was also need for larger involvement of informal systems and community based welfare agencies in the care, protection, treatment, development and rehabilitation of such juveniles and with these objectives in mind, it enacted Juvenile Justice Act, 1986 (for short, ‘1986 Act’). 

4. 1986 Act was replaced by the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000 (for short, ‘2000 Act’). 2000 Act has been enacted to carry forward the constitutional philosophy engrafted in Articles 15(3), 39(e) and (f), 45 and 47 of the Constitution and also incorporate the standards prescribed in the Convention on the Rights of the Child, United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Administration of Juvenile Justice, 1985, the United Nations Rules for the Protection of Juveniles Deprived of their Liberty (1990) and all other relevant international instruments. Clause (k) of Section 2 defines “juvenile” or “child” to mean a person who has not completed eighteenth year of age. Clause (l) of Section 2 defines “juvenile in conflict with law” to mean a juvenile who is alleged to have committed an offence and has not completed eighteenth year of age on the date of commission of such offence. 

5. Section 3 of 2000 Act provides for continuation of inquiry in respect of juvenile who has ceased to be a juvenile. It reads as under: 

“S.3. Continuation of inquiry in respect of juvenile who has ceased to be a juvenile.— Where an inquiry has been initiated against a juvenile in conflict with law or a child in need of care and protection and during the course of such inquiry the juvenile or the child ceases to be such, then, notwithstanding anything contained in this Act or in any other law for the time being in force, the inquiry may be continued and orders may be made in respect of such person as if such person had continued to be a juvenile or a child.” 

6. Chapter II of 2000 Act deals with juvenile in conflict with law. This Chapter comprises of Sections 4 to 28. Section 4 provides for constitution of juvenile justice board and its composition. Section 5 provides for procedure, etc. in relation to juvenile justice board. Section 6 deals with the powers of juvenile justice board. Section 6 reads as under : 

“S.6 . Powers of Juvenile Justice Board.— 

(1) Where a Board has been constituted for any district, such Board shall, notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force but save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, have power to deal exclusively with all proceedings under this Act relating to juvenile in conflict with law. 

(2) The powers conferred on the Board by or under this Act may also be exercised by the High Court and the Court of Session, when the proceeding comes before them in appeal, revision or otherwise.” 

7. By Act 33 of 2006, the Parliament brought in significant changes in 2000 Act. Inter alia, Section 7A came to be inserted. This Section is lynchpin around which the debate has centered around in these matters. Section 7A provides for procedure to be followed when claim of juvenility is raised before any court. It reads as follows: 

“S.7A. Procedure to be followed when claim of juvenility is raised before any court.— 

(1) Whenever a claim of juvenility is raised before any court or a court is of the opinion that an accused person was a juvenile on the date of commission of the offence, the court shall make an inquiry, take such evidence as may be necessary (but not an affidavit) so as to determine the age of such person, and shall record a finding whether the person is a juvenile or a child or not, stating his age as nearly as may be: 

Provided that a claim of juvenility may be raised before any court and it shall be recognised at any stage, even after final disposal of the case, and such claim shall be determined in terms of the provisions contained in this Act and the rules made thereunder, even if the juvenile has ceased to be so on or before the date of commencement of this Act. 

(2) If the court finds a person to be a juvenile on the date of commission of the offence under sub-section (1), it shall forward the juvenile to the Board for passing appropriate orders and the sentence, if any, passed by a court shall be deemed to have no effect.” 

8. Section 49 of 2000 Act deals with presumption and determination of age. This Section reads as under: 

“49 . Presumption and determination of age.— 

(1) Where it appears to a competent authority that person brought before it under any of the provisions of this Act (otherwise than for the purpose of giving evidence) is a juvenile or the child, the competent authority shall make due inquiry so as to the age of that person and for that purpose shall take such evidence as may be necessary (but not an affidavit)and shall record a finding whether the person is a juvenile or the child or not, stating his age as nearly as may be. 

(2) No order of a competent authority shall be deemed to have become invalid merely by any subsequent proof that the person in respect of whom the order has been made is not a juvenile or the child, and the age recorded by the competent authority to be the age of person so brought before it, shall for the purpose of this Act, be deemed to be the true age of that person.” 

9. Sections 52 and 53 deal with appeals and revision. Section 54 provides for procedure in inquiries, appeals and revision proceedings, which reads as follows: 

“S.54 . Procedure in inquiries, appeals and revision proceedings.— 

(1) Save as otherwise expressly provided by this Act, a competent authority while holding any inquiry under any of the provisions of this Act, shall follow such procedure as may be prescribed and subject thereto, shall follow, as far as may be, the procedure laid down in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) for trials in summons cases. 

(2) Save as otherwise expressly provided by or under this Act, the procedure to be followed in hearing appeals or revision proceedings under this Act shall be, as far as practicable, in accordance with the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973(2 of 1974).” 

10. In exercise of powers conferred by the proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 68 of the 2000 Act, the Central Government has framed the rules entitled “The Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Rules, 2007” (for short, “2007 Rules”). The relevant rule for the purposes of consideration of the issue before us is Rule 12 which provides for procedure to be followed in determination of age. Since this Rule has a direct bearing for consideration of the matter, it is quoted as it is. It reads as under: 

“R. 12. Procedure to be followed in determination of Age.— 

(1) In every case concerning a child or a juvenile in conflict with law, the court or the Board or as the case may be the Committee referred to in rule 19 of these rules shall determine the age of such juvenile or child or a juvenile in conflict with law within a period of thirty days from the date of making of the application for that purpose. 

(2) The Court or the Board or as the case may be the Committee shall decide the juvenility or otherwise of the juvenile or the child or as the case may be the juvenile in conflict with law, prima facie on the basis of physical appearance or documents, if available, and send him to the observation home or in jail. 

(3) In every case concerning a child or juvenile in conflict with law, the age determination inquiry shall be conducted by the court or the Board or, as the case may be, the Committee by seeking evidence by obtaining— 

(a) (i) the matriculation or equivalent certificates, if available; and in the absence whereof; 

(ii) the date of birth certificate from the school (other than a play school) first attended; and in the absence whereof; 

(iii) the birth certificate given by a corporation or a municipal authority or a panchayat; 

(b) and only in the absence of either (i), (ii) or (iii) of clause (a) above, the medical opinion will be sought from a duly constituted Medical Board, which will declare the age of the juvenile or child. In case exact assessment of the age cannot be done, the Court or the Board or, as the case may be, the Committee, for the reasons to be recorded by them, may, if considered necessary, give benefit to the child or juvenile by considering his/her age on lower side within the margin of one year. 

and, while passing orders in such case shall, after taking into consideration such evidence as may be available, or the medical opinion, as the case may be, record a finding in respect of his age and either of the evidence specified in any of the clauses (a)(i),(ii), (iii) or in the absence whereof, clause (b) shall be the conclusive proof of the age as regards such child or the juvenile in conflict with law. 

(4) If the age of a juvenile or child or the juvenile in conflict with law is found to be below 18 years on the date of offence, on the basis of any of the conclusion proof specified in sub-rule (3), the Court or the Board or as the case may be the Committee shall in writing pass an order stating the age and declaring the status of juvenility or otherwise, for the purpose of the Act and these rules and a copy of the order shall be given to such juvenile or the person concerned. 

(5) Save and except where, further inquiry or otherwise is required, inter alia, in terms of section 7A, section 64 of the Act and these rules, no further inquiry shall be conducted by the court or the Board after examining and obtaining the certificate or any other documentary proof referred to in sub- rule (3) of this rule. 

(6) The provisions contained in this rule shall also apply to those disposed of cases, where the status of juvenility has not been determined in accordance with the provisions contained in sub-rule (3) and the Act, requiring dispensation of the sentence under the Act for passing appropriate order in the interest of the juvenile in conflict with law.” 

11. It is not necessary to refer to facts of criminal appeal preferred by Abuzar Hossain @ Gulam Hossain or the other referred matters. Suffice it to say that in criminal appeal of Abuzar Hossain @ Gulam Hossain, in support of the argument that he was juvenile on the date of incident and as such he could not have been tried in the normal criminal court, his statement recorded under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short, 'the Code’) was pressed into service. It was, however, found from the evidence as well as the judgments of the trial court and the High Court that the issue of juvenility was not pressed at any stage and no evidence whatsoever was led by him to prove the age. It was in the backdrop of these facts that Gopinath Ghosh was relied upon in support of the proposition that notwithstanding the fact that the plea of juvenility had not been pressed, it was obligatory on the court to go into the question of juvenility and determine his age. 

