Castrate Child Rapists, Delhi ASJ Kamini Lau Suggests

Source : Times of India

In an observation that is bound to spark a debate, a trial court on Saturday advocated the use of "chemical castration" as an alternative to a jail term for rapists. 

Additional sessions judge Kamini Lau said, "The Indian legislatures are yet to... address the issue (of rape) with all seriousness by exploring the possibility of permitting imposition of alternative sentences of surgical castration or chemical castration, particularly in cases involving rape of minors, serial offenders and child molesters or as a condition for probation, or as an alternative sentence in case of plea bargaining." 

Delhi additional sessions judge Kamini Lau suggested castration as an alternative punishment for rapists while hearing the case against a man who had raped his 15-year-old step-daughter for over four years. Though the court sentenced him to 10 year of rigorous imprisonment, it said that such crimes were required to be addressed differently. "A full public debate, with regard to imposition of castration (both surgical and chemical) as an alternative punishment for the offence of rape and molestation, is the need of the hour," ASJ Lau said. The court also imposed a fine of Rs 25,000 on convict Dinesh Yadav, 35, a labourer by profession. 

It directed that a copy of the order be sent to the secretary of ministry of law and justice, Government of India and national commission for women. 

The Indian Penal Code provides only a jail term for sexual offenders. Countries like USA, UK, Germany, etc, have started using chemical castration as an alternative. Chemical castration is administration of medication designed to reduce libido and sexual activity, usually in the hope of preventing rapists, child molesters and other sex offenders from repeating their crimes. In surgical castration, the testes or ovaries are removed through an incision in the body. Medical experts, however, are divided on the efficacy of the method. 

The judge observed that though the method is "not the perfect solution to inhibit child molestation", it certainly discourages sexual assault better than incarceration. 

The court expressed its apprehension that the idea may get panned by activists. "I am not oblivious of the fact that arguments are bound to be raised against the above by some activists, but in my view, it would be sheer hypocrisy given the damage the rapist and sexual predators do to their victims,'' the judge added.

Women's Right in Property & Amendment of Hindu Succession Act : Whether Any Retrospective Effect?

Justice P. Nandrajog
Delhi High Court

Justice Pradeep Nandrajog of the Delhi High Court, in Smt. Mukesh & Ors. v. Shri Bharat Singh & Ors. had the occasion to examine the question whether the Amending Act of 2005 in the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 would apply retrospectively and effect succession prior to its enactment. While answering the question in the negative, the Hon'ble court held as under;

5. Section 4 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 as originally enacted read as under:

4. Over-riding effect of Act.-(1) Save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act,-

(a) any text, rule or interpretation of Hindu law or any custom or usage as part of that law in force immediately before the commencement of this Act shall cease to have effect with respect to any matter for which provision is made in this Act;

(b) any other law in force immediately before the commencement of this Act shall cease to apply to Hindus in so far as it is inconsistent with any of the provisions contained in this Act.

2. For the removal of doubts it is hereby declared that nothing contained in this Act shall be deemed to affect the provision of any law for the time being in force providing for the prevention of fragmentation of agricultural holdings or for the fixation of ceilings or for the devolution of tenancy rights in respect of such holdings.

6. Section 50 of the Delhi Land Reforms Act, 1954 reads as under:

50. General order of succession from males.- Subject to the provisions of Section 48 and 52, when a Bhumidar or Asami being a male dies, his interest in his holding shall devolve in accordance with the order of the succession given below:

(a) male lineal descendants in the male line of the descent:

Provided that no member of this class shall inherit if any male descendant between him and the deceased is alive:

Provided further that the son or sons of a predeceased son howsoever low shall inherit the share which would have devolved upon the deceased if he had been then alive;

(b) widow;

(c) father;

(d) mother, being a widow;

(e) step mother, being a widow;

(f) father's father;

(g) father's mother, being a widow;

(h) widow of a male lineal descendant in the male line of descent;

(i) brother being the son of same father as the deceased;

(j) unmarried sister;

(k) brother's son, the brother having been son of the same father as the deceased;

(l) father's father's son;

(m) brother's son's son;

(n) father's father's son's son;

(o) daughter's son.