12. Gopinath Ghosh was a case where he was convicted along with two others for an offence under Section 302 read with Section 34 of IPC and sentenced to suffer imprisonment for life by the trial court. He and two co- accused preferred criminal appeal before Calcutta High Court. In the appeal, two accused were acquitted while the conviction and sentence of Gopinath Ghosh was maintained. Gopinath Ghosh filed appeal by special leave before this Court. On his behalf, the argument was raised that on the date of offence, i.e. on 19.8.1974 he was aged below 18 years and he is therefore a “child” within the meaning of the expression in the West Bengal Children Act, 1959 and, therefore, the court had no jurisdiction to sentence him to suffer imprisonment after holding a trial. Having regard to the contention raised on behalf of the appellant, this Court framed an issue for determination; what was the age of the accused Gopinath Ghosh (appellant) on the date of offence for which he was tried and convicted? The issue was remitted to the Sessions Judge, Nadia to ascertain his age and submit the finding. The Additional Sessions Judge, First Court, Nadia, accordingly, held an inquiry and after recording the evidence and calling for medical report and after hearing parties certified that Gopinath Ghosh was aged between 16 and 17 years on the date of the offence. The finding sent by the Additional Sessions Judge was not questioned before this Court. The Court examined the scheme of West Bengal Children Act, 1959 and also noted Section 24 thereof which had an overriding effect taking away the power of the court to impose the sentence of imprisonment unless the case was covered by the proviso thereto. Then in paragraph 10 (pg. 231) of the Report, this Court held as under: 

“10. Unfortunately, in this case, appellant Gopinath Ghosh never questioned the jurisdiction of the Sessions Court which tried him for the offence of murder. Even the appellant had given his age as 20 years when questioned by the learned Additional Sessions Judge. Neither the appellant nor his learned counsel appearing before the learned Additional Sessions Judge as well as at the hearing of his appeal in the High Court ever questioned the jurisdiction of the trial court to hold the trial of the appellant, nor was it ever contended that he was a juvenile delinquent within the meaning of the Act and therefore, the Court had no jurisdiction to try him, as well as the Court had no jurisdiction to sentence him to suffer imprisonment for life. It was for the first time that this contention was raised before this Court. However, in view of the underlying intendment and beneficial provisions of the Act read with clause (f) of Article 39 of the Constitution which provides that the State shall direct its policy towards securing that children are given opportunities and facilities to develop in a healthy manner and in conditions of freedom and dignity and that childhood and youth are protected against exploitation and against moral and material abandonment, we consider it proper not to allow a technical contention that this contention is being raised in this Court for the first time to thwart the benefit of the provisions being extended to the appellant, if he was otherwise entitled to it.” 

13. In paragraph 13 (pgs. 232-233) of the Report, the Court observed as under: 

“13. Before we part with this judgment, we must take notice of a developing situation in recent months in this Court that the contention about age of a convict and claiming the benefit of the relevant provisions of the Act dealing with juvenile delinquents prevalent in various States is raised for the first time in this Court and this Court is required to start the inquiry afresh. Ordinarily this Court would be reluctant to entertain a contention based on factual averments raised for the first time before it. However, the Court is equally reluctant to ignore, overlook or nullify the beneficial provisions of a very socially progressive statute by taking shield behind the technicality of the contention being raised for the first time in this Court. A way has therefore, to be found from this situation not conducive to speedy disposal of cases and yet giving effect to the letter and the spirit of such socially beneficial legislation. We are of the opinion that whenever a case is brought before the Magistrate and the accused appears to be aged 21 years or below, before proceeding with the trial or undertaking an inquiry, an inquiry must be made about the age of the accused on the date of the occurrence. This ought to be more so where special Acts dealing with juvenile delinquent are in force. If necessary, the Magistrate may refer the accused to the Medical Board or the Civil Surgeon, as the case may be, for obtaining creditworthy evidence about age. The Magistrate may as well call upon accused also to lead evidence about his age. Thereafter, the learned Magistrate may proceed in accordance with law. This procedure, if properly followed, would avoid a journey upto the Apex Court and the return journey to the grass- root court. If necessary and found expedient, the High Court may on its administrative side issue necessary instructions to cope with the situation herein indicated.” 

14. In Bhoop Ram v. State of U.P. [(1989) 3 SCC 1], a two-Judge Bench of this Court was concerned with the question as to whether the appellant Bhoop Ram should have been treated as a “child” within the meaning of Section 2(4) of the U.P. Children Act, 1951 and sent to an approved school for detention therein till he attained the age of 18 years instead of being sentenced to undergo imprisonment in jail. In Bhoop Ram4, the Chief Medical Officer, Bareilly gave a certificate that as per the radiology examination and physical features, he appeared to be 30 years of age as on 30.4.1987. Bhoop Ram did not place any other material before the Sessions Judge except the school certificate to prove that he had not completed 16 years on the date of commission of the offences. The Sessions judge rejected the school certificate produced by him on the ground that “it is not unusual that in schools ages are understated by one or two years for future benefits”. As regards medical certificate the Sessions Judge observed that as he happened to be about 28-29 years of age on 1.6.1987, he would have completed 16 years on the date of occurrence. Before the Court, on behalf of the appellant, Bhoop Ram, it was contended that school certificate produced by him contained definite information regarding date of birth and that should have prevailed over the certificate of the doctor and the Sessions Judge committed wrong in doubting the correctness of the school certificate. This Court on consideration of the matter held that appellant Bhoop Ram could not have completed 16 years of age on 3.10.1975 when the occurrence took place and as such he ought to have been treated as “child” within the meaning of Section 2(4) of the U.P. Children Act, 1951 and dealt with under Section 29 of the Act. The Court gave the following reasons for holding appellant, Bhoop Ram, a “child” on the date of occurrence of the incident: 

“7. .......The first is that the appellant has produced a school certificate which carries the date 24-6-1960 against the column “date of birth”. There is no material before us to hold that the school certificate does not relate to the appellant or that the entries therein are not correct in their particulars. The Sessions Judge has failed to notice this aspect of the matter and appears to have been carried away by the opinion of the Chief Medical Officer that the appellant appeared to be about 30 years of age as on 30-4-1987. Even in the absence of any material to throw doubts about the entries in the school certificate, the Sessions Judge has brushed it aside merely on the surmise that it is not unusual for parents to understate the age of their children by one or two years at the time of their admission in schools for securing benefits to the children in their future years. The second factor is that the Sessions Judge has failed to bear in mind that even the trial Judge had thought it fit to award the lesser sentence of imprisonment for life to the appellant instead of capital punishment when he delivered judgment on 12-9-1977 on the ground the appellant was a boy of 17 years of age. The observation of the trial Judge would lend credence to the appellant's case that he was less than 10 (sic 16) years of age on 3-10-1975 when the offences were committed. The third factor is that though the doctor has certified that the appellant appeared to be 30 years of age as on 30-4-1987, his opinion is based only on an estimate and the possibility of an error of estimate creeping into the opinion cannot be ruled out. As regards the opinion of the Sessions Judge, it is mainly based upon the report of the Chief Medical Officer and not on any independent material. On account of all these factors, we are of the view that the appellant would not have completed 16 years of age on the date the offences were committed........” 

15. A three-Judge Bench of this Court in Pradeep Kumar v. State of U.P. [1995 Supp (4) SCC 419] was concerned with the question whether each of the appellants was a “child” within the meaning of Section 2(4) of the U.P. Children Act, 1951 and as such on conviction under Section 302/34 IPC, they should have been sent to approved school for detention till the age of 18 years. The Court dealt with the matter in its brief order thus: 

“2. At the time of granting special leave, Jagdish appellant produced High School Certificate, according to which he was about 15 years of age at the time of occurrence. Appellant Krishan Kant produced horoscope which showed that he was 13 years of age at the time of occurrence. So far as appellant Pradeep is concerned a medical report was called for by this Court which disclosed that his date of birth as January 7, 1959 was acceptable on the basis of various tests conducted by the medical authorities. 

3. It is thus proved to the satisfaction of this Court that on the date of occurrence, the appellants had not completed 16 years of age and as such they should have been dealt with under the U.P. Children Act instead of being sentenced to imprisonment on conviction under Section 302/34 of the Act.” 

16. The above three decisions came up for consideration before this Court in Bhola Bhagat v. State of Bihar [(1997) 8 SCC 720]. The plea raised on behalf of the appellants that they were ‘children’ as defined in the Bihar Children Act, 1970 on the date of occurrence and their trial along with adult accused by the criminal court was not in accordance with law was rejected by the High Court observing that except for the age given by the appellants and the estimate of the court at the time of their examination under Section 313 of the Code, there was no other material in support of the appellants’ claim that they were below 18 years of age. This Court flawed the approach of the High Court and observed as follows : 

“8. To us it appears that the approach of the High Court in dealing with the question of age of the appellants and the denial of benefit to them of the provisions of both the Acts was not proper. Technicalities were allowed to defeat the benefits of a socially-oriented legislation like the Bihar Children Act, 1982 and the Juvenile Justice Act, 1986. If the High Court had doubts about the correctness of their age as given by the appellants and also as estimated by the trial court, it ought to have ordered an enquiry to determine their ages. It should not have brushed aside their plea without such an enquiry.” 

17. Gopinath Ghosh, Bhoop Ram and Pradeep Kumar were elaborately considered in paragraphs 10, 11 and 12 of the Report. The Court also considered a decision of this Court in State of Haryana v. Balwant Singh [1993 (Supp) 1 SCC 409] and held that the said decision was not a good law. In paragraph 15 of the Report, the Court followed the course adopted in Gopinath Ghosh1 , Bhoop Ram4 and Pradeep Kumar5 and held as under : 

“15. The correctness of the estimate of age as given by the trial court was neither doubted nor questioned by the State either in the High Court or in this Court. The parties have, therefore, accepted the correctness of the estimate of age of the three appellants as given by the trial court. Therefore, these three appellants should not be denied the benefit of the provisions of a socially progressive statute. In our considered opinion, since the plea had been raised in the High Court and because the correctness of the estimate of their age has not been assailed, it would be fair to assume that on the date of the offence, each one of the appellants squarely fell within the definition of the expression “child”. We are under these circumstances reluctant to ignore and overlook the beneficial provisions of the Acts on the technical ground that there is no other supporting material to support the estimate of ages of the appellants as given by the trial court, though the correctness of that estimate has not been put in issue before any forum.....”. 

xxx

25. The amendment in 2000 Act by the Amendment Act, 2006, particularly, introduction of Section 7A and subsequent introduction of Rule 12 in the 2007 Rules, was sequel to the Constitution Bench decision of this Court in Pratap Singh v. State of Jharkhand and Another [(2005) 3 SCC 551]. In Hari Ram3, a two-Judge Bench of this Court extensively considered the scheme of 2000 Act, as amended by 2006 Amendment Act. With regard to sub-rules (4) and (5) of Rule 12, this Court observed as follows : 

“27. Sub-rules (4) and (5) of Rule 12 are of special significance in that they provide that once the age of a juvenile or child in conflict with law is found to be less than 18 years on the date of offence on the basis of any proof specified in sub-rule (3) the court or the Board or as the case may be the Child Welfare Committee appointed under Chapter IV of the Act, has to pass a written order stating the age of the juvenile or stating the status of the juvenile, and no further inquiry is to be conducted by the court or Board after examining and obtaining any other documentary proof referred to in sub- rule (3) of Rule 12. Rule 12, therefore, indicates the procedure to be followed to give effect to the provisions of Section 7-A when a claim of juvenility is raised.” 

26. This Court observed that the scheme of the 2000 Act was to give children, who have, for some reason or the other, gone astray, to realize their mistakes, rehabilitate themselves and rebuild their lives and become useful citizens of the society, instead of degenerating into hardened criminals. In paragraph 59 of the Report, the Court held as under : 

“59. The law as now crystallised on a conjoint reading of Sections 2(k), 2(l), 7-A, 20 and 49 read with Rules 12 and 98, places beyond all doubt that all persons who were below the age of 18 years on the date of commission of the offence even prior to 1-4-2001, would be treated as juveniles, even if the claim of juvenility was raised after they had attained the age of 18 years on or before the date of commencement of the Act and were undergoing sentence upon being convicted.” 

27. The Court observed in Hari Ram3 that often parents of children, who come from rural backgrounds, are not aware of the actual date of birth of a child, but relate the same to some event which might have taken place simultaneously. In such a situation, the Board and the Courts will have to take recourse to the procedure laid down in Rule 12. 

28. The judgment in the case of Hari Ram was delivered by this Court on 5.5.2009. On that very day, judgment in Akbar Sheikh was delivered by a two-Judge Bench of which one of us (R.M. Lodha, J.) was a member. In Akbar Sheikh on behalf of one of the appellants, Kabir, a submission was made that he was juvenile on the date of occurrence. While dealing with the said argument, this Court observed that no such question had ever been raised. Even where a similar question was raised by five other accused, no such plea was raised even before the High Court. On behalf of the appellant, Kabir, in support of the juvenility, two documents were relied upon, namely, (i) statement recorded under Section 313 of the Code and (ii) voters’ list. As regards the statement recorded under Section 313, this Court was of the opinion that the said document was not decisive. In respect of voters’ list, this Court observed that the same had been prepared long after the incident occurred and it was again not decisive. In view of these findings, this Court did not find any merit in the claim of Kabir, one of the appellants, that he was juvenile and the submission was rejected. From a careful reading of the judgment in the matter of Akbar Sheikh2, it is clear that the two documents on which reliance was placed in support of claim of juvenility were not found decisive and, consequently, no inquiry for determination of age was ordered. From the consideration of the matter by this Court in Akbar Sheikh2, it is clear that the case turned on its own facts. 

29. As a matter of fact, prior to the decisions of this Court in Hari Ram and Akbar Sheikh, a three-Judge Bench of this Court speaking through one of us (R.M. Lodha, J.) in Pawan8 had considered the question relating to admissibility of claim of juvenility for the first time in this Court with reference to Section 7A. The contention of juvenility was raised for the first time before this Court on behalf of the two appellants, namely, A-1 and A-2. The argument on their behalf before this Court was that they were juvenile within the meaning of 2000 Act on the date of incident and the trial held against them under the Code was illegal. With regard to A-1, his school leaving certificate was relied on while as regards A-2, reliance was placed on his statement recorded under Section 313 and the school leaving certificate. Dealing with the contention of juvenility, this Court stated that the claim of juvenility could be raised at any stage, even after final disposal of the case. The Court then framed the question in paragraph 41 of the Report as to whether an inquiry should be made or report be called for from the trial court invariably where juvenility is claimed for the first time before this Court. It was held that where the materials placed before this Court by the accused, prima facie, suggested that he was ‘juvenile’ as defined in 2000 Act on the date of incident, it was necessary to call for the report or an inquiry to be made for determination of the age on the date of incident. However, where a plea of juvenility is found unscrupulous or the materials lack credibility or do not inspire confidence and even prima facie satisfaction of the court is not made out, further exercise in this regard may not be required. It was also stated that if the plea of juvenility was not raised before the trial court or the High Court and is raised for the first time before this Court, the judicial conscience of the court must be satisfied by placing adequate material that the accused had not attained the age of 18 years on the date of commission of offence. In absence of adequate material, any further inquiry into juvenility would not be required. 

30. Having regard to the general guidelines highlighted in paragraph 41 with regard to the approach of this Court where juvenility is claimed for the first time, the court then considered the documents relied upon by A-1 and A-2 in support of the claim of juvenility on the date of incident. In respect of the two documents relied upon by A-2, namely, statement under Section 313 of the Code and the school leaving certificate, this Court observed that the statement recorded under Section 313 was a tentative observation based on physical appearance which was hardly determinative of age and insofar as school leaving certificate was concerned, it did not inspire any confidence as it was issued after A-2 had already been convicted and the primary evidence like entry from the birth register had not been produced. As regards school leaving certificate relied upon by A-1, this Court found that the same had been procured after his conviction and no entry from the birth register had been produced. The Court was, thus, not prima facie impressed or satisfied by the material placed on behalf of A-1 and A-2. Those documents were not found satisfactory and adequate to call for any report from the Board or trial court about the age of A-1 and A-2. 