7. Due to Sub-section 2 to Section 4 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 the rule of succession stipulated under the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 was subject to any law for the time being in force relating to agricultural holdings. Thus, if succession to an agricultural holding was stipulated in any local law applicable to an agricultural holding, provisions thereof would apply relating to devolution of interest in a holding. The effect of deletion of Sub-section 2 to Section 4 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 due to the promulgation of the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005 is that with effect from the date when the Amending Act was promulgated succession would be as per the Hindu Succession Act, 1956.

8. Prima facie, the Amending Act of 2005 cannot be read retrospectively as the Amending Act has not been given a retrospective operation. Meaning thereby, successions which had taken place prior to the promulgation of the Amendment Act of 2005 cannot be disturbed.

9. Section 3 of the Amending Act has substituted the existing Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act. One gets a clue of the legislative intent when one looks at Sub-Section 3 of Section 6, as amended. It stipulates that where a Hindu dies after the commencement of the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005 his interest in the property of a joint family governed by Mitakshara Law shall devolve by testamentary or intestate succession and not by survivorship. A daughter is given a share equal to that of a son.

10. In respect of the co-parcenery property the right of a daughter to receive a share equal to that of a son applies only if the death of male Hindu is after commencement of the Amendment Act, 2005.

11. Thus, the prima facie view recorded by the learned Trial Judge is correct.

Dowry Death - Meaning : Supreme Court explains

Justice Lodha

We have dealt with various posts, relating to the Law of Dowry in India. The Supreme Court in Satya Narain Tiwari @ Jolly v. State of UP went to the extent of observing that Bride Burning cases should be treated as 'rarest of the rare'. In a recent case of Bachni Devi v. State of Haryana, Justice R.M. Lodha examined the relevant provisions of S. 304 B of the IPC, as under;

11. Section 304B was inserted in IPC with effect from November 19, 1986 by the Dowry Prohibition (Amendment) Act, 1986 (for short, `(Amendment) Act, 1986'). Thereby substantive offence relating to `dowry death' was introduced in the IPC. Section 304-B IPC reads as follows :

"304B. Dowry death.--(1) Where the death of a woman is caused by any burns or bodily injury or occurs otherwise than under normal circumstances within seven years of her marriage and it is shown that soon before her death she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry, such death shall be called "dowry death", and such husband or relative shall be deemed to have caused her death.

Explanation.- For the purposes of this sub- section," dowry" shall have the same meaning as in section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 (28 of 1961 ).

(2) Whoever commits dowry death shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than seven years but which may extend to imprisonment for life."

12. For making out an offence of `dowry death' under Section 304B, the following ingredients have to be proved by the prosecution:

(a) death of a woman must have been caused by any burns or bodily injury or her death must have occurred otherwise than under normal circumstances;

(b) such death must have occurred within seven years of her marriage;

(c) soon before her death, she must have been subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband; and

(d) such cruelty or harassment must be in connection with the demand for dowry.

13. Pertinently, for the purposes of Section 304B IPC, `dowry' has the same meaning as in Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 (for short, `1961 Act').

14. Section 2 of the 1961 Act defines `Dowry' as follows:

"2. Definition of `dowry'.- "Dowry" means any property or valuable security given or agreed to be given either directly or indirectly--

(a) By one party to a marriage to the other party to the marriage; or

(b) By the parent of either party to a marriage or by any other person to either party to the marriage or to any other person, at or before or any time after the marriage in connection with the marriage of the said parties, but does not include dower or mahr in the case of persons to whom the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) applies.

Explanation I--............(Omitted).

Explanation II--The expression "valuable security" has the same meaning as in section 30 of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860)."