31. In Jitendra Singh alias Babboo Singh and another v. State of Uttar Pradesh [(2010) 13 SCC 523], on behalf of the appellant, a plea was raised that he was minor within the meaning of Section 2(k) of 2000 Act on the date of commission of the offence. The appellant had been convicted for the offences punishable under Sections 304-B and 498A IPC and sentenced to suffer seven years’ imprisonment under the former and two years under the latter. The appellant had got the bail from the High Court on the ground of his age which was on medical examination certified to be around seventeen years on the date of commission of the offence. One of us (T.S. Thakur, J.) who authored the judgment for the Bench held that in the facts and circumstances of the case, an enquiry for determining the age of the appellant was necessary. This Court referred to the earlier decisions in Gopinath Ghosh, Bhoop Ram , Bhola Bhagat , Hari Ram and Pawan and then held that the burden of making out the prima facie case had been discharged. In paragraphs 9, 10 and 11 of the Report, it was held as under: 

“9. The burden of making out a prima facie case for directing an enquiry has been in our opinion discharged in the instant case inasmuch as the appellant has filed along with the application a copy of the school leaving certificate and the marksheet which mentions the date of birth of the appellant to be 24-5-1988. The medical examination to which the High Court has referred in its order granting bail to the appellant also suggests the age of the appellant being 17 years on the date of the examination. These documents are sufficient at this stage for directing an enquiry and verification of the facts. 

10. We may all the same hasten to add that the material referred to above is yet to be verified and its genuineness and credibility determined. There are no doubt certain telltale circumstances that may raise a suspicion about the genuineness of the documents relied upon by the appellant. For instance, the deceased Asha Devi who was married to the appellant was according to Dr. Ashok Kumar Shukla, Pathologist, District Hospital, Rae Bareilly aged 19 years at the time of her death. This would mean as though the appellant husband was much younger to his wife which is not the usual practice in the Indian context and may happen but infrequently. So also the fact that the appellant obtained the school leaving certificate as late as on 17-11-2009 i.e. after the conclusion of the trial and disposal of the first appeal by the High Court, may call for a close scrutiny and examination of the relevant school record to determine whether the same is free from any suspicion, fabrication or manipulation. It is also alleged that the electoral rolls showed the age of the accused to be around 20 years while the extract from the panchayat register showed him to be 19 years old. 

11. All these aspects would call for close and careful scrutiny by the court below while determining the age of the appellant. The date of birth of appellant Jitendra Singh's siblings and his parents may also throw considerable light upon these aspects and may have to be looked into for a proper determination of the question. Suffice it to say while for the present we consider it to be a case fit for directing an enquiry, that direction should not be taken as an expression of any final opinion as regards the true and correct age of the appellant which matter shall have to be independently examined on the basis of the relevant material.” 

32. In Daya Nand v. State of Haryana [(2011) 2 SCC 224], this Court found that on the date of occurrence the age of the appellant was sixteen years five months and nineteen days and, accordingly, it was held that he could not have been kept in prison to undergo the sentence imposed by the Additional Sessions Judge and affirmed by the High Court. This Court set aside the sentence imposed against the appellant and he was directed to be released from prison. 

33. In Lakhan Lal v. State of Bihar [(2011) 2 SCC 251], the question was about the applicability of 2000 Act where the appellants were not juveniles within the meaning of 1986 Act as they were above 16 years of age but had not completed 18 years of age when offences were committed and even when claim of juvenility was raised after they had attained 18 years of age. This Court gave benefit of 2000 Act to the appellants and they were directed to be released forthwith. 

34. In Shah Nawaz v. State of Uttar Pradesh and another [(2011) 13 SCC 751], the matter reached this Court from the judgment and order of the Allahabad High Court. An F.I.R. was lodged against the appellant, Shah Nawaz, and three others for the offences punishable under Sections 302 and 307 of IPC. The mother of the appellant submitted an application before the Board stating that Shah Nawaz was minor at the time of alleged occurrence. The Board after holding an enquiry declared Shah Nawaz a juvenile under the 2000 Act. The wife of the deceased filed criminal appeal against the judgment of the Board before the Additional Sessions Judge, Muzaffarnagar. That appeal was allowed and the order of the Board was set aside. Shah Nawaz preferred criminal revision before the High Court against the order of the Additional Sessions Judge which was dismissed giving rise to appeal by special leave before this Court. This Court considered Rule 12 of 2007 Rules and also noted, amongst others, the decision in Hari Ram3 and then on consideration of the documents, particularly entry relating to the date of birth entered in the marksheet held that Shah Nawaz was juvenile on the date of occurrence of the incident. This Court in paragraphs 23 and 24 of the Report held as under: 

“23. The documents furnished above clearly show that the date of birth of the appellant had been noted as 18-6-1989. Rule 12 of the Rules categorically envisages that the medical opinion from the Medical Board should be sought only when the matriculation certificate or school certificate or any birth certificate issued by a corporation or by any panchayat or municipality is not available. We are of the view that though the Board has correctly accepted the entry relating to the date of birth in the marksheet and school certificate, the Additional Sessions Judge and the High Court committed a grave error in determining the age of the appellant ignoring the date of birth mentioned in those documents which is illegal, erroneous and contrary to the Rules. 

24. We are satisfied that the entry relating to date of birth entered in the marksheet is one of the valid proofs of evidence for determination of age of an accused person. The school leaving certificate is also a valid proof in determining the age of the accused person. Further, the date of birth mentioned in the High School marksheet produced by the appellant has duly been corroborated by the school leaving certificate of the appellant of Class X and has also been proved by the statement of the clerk of Nehru High School, Dadheru, Khurd-o-Kalan and recorded by the Board. The date of birth of the appellant has also been recorded as 18-6-1989 in the school leaving certificate issued by the Principal of Nehru Preparatory School, Dadheru, Khurd-o-Kalan, Muzaffarnagar as well as the said date of birth mentioned in the school register of the said School at Sl. No. 1382 which have been proved by the statement of the Principal of that School recorded before the Board.” 

In paragraph 26 of the Report, this Court observed that Rule 12 has described four categories of evidence which gave preference to school certificate over the medical report. 

35. In Pawan, a 3-Judge Bench has laid down the standards for evaluating claim of juvenility raised for the first time before this Court. If Pawan8 had been cited before the Bench when criminal appeal of Abuzar Hossain @ Gulam Hossain came up for hearing, perhaps reference would not have been made. Be that as it may, in light of the discussion made above, we intend to summarise the legal position with regard to Section 7A of 2000 Act and Rule 12 of the 2007 Rules. But before we do that, we say a word about the argument raised on behalf of the State of Bihar that claim of juvenility cannot be raised before this Court after disposal of the case. The argument is so hopeless that it deserves no discussion. The expression, ‘any court’ in Section 7A is too wide and comprehensive; it includes this Court. Supreme Court Rules surely do not limit the operation of Section 7A to the courts other than this Court where the plea of juvenility is raised for the first time after disposal of the case. 

36. Now, we summarise the position which is as under: 

(i) A claim of juvenility may be raised at any stage even after final disposal of the case. It may be raised for the first time before this Court as well after final disposal of the case. The delay in raising the claim of juvenility cannot be a ground for rejection of such claim. The claim of juvenility can be raised in appeal even if not pressed before the trial court and can be raised for the first time before this Court though not pressed before the trial court and in appeal court. 

(ii) For making a claim with regard to juvenility after conviction, the claimant must produce some material which may prima facie satisfy the court that an inquiry into the claim of juvenility is necessary. Initial burden has to be discharged by the person who claims juvenility. 