15. 1961 Act was enacted to prohibit the giving or taking of `dowry' and for the protection of married woman against cruelty and violence in the matrimonial home by the husband and in-laws. The mere demand for `dowry' before marriage, at the time of marriage or any time after the marriage is an offence. 1961 Act has been amended by the Parliament on more than one occasion and by the (Amendment) Act, 1986, Parliament brought in stringent provisions and provided for offence relating to `dowry death'. The amendments became imperative as the dowry deaths continued to increase to disturbing proportions and the existing provisions in 1961 Act were found inadequate in dealing with the problems of dowry deaths. The definition of `dowry' reproduced above would show that the term is defined comprehensively to include properties of all sorts as it takes within its fold `any property or valuable security' given or agreed to be given in connection with marriage either directly or indirectly. In S. Gopal Reddy v. State of A.P. , this Court stated as follows : "9. The definition of the term `dowry' under Section 2 of the Act shows that any property or valuable security given or "agreed to be given" either directly or indirectly by one party to the marriage to the other party to the marriage "at or before or after the marriage" as a "consideration for the marriage of the said parties" would become `dowry' punishable under the Act. Property or valuable security so as to constitute `dowry' within the meaning of the Act must therefore be given or demanded "as consideration for the marriage".

11. The definition of the expression `dowry' contained in Section 2 of the Act cannot be confined merely to the `demand' of money, property or valuable security "made at or after the performance of marriage" as is urged by Mr Rao. The legislature has in its wisdom while providing for the definition of `dowry' emphasised that any money, property or valuable security given, as a consideration for marriage, "before, at or after" the marriage would be covered by the expression `dowry' and this definition as contained in Section 2 has to be read wherever the expression `dowry' occurs in the Act. Meaning of the expression `dowry' as commonly used and understood is different than the peculiar definition thereof under the Act. Under Section 4 of the Act, mere demand of `dowry' is sufficient to bring home the offence to an accused. Thus, any `demand' of money, property or valuable security made from the bride or her parents or other relatives by the bridegroom or his parents or other relatives or vice versa would fall within the mischief of `dowry' under the Act where such demand is not properly referable to any legally recognised claim and is relatable only to the consideration of marriage. Marriage in this context would include a proposed marriage also more particularly where the non- fulfilment of the "demand of dowry" leads to the ugly consequence of the marriage not taking place at all. The expression `dowry' under the Act must be interpreted in the sense which the statute wishes to attribute to it...............The definition given in the statute is the determinative factor. The Act is a piece of social legislation which aims to check the growing menace of the social evil of dowry and it makes punishable not only the actual receiving of dowry but also the very demand of dowry made before or at the time or after the marriage where such demand is referable to the consideration of marriage. Dowry as a quid pro quo for marriage is prohibited .......... .".

16. While dealing with the term `dowry' in Section 304B IPC, this Court in the case of Kamesh Panjiyar @ Kamlesh Panjiyar v. State of Bihar held as under : "14. The word "dowry" in Section 304-B IPC has to be understood as it is defined in Section 2 of the Dowry Act. Thus, there are three occasions related to dowry. One is before the marriage, second is at the time of marriage and the third "at any time" after the marriage. The third occasion may appear to be unending period. But the crucial words are "in connection with the marriage of the said parties". As was observed in the said case "suicidal death" of a married woman within seven years of her marriage is covered by the expression "death of a woman is caused ... or occurs otherwise than under normal circumstances" as expressed in Section 304-B IPC."

Supreme Court : Illicit relationship of married man is cruelty to his wife

Source : Indlaw.com

The Supreme Court has ruled that an illicit relationship of a married man with another woman amounts to cruelty to his wife. 

A bench, comprising Justices Harjeet Singh Bedi and R M Lodha, while dismissing appeal of Laxman Ram Mane from Raigarh district of Maharashtra, whose wife had committed suicide after being subjected to beating and humiliation by him when she objected to an illicit relationship, noted, 'We are of the opinion that an illicit relationship of a married man with another woman would clearly amount to cruelty within the meaning of Section 498-A of the IPC.'

Add Section 302 IPC in case of Dowry Death : Supreme Court

We had earlier reported a Judgment of the Apex Court where the Bench had opined that Dowry Deaths fall under the category of 'rarest of rare' case and thus is liable to be punished with the death sentence.