(iii) As to what materials would prima facie satisfy the court and/or are sufficient for discharging the initial burden cannot be catalogued nor can it be laid down as to what weight should be given to a specific piece of evidence which may be sufficient to raise presumption of juvenility but the documents referred to in Rule 12(3)(a)(i) to (iii) shall definitely be sufficient for prima facie satisfaction of the court about the age of the delinquent necessitating further enquiry under Rule 12. The statement recorded under Section 313 of the Code is too tentative and may not by itself be sufficient ordinarily to justify or reject the claim of juvenility. The credibility and/or acceptability of the documents like the school leaving certificate or the voters’ list, etc. obtained after conviction would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case and no hard and fast rule can be prescribed that they must be prima facie accepted or rejected. In Akbar Sheikh2 and Pawan8 these documents were not found prima facie credible while in Jitendra Singh10 the documents viz., school leaving certificate, marksheet and the medical report were treated sufficient for directing an inquiry and verification of the appellant’s age. If such documents prima facie inspire confidence of the court, the court may act upon such documents for the purposes of Section 7A and order an enquiry for determination of the age of the delinquent. 

(iv) An affidavit of the claimant or any of the parents or a sibling or a relative in support of the claim of juvenility raised for the first time in appeal or revision or before this Court during the pendency of the matter or after disposal of the case shall not be sufficient justifying an enquiry to determine the age of such person unless the circumstances of the case are so glaring that satisfy the judicial conscience of the court to order an enquiry into determination of age of the delinquent. 

(v) The court where the plea of juvenility is raised for the first time should always be guided by the objectives of the 2000 Act and be alive to the position that the beneficent and salutary provisions contained in 2000 Act are not defeated by hyper-technical approach and the persons who are entitled to get benefits of 2000 Act get such benefits. The courts should not be unnecessarily influenced by any general impression that in schools the parents/guardians understate the age of their wards by one or two years for future benefits or that age determination by medical examination is not very precise. The matter should be considered prima facie on the touchstone of preponderance of probability. 

(vi) Claim of juvenility lacking in credibility or frivolous claim of juvenility or patently absurd or inherently improbable claim of juvenility must be rejected by the court at threshold whenever raised. 

37. The reference is answered in terms of the position highlighted in paragraph 36 (i) to (vi). 

The matters shall now be listed before the concerned Bench(es) for disposal

Second / Successive Notice of Dishonour can also be basis of Prosecution under S. 138 Negotiable Instruments Act : Supreme Court Rules

Justice TS Thakur
Supreme Court of India

The Supreme Court in MSR Leathers Vs. S. Palaniappan has held that prosecution based upon second or successive dishonour of the cheque is also permissible so long as the same satisfies the requirements stipulated in the proviso to Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. The present case overrules Sadanandan Bhadran v. Madhavan Sunil Kumar (1998) 6 SCC 514 which laid down that cause of action under Section 138 arose only once and if the concept of successive causes of action were to be accepted the same would make the limitation under Section 142(b) otiose.

In Sadanandan Bhadran v. Madhavan Sunil Kumar (1998) 6 SCC 514, this Court was dealing with a case under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instrument Act, 1881 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’) in which the complainant had, after dishonour of a cheque issued in his favour, taken steps to serve upon the accused-drawer of the cheque a notice under clause (b) of proviso to Section 138 of the Act. No complaint was, however, filed by the complainant despite failure of the accused to arrange the payment of the amount covered by the cheque. Instead, the complainant-payee of the cheque had presented the cheque for collection once again, which was dishonoured a second time for want of sufficient funds. Another notice was served on the drawer of the cheque to arrange payment within fifteen days of receipt of said notice. Only after failure of drawer to do so did the payee file a complaint against the former under Section 138 of the Act. 

2. After entering appearance, the drawer filed an application seeking discharge on the ground that the payee could not create more than one cause of action in respect of a single cheque and the complaint in question having been filed on the basis of the second presentation and resultant second cause of action was not maintainable. The Magistrate accepted that contention relying upon a Division Bench decision of Kerala High Court in Kumaresan v. Ameerappa (1991) 1 Ker L.T. 893 and dismissed the complaint. The order passed by the Magistrate was then questioned before the High Court of Kerala who relying upon Kumaresan’s case (supra) upheld the order passed by the Magistrate. The matter was eventually brought up to this Court by special leave. This Court formulated the following question for determination: 

“Whether payee or holder of cheque can initiate proceeding of prosecution under Section 138 of Negotiable Instrument Act, 1881 for the second time if he has not initiated any action on earlier cause of action?” 

3. Answering the question in the negative this Court held that a combined reading of Sections 138 and 142 of the Act left no room for doubt that cause of action under Section 142(b) can arise only once. The conclusion observed by the court is supported not only by Sections 138 and 142 but also by the fact that the dishonour of cheque gives rise to the commission of offence only on the failure to pay money when a notice is served upon the drawer in accordance with clause (b) of the proviso to Section 138. The Court further held that if the concept of successive causes of action were to be accepted the same would make the limitation under Section 142(b) otiose. The Court observed: 

“7. Besides the language of Sections 138 and 142 which clearly postulates only one cause of action, there are other formidable impediments which negate the concept of successive causes of action. One of them is that for dishonour of one cheque, there can be only one offence and such offence is committed by the drawer immediately on his failure to make the payment within fifteen days of the receipt of the notice served in accordance with clause (b) of the proviso to Section 138. That necessarily means that for similar failure after service of fresh notice on subsequent dishonour, the drawer cannot be liable for any offence nor can the first offence be treated as non est so as to give the payee a right to file a complaint treating the second offence as the first one. At that stage, it will not be a question of waiver of the right of the payee to prosecute the drawer but of absolution of the drawer of an offence, which stands already committed by him and which cannot be committed by him again. 

8. The other impediment to the acceptance of the concept of successive causes of action is that it will make the period of limitation under clause (c) of Section 142 otiose, for, a payee who failed to file his complaint within one month and thereby forfeited his right to prosecute the drawer, can circumvent the above limitative clause by filing a complaint on the basis of a fresh presentation of the cheque and its dishonour. Since in the interpretation of statutes, the court always presumes that the legislature inserted every part thereof for a purpose and the legislative intention is that every part should have effect, the above conclusion cannot be drawn for that will make the provision for limiting the period of making the complaint nugatory.” 

4. The Court then tried to reconcile the apparently conflicting provisions of the Act - one enabling the payee to present the cheque and the other giving him opportunity to file a complaint within one month and observed: 

“.....Having given our anxious consideration to this question, we are of the opinion that the above two provisions can be harmonised, with the interpretation that on each presentation of the cheque and its dishonour, a fresh right — and not cause of action — accrues in his favour. He may, therefore, without taking pre-emptory action in exercise of his such right under clause (b) of Section 138, go on presenting the cheque so as to enable him to exercise such right at any point of time during the validity of the cheque. But once he gives a notice under clause (b) of Section 138, he forfeits such right for in case of failure of the drawer to pay the money within the stipulated time, he would be liable for offence and the cause of action for filing the complaint will arise. Needless to say, the period of one month for filing the complaint will be reckoned from the day immediately following the day on which the period of fifteen days from the date of the receipt of the notice by the drawer expires.” 

5. The Court accordingly dismissed the appeal while affirming the decision of the Kerala High Court in Kumaresan’s case (supra), no matter the same had been in the meantime overruled by a decision of the Full Bench of that Court in S.K.D. Lakshmanan Fireworks Industries v. K.V. Sivarama Krishnan (1995) Cri L J 1384 (Ker). 

6. When the present appeal first came up for hearing before a bench comprising Markandey Katju and B. Sudershan Reddy, JJ., reliance on behalf of respondents was placed upon the decision of this Court in Sadanandan Bhadran’s case (supra) to argue that the complaint in the instant case had also been filed on the basis of the second dishonour of a cheque after the payee of the cheque had issued a notice to the drawer under clause (b) of the proviso to Section 138 of the Act based on an earlier dishonour. On the ratio of Sadanandan Bhadran’s case (supra) such a complaint was not maintainable, argued the respondents. The Court, however, expressed its reservation about the correctness of the view taken in Sadanandan Bhadran’s case (supra) especially in para 9 thereof and accordingly referred the matter to a larger Bench. That is precisely how the present appeal has come up for hearing before us. It is, therefore, evident that this Court has repeatedly followed the view taken in Sadanandan Bhadran’s case (supra). But a careful reading of these decisions reveals that in these subsequent decisions there had been no addition to the ratio underlying the conclusion in Sadanandan Bhadran’s case (supra). 

7. Before adverting to the submissions that were urged at the Bar we may briefly summarise the facts in the backdrop of which the issue arises for our determination. Four cheques for a total sum of rupees ten lakhs were issued by the respondent-company on 14th August, 1996 in favour of the appellant which were presented to the bank for collection on 21st November, 1996. The cheques were dishonoured in terms of memo dated 22nd November, 1996 for insufficiency of funds. A notice under clause (b) of proviso to Section 138 was then issued by the appellant to the respondent on 8th January, 1997 demanding payment of the amount covered by the cheques. Despite receipt of the notice by the respondent the payment was not arranged. The appellant’s case is that the respondent assured the appellant that the funds necessary for the encashment of the cheques shall be made available by the respondent, for which purpose the cheques could be presented again to the bank concerned. The cheques were accordingly presented for the second time to the bank on 21st January, 1997 and were dishonoured for a second time in terms of a memo dated 22nd January, 1997 once again on the ground of insufficiency of funds. A statutory notice issued by the appellant under clause (b) of proviso to Section 138 of the Act on 28th January, 1997 called upon the respondent-drawer of the cheques to arrange payment of the amount within 15 days. Despite receipt of the said notice on 3rd February, 1997, no payment was arranged which led to the filing of Complaint Case No.1556-1557/1997 by the appellant before the II Metropolitan Magistrate, Madras for the offence punishable under Section 138 read with Section 142 of the Act. The Magistrate took cognizance and issued summons to the respondents in response whereto the respondents entered appearance and sought discharge primarily on the ground that the complaint had not been filed within 30 days of the expiry of the notice based on the first dishonour of the cheque. It was also alleged that the statutory notice which formed the basis of the complaint had not been served upon the accused persons. The Magistrate upon consideration dismissed the applications for discharge which order was then assailed by the respondents before the High Court of Madras in Criminal Appeal Nos. 618, 624, 664, 665/2000. 

8. The High Court has, by the order impugned in this appeal, allowed the revision and quashed the orders passed by the Magistrate relying upon the decision of this Court in Sadanandan Bhadran’s case (supra) according to which a complaint based on a second or successive dishonour of the cheque was not maintainable if no complaint based on an earlier dishonour, followed by the statutory notice issued on the basis thereof, had been filed. 

9. Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, constituting Chapter XVII of the Act which was introduced by Act 66 of 1988, inter alia, provides: 

“138. Dishonour of cheque for insufficiency, etc., of funds in the account. Where any cheque drawn by a person on an account maintained by him with a banker for payment of any amount of money to another person from out of that account for the discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or other liability, is returned by the bank unpaid, either because of the amount of money standing to the credit of that account is insufficient to honour the cheque or that it exceeds the amount arranged to be paid from that account by an agreement made with that bank, such person shall be deemed to have committed an offence and shall, without prejudice. to any other provision of this Act, be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to two year, or with fine which may extend to twice the amount of the cheque, or with both” 

10. Proviso to Section 138, however, is all important and stipulates three distinct conditions precedent, which must be satisfied before the dishonour of a cheque can constitute an offence and become punishable. The first condition is that the cheque ought to have been presented to the bank within a period of six months from the date on which it is drawn or within the period of its validity, whichever is earlier. The second condition is that the payee or the holder in due course of the cheque, as the case may be, ought to make a demand for the payment of the said amount of money by giving a notice in writing, to the drawer of the cheque, within thirty days of the receipt of information by him from the bank regarding the return of the cheque as unpaid. The third condition is that the drawer of such a cheque should have failed to make payment of the said amount of money to the payee or as the case may be, to the holder in due course of the cheque within fifteen days of the receipt of the said notice. It is only upon the satisfaction of all the three conditions mentioned above and enumerated under the proviso to Section 138 as clauses (a), (b) and (c) thereof that an offence under Section 138 can be said to have been committed by the person issuing the cheque. 

11. Section 142 of the Negotiable Instruments Act governs taking of cognizance of the offence and starts with a non-obstante clause. It provides that no court shall take cognizance of any offence punishable under Section 138 except upon a complaint, in writing, made by the payee or, as the case may be, by the holder in due course and such complaint is made within one month of the date on which the cause of action arises under clause (c) of the proviso to Section 138. In terms of sub-section (c) to Section 142, no court inferior to that of a Metropolitan Magistrate or a Judicial Magistrate of the first class is competent to try any offence punishable under Section 138. 

12. A careful reading of the above provisions makes it manifest that a complaint under Section 138 can be filed only after cause of action to do so has accrued in terms of clause (c) of proviso to Section 138 which, as noticed earlier, happens no sooner than when the drawer of the cheque fails to make the payment of the cheque amount to the payee or the holder of the cheque within 15 days of the receipt of the notice required to be sent in terms of clause (b) of proviso to Section 138 of the Act. 

13. What is important is that neither Section 138 nor Section 142 or any other provision contained in the Act forbids the holder or payee of the cheque from presenting the cheque for encashment on any number of occasions within a period of six months of its issue or within the period of its validity, whichever is earlier. That such presentation will be perfectly legal and justified was not disputed before us even at the Bar by learned counsel appearing for the parties and rightly so in light of the judicial pronouncements on that question which are all unanimous. Even Sadanandan Bhadran’s case (supra) the correctness whereof we are examining, recognized that the holder or the payee of the cheque has the right to present the same any number of times for encashment during the period of six months or during the period of its validity, whichever is earlier. 

14. Presentation of the cheque and dishonour thereof within the period of its validity or a period of six months is just one of the three requirements that constitutes ‘cause of action’ within the meaning of Sections 138 and 142(b) of the Act, an expression that is more commonly used in civil law than in penal statutes. For a dishonour to culminate into the commission of an offence of which a court may take cognizance, there are two other requirements, namely, (a) service of a notice upon the drawer of the cheque to make payment of the amount covered by the cheque and (b) failure of the drawer to make any such payment within the stipulated period of 15 days of the receipt of such a notice. It is only when the said two conditions are superadded to the dishonour of the cheque that the holder/payee of the cheque acquires the right to institute proceedings for prosecution under Section 138 of the Act, which right remains legally enforceable for a period of 30 days counted from the date on which the cause of action accrued to him. There is, however, nothing in the proviso to Section 138 or Section 142 for that matter, to oblige the holder/payee of a dishonoured cheque to necessarily file a complaint even when he has acquired an indefeasible right to do so. The fact that an offence is complete need not necessarily lead to launch of prosecution especially when the offence is not a cognizable one. It follows that the complainant may, even when he has the immediate right to institute criminal proceedings against the drawer of the cheque, either at the request of the holder/payee of the cheque or on his own volition, refrain from instituting the proceedings based on the cause of action that has accrued to him. Such a decision to defer prosecution may be impelled by several considerations but more importantly it may be induced by an assurance which the drawer extends to the holder of the cheque that given some time the payment covered by the cheques would be arranged, in the process rendering a time consuming and generally expensive legal recourse unnecessary. It may also be induced by a belief that a fresh presentation of the cheque may result in encashment for a variety of reasons including the vicissitudes of trade and business dealings where financial accommodation given by the parties to each other is not an unknown phenomenon. Suffice it to say that there is nothing in the provisions of the Act that forbids the holder/payee of the cheque to demand by service of a fresh notice under clause (b) of proviso to Section 138 of the Act, the amount covered by the cheque, should there be a second or a successive dishonour of the cheque on its presentation. 

15. Sadanandan Bhadran’s case (supra) holds that while a second or successive presentation of the cheque is legally permissible so long as such presentation is within the period of six months or the validity of the cheque whichever is earlier, the second or subsequent dishonour of the cheque would not entitle the holder/payee to issue a statutory notice to the drawer nor would it entitle him to institute legal proceedings against the drawer in the event he fails to arrange the payment. The decision gives three distinct reasons why that should be so. The first and the foremost of these reasons is the use of the expression “cause of action” in Section 142(b) of the Act which according to the Court has been used in a restrictive sense and must therefore be understood to mean that cause of action under Section 142(b) can arise but once. The second reason cited for the view taken in the Sadanandan Bhadran’s case (supra) is that dishonour of a cheque will lead to commission of only one offence and that the offence is complete no sooner the drawer fails to make the payment of the cheque amount within a period of 15 days of the receipt of the notice served upon him. The Court has not pressed into service the doctrine of “waiver of the right to prosecute” but held that the failure of the holder to institute proceedings would tantamount to “absolution” of the drawer of the offence committed by him. The third and the only other reason is that successive causes of action will militate against the provisions of Section 142(b) and make the said provision otiose. The Court in Sadanandan Bhadran’s case (supra) held that the failure of the drawer/payee to file a complaint within one month resulted in forfeiture of the complainant’s right to prosecute the drawer/payee which forfeiture cannot be circumvented by him by presenting the cheque afresh and inviting a dishonour to be followed by a fresh notice and a delayed complaint on the basis thereof. 

16. With utmost respect to the Judges who decided Sadanandan Bhadran’s case (supra) we regret our inability to fall in line with the above line of reasoning to hold that while a cheque is presented afresh the right to prosecute the drawer, if the cheque is dishonoured, is forfeited only because the previous dishonour had not resulted in immediate prosecution of the offender even when a notice under clause (b) of proviso to Section 138 had been served upon the drawer. We are conscious of the fact that Sadanandan Bhadran’s case (supra) has been followed in several subsequent decisions of this Court such as in Sil Import, USA v. Exim Aides Silk Exporters, Bangalore, (1999) 4 SCC 567, Uniplas India Ltd. and Ors. v. State (Govt. of NCT Delhi) and Anr., (2001) 6 SCC 8, Dalmia Cement (Bharat) Ltd. v. Galaxy Traders & Agencies Ltd. and Anr., (2001) 6 SCC 463, Prem Chand Vijay Kumar v. Yashpal Singh and Anr., (2005) 4 SCC 417, S.L. Constructions and Anr. v. Alapati Srinivasa Rao and Anr., (2009) 1 SCC 500, Tameshwar Vaishnav v. Ramvishal Gupta, (2010) 2 SCC 329. 

17. All these decisions have without disturbing or making any addition to the rationale behind the decision in Sadanandan Bhadran’s case (supra) followed the conclusion drawn in the same. We, therefore, propose to deal with the three dimensions that have been highlighted in that case while holding that successive causes of action are not within the comprehension of Sections 138 and 142 of the Act. 

18. The expression ‘cause of action’ is more commonly and easily understood in the realm of civil laws. The expression is not defined anywhere in the Code of Civil Procedure to which it generally bears relevance but has been universally understood to mean the bundle of facts which the plaintiff must prove in order to entitle him to succeed in the suit. (See State of Madras v. C.P. Agencies AIR 1960 SC 1309; Rajasthan High Court Advocates Association v. U.O.I. & Ors. AIR 2001 SC 416 and Mohamed Khaleel Khan v. Mahaboob Ali Mia AIR 1949 PC 78). 

19. Section 142 of the Negotiable Instruments Act is perhaps the only penal provision in a statute which uses the expression ‘cause of action’ in relation to the commission of an offence or the institution of a complaint for the prosecution of the offender. A careful reading of Sections 138 and 142, as noticed above, makes it abundantly clear that the cause of action to institute a complaint comprises the three different factual prerequisites for the institution of a complaint to which we have already referred in the earlier part of this order. None of these prerequisites is in itself sufficient to constitute a complete cause of action for an offence under Section 138. For instance if a cheque is not presented within a period of six months from the date on which it is drawn or within the period of its validity, whichever is earlier, no cause of action would accrue to the holder of the cheque even when the remaining two requirements, namely service of a notice and failure of the drawer to make the payment of the cheque amount are established on facts. So also presentation of the cheque within the stipulated period without service of a notice in terms of Section 138 proviso (b) would give no cause of action to the holder to prosecute the drawer just as the failure of the drawer to make the payment demanded on the basis of a notice that does not satisfy the requirements of clause (b) of proviso to Section 138 would not constitute a complete cause of action. 

20. The expression ‘cause of action’ appearing in Section 142 (b) of the Act cannot therefore be understood to be limited to any given requirement out of the three requirements that are mandatory for launching a prosecution on the basis of a dishonoured cheque. Having said that, every time a cheque is presented in the manner and within the time stipulated under the proviso to Section 138 followed by a notice within the meaning of clause (b) of proviso to Section 138 and the drawer fails to make the payment of the amount within the stipulated period of fifteen days after the date of receipt of such notice, a cause of action accrues to the holder of the cheque to institute proceedings for prosecution of the drawer. 

21. There is, in our view, nothing either in Section 138 or Section 142 to curtail the said right of the payee, leave alone a forfeiture of the said right for no better reason than the failure of the holder of the cheque to institute prosecution against the drawer when the cause of action to do so had first arisen. Simply because the prosecution for an offence under Section 138 must on the language of Section 142 be instituted within one month from the date of the failure of the drawer to make the payment does not in our view militate against the accrual of multiple causes of action to the holder of the cheque upon failure of the drawer to make the payment of the cheque amount. In the absence of any juristic principle on which such failure to prosecute on the basis of the first default in payment should result in forfeiture, we find it difficult to hold that the payee would lose his right to institute such proceedings on a subsequent default that satisfies all the three requirements of Section 138. 

22. That brings us to the question whether an offence punishable under Section 138 can be committed only once as held by this Court in Sadanandan Bhadran’s case (supra). The holder of a cheque as seen earlier can present it before a bank any number of times within the period of six months or during the period of its validity, whichever is earlier. This right of the holder to present the cheque for encashment carries with it a corresponding obligation on the part of the drawer to ensure that the cheque drawn by him is honoured by the bank who stands in the capacity of an agent of the drawer vis-à-vis the holder of the cheque. If the holder of the cheque has a right, as indeed is in the unanimous opinion expressed in the decisions on the subject, there is no reason why the corresponding obligation of the drawer should also not continue every time the cheque is presented for encashment if it satisfies the requirements stipulated in that clause (a) to the proviso to Section 138. There is nothing in that proviso to even remotely suggest that clause (a) would have no application to a cheque presented for the second time if the same has already been dishonoured once. Indeed if the legislative intent was to restrict prosecution only to cases arising out of the first dishonour of a cheque nothing prevented it from stipulating so in clause (a) itself. In the absence of any such provision a dishonour whether based on a second or any successive presentation of a cheque for encashment would be a dishonour within the meaning of Section 138 and clause (a) to proviso thereof. We have, therefore, no manner of doubt that so long as the cheque remains unpaid it is the continuing obligation of the drawer to make good the same by either arranging the funds in the account on which the cheque is drawn or liquidating the liability otherwise. It is true that a dishonour of the cheque can be made a basis for prosecution of the offender but once, but that is far from saying that the holder of the cheque does not have the discretion to choose out of several such defaults, one default, on which to launch such a prosecution. The omission or the failure of the holder to institute prosecution does not, therefore, give any immunity to the drawer so long as the cheque is dishonoured within its validity period and the conditions precedent for prosecution in terms of the proviso to Section 138 are satisfied. 

23. Coming then to the question whether there is anything in Section 142(b) to suggest that prosecution based on subsequent or successive dishonour is impermissible, we need only mention that the limitation which Sadanandan Bhadran’s case (supra) reads into that provision does not appear to us to arise. We say so because while a complaint based on a default and notice to pay must be filed within a period of one month from the date the cause of action accrues, which implies the date on which the period of 15 days granted to the drawer to arrange the payment expires, there is nothing in Section 142 to suggest that expiry of any such limitation would absolve him of his criminal liability should the cheque continue to get dishonoured by the bank on subsequent presentations. So long as the cheque is valid and so long as it is dishonoured upon presentation to the bank, the holder’s right to prosecute the drawer for the default committed by him remains valid and exercisable. The argument that the holder takes advantage by not filing a prosecution against the drawer has not impressed us. By reason of a fresh presentation of a cheque followed by a fresh notice in terms of Section 138, proviso (b), the drawer gets an extended period to make the payment and thereby benefits in terms of further opportunity to pay to avoid prosecution. Such fresh opportunity cannot help the defaulter on any juristic principle, to get a complete absolution from prosecution. 

24. Absolution is, at any rate, a theological concept which implies an act of forgiving the sinner of his sins upon confession. The expression has no doubt been used in some judicial pronouncements, but the same stop short of recognizing absolution as a juristic concept. It has always been used or understood in common parlance to convey “setting free from guilt” or “release from a penalty”. The use of the expression “absolution” in Sadanandan Bhadran’s case (supra) at any rate came at a time when proviso to Section 142(b) had not found a place on the statute book. That proviso was added by the Negotiable Instruments (Amendment and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 2002 which read as under: 

“Provided that the cognizance of a complaint may be taken by the Court after the prescribed period, if the complainant satisfies the Court that he had sufficient cause for not making a complaint within such period.” 

25. The Statement of Objects and Reasons appended to the Amendment Bill, 2002 suggests that the introduction of this proviso was recommended by the Standing Committee on Finance and other representatives so as to provide discretion to the Court to waive the period of one month, which has been prescribed for taking cognizance of a case under the Act. This was so recognised judicially also by this Court in Subodh S. Salaskar v. Jayprakash M. Shah & Anr. (2008) 13 SCC 689 where this Court observed 

“11. The [Negotiable Instruments] Act was amended in the year 2002 whereby additional powers have been conferred upon the court to take cognizance even after expiry of the period of limitation by conferring on it a discretion to waive the period of one month. xx xx xx xx 

24...The provisions of the Act being special in nature, in terms thereof the jurisdiction of the court to take cognizance of an offence under Section 138 of the Act was limited to the period of thirty days in terms of the proviso appended thereto. The Parliament only with a view to obviate the aforementioned difficulties on the part of the complainant inserted proviso to Clause (b) of Section 142 of the Act in 2002. It confers a jurisdiction upon the court to condone the delay...” 

26. The proviso referred to above now permits the payee to institute prosecution proceedings against a defaulting drawer even after the expiry of the period of one month. If a failure of the payee to file a complaint within a period of one month from the date of expiry of the period of 15 days allowed for this purpose was to result in ‘absolution’, the proviso would not have been added to negate that consequence. The statute as it exists today, therefore, does not provide for ‘absolution’ simply because the period of 30 days has expired or the payee has for some other reasons deferred the filing of the complaint against the defaulter. 

27. It is trite that the object underlying Section 138 of the Act is to promote and inculcate faith in the efficacy of banking system and its operations, giving credibility to Negotiable Instruments in business transactions and to create an atmosphere of faith and reliance by discouraging people from dishonouring their commitments which are implicit when they pay their dues through cheques. The provision was intended to punish those unscrupulous persons who issued cheques for discharging their liabilities without really intending to honour the promise that goes with the drawing up of such a negotiable instrument. It was intended to enhance the acceptability of cheques in settlement of liabilities by making the drawer liable for penalties in case the cheque was dishonoured and to safeguard and prevent harassment of honest drawers. (See Mosaraf Hossain Khan v. Bhagheeratha Engg. Ltd. (2006) 3 SCC 658, C.C. Alavi Haji v. Palapetty Muhammed & Anr. (2007) 6 SCC 555 and Damodar S. Prabhu v. Sayed Babulal H. (2010) 5 SCC 663). Having said that, we must add that one of the salutary principles of interpretation of statutes is to adopt an interpretation which promotes and advances the object sought to be achieved by the legislation, in preference to an interpretation which defeats such object. This Court has in a long line of decisions recognized purposive interpretation as a sound principle for the Courts to adopt while interpreting statutory provisions. We may only refer to the decisions of this Court in New India Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Commissioner of Sales Tax, Bihar (AIR 1963 SC 1207), where this Court observed: 

“It is a recognised rule of interpretation of statutes that expressions used therein should ordinarily be understood in a sense in which they best harmonise with the object of the statute, and which effectuate the object of the Legislature. If an expression is susceptible of a narrow or technical meaning, as well as a popular meaning, the Court would be justified in assuming that the Legislature used the expression in the sense which would carry out its object and reject that which renders the exercise of its power invalid.” 

28. Reference may also be made to the decision of this Court in Deputy Custodian, Evacuee Property v. Official Receiver (AIR 1965 SC 951), where this Court observed: 

“The rules of grammar may suggest that when the section says that the property is evacuee property, it prima facie indicates that the property should bear that character at the time when the opinion is formed. But Mr. Ganapathy Iyer for the appellants has strenuously contended that the construction of s. 7(1) should not be based solely or primarily on the mechanical application of the rules of grammar. He urges that the construction for which Mr. Pathak contents and which, in substance, has been accepted by the High Court, would lead to very anomalous results; and his arguments is that it is open to the Court to take into account the obvious aim and object of the statutory provision when attempting the task of construing its words. If it appears that the obvious aim and object of the statutory provisions would be frustrated by accepting the literal construction suggested by the respondent, then it may be open to the Court to enquire whether an alternative construction which would serve the purpose of achieving the aim and object of the Act, is reasonably possible.” 

29. The decision of this Court in Nathi Devi v. Radha Devi (2005) 2 SCC 271, reiterates the rule of purposive construction in the following words: 

“Even if there exists some ambiguity in the language or the same is capable of two interpretations, it is trite the interpretation which serves the object and purport of the Act must be given effect to. In such a case the doctrine of purposive construction should be adopted.” 

30. To the same effect is the decision of this Court in S.P. Jain v. Krishan Mohan Gupta (1987) 1 SCC 191, where this Court observed: 

“We are of the opinion that law should take a pragmatic view of the matter and respond to the purpose for which it was made and also take cognizance of the current capabilities of technology and life- style of the community. It is well settled that the purpose of law provides a good guide to the interpretation of the meaning of the Act. We agree with the views of Justice Krishna Iyer in Busching Schmitz Private Ltd’s case (supra) that legislative futility is to be ruled out so long as interpretative possibility permits.” 

31. Applying the above rule of interpretation and the provisions of Section 138, we have no hesitation in holding that a prosecution based on a second or successive default in payment of the cheque amount should not be impermissible simply because no prosecution based on the first default which was followed by a statutory notice and a failure to pay had not been launched. If the entire purpose underlying Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act is to compel the drawers to honour their commitments made in the course of their business or other affairs, there is no reason why a person who has issued a cheque which is dishonoured and who fails to make payment despite statutory notice served upon him should be immune to prosecution simply because the holder of the cheque has not rushed to the court with a complaint based on such default or simply because the drawer has made the holder defer prosecution promising to make arrangements for funds or for any other similar reason. There is in our opinion no real or qualitative difference between a case where default is committed and prosecution immediately launched and another where the prosecution is deferred till the cheque presented again gets dishonoured for the second or successive time. 

32. The controversy, in our opinion, can be seen from another angle also. If the decision in Sadanandan Bhadran’s case (supra) is correct, there is no option for the holder to defer institution of judicial proceedings even when he may like to do so for so simple and innocuous a reason as to extend certain accommodation to the drawer to arrange the payment of the amount. Apart from the fact that an interpretation which curtails the right of the parties to negotiate a possible settlement without prejudice to the right of holder to institute proceedings within the outer period of limitation stipulated by law should be avoided we see no reason why parties should, by a process of interpretation, be forced to launch complaints where they can or may like to defer such action for good and valid reasons. After all, neither the courts nor the parties stand to gain by institution of proceedings which may become unnecessary if cheque amount is paid by the drawer. The magistracy in this country is over-burdened by an avalanche of cases under Section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act. If the first default itself must in terms of the decision in Sadanandan Bhadran’s case (supra) result in filing of prosecution, avoidable litigation would become an inevitable bane of the legislation that was intended only to bring solemnity to cheques without forcing parties to resort to proceedings in the courts of law. While there is no empirical data to suggest that the problems of overburdened magistracy and judicial system at the district level is entirely because of the compulsions arising out of the decisions in Sadanandan Bhadran’s case (supra), it is difficult to say that the law declared in that decision has not added to court congestion. 

33. In the result, we overrule the decision in Sadanandan Bhadran’s case (supra) and hold that prosecution based upon second or successive dishonour of the cheque is also permissible so long as the same satisfies the requirements stipulated in the proviso to Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. The reference is answered accordingly. The appeals shall now be listed before the regular Bench for hearing and disposal in light of the observations made above.