In a significant order, passed today, the Supreme Court directed that all trial courts in the country shall add Section 302 IPC (murder) in a case of dowry death under Section 304 B so that death sentence can be given in heinous and barbaric crimes against women. 

A bench comprising Justices Markandey Katju and Gyan Sudha Misra also directed that the copy of this order be sent to Registrar Generals of all High Courts which will circulate it to all trial courts for compliance. 

The apex court disapproved the approach of the Punjab and Haryana High Court which reduced the life sentence given to the appellant Rajbir alias Raju, who killed his wife Sunita by striking her head repeatedly against the wall and finally throttling her, to ten years. 

The apex court issued notice to Rajbir, asking him to explain why life imprisonment awarded to him by the trial court should not be restored. 

The apex court, however, granted bail to his mother considering that she is about 80 years old. 

Sunita was killed within six months of her marriage for not meeting the dowry demands. 

The Supreme Court had in another case issued notice to Sukhdev Singh, asking him to explain why his life imprisonment should not be enhanced to death sentence. 

The apex court in order said, ‘We further direct all trial courts in India to ordinarily add Section 302 to the charge of Section 304 B, so that death sentence can be imposed in such heinous and barbaric crimes against women.’ Justice Katju had earlier described Indian society as sick in view of increasing incidence of murder of young married women to satisfy the lust and greed for dowry

Cabinet clears Sexual Harassment Bill

Source: CNN-IBN

New Delhi: Women employees in India can now sue their colleagues for sexual abuse and harassment after the Union Cabinet on Thursday finally approved the introduction of the Protection of Women against Sexual Harassment at Workplace Bill, 2010 in Parliament.

The bill seeks to ensure protection of women against sexual harassment at the workplace, both in public and private sectors whether organised or unorganized.

Women can now complain against harassment ranging from physical contact, demand or requests for sexual favours, sexually coloured remarks or showing pornography.

The bill, applicable to all organised and unorganised sectors, also has a penalty provision for employers who do not comply.

Implementation of the Bill will be the responsibility of the Central Government in case of its own undertakings/establishments and of the State Governments in respect of every workplace established, owned, controlled or wholly or substantially financed by it as well as of private sector establishments falling within their territory.

Through this implementation mechanism, every employer has the primary duty to implement the provisions of law within his/her establishment while the State and Central Governments have been made responsible for overseeing and ensuring overall implementation of the law. The Governments will also be responsible for maintaining data on the implementation of the law.

Salient features of the Bill are as follows:

1) The Bill proposes a definition of sexual harassment, which is as laid down by the Honourable Supreme Court in Vishaka vs State of Rajasthan (1997). Additionally it recognises the promise or threat to a woman's employment prospects or creation of hostile work environment as 'sexual harassment' at workplace and expressly seeks to prohibit such acts.

2) The Bill provides protection not only to women who are employed but also to any woman who enters the workplace as a client, customer, apprentice, and daily wageworker or in ad-hoc capacity. Students, research scholars in colleges/university and patients in hospitals have also been covered. Further, the Bill seeks to cover workplaces in the unorganised sectors.

3) The Bill provides for an effective complaints and redressal mechanism. Under the proposed Bill, every employer is required to constitute an Internal Complaints Committee. Since a large number of the establishments (41.2 million out of 41.83 million as per Economic Census, 2005) in our country have less than 10 workers for whom it may not be feasible to set up an Internal Complaints Committee (ICC), the Bill provides for setting up of Local Complaints Committee (LCC) to be constituted by the designated District Officer at the district or sub-district levels, depending upon the need. This twin mechanism would ensure that women in any workplace, irrespective of its size or nature, have access to a redressal mechanism. The LCCs will enquire into the complaints of sexual harassment and recommend action to the employer or District Officer.

4) Employers who fail to comply with the provisions of the proposed Bill will be punishable with a fine which may extend to Rs 50,000.

5) Since there is a possibility that during the pendency of the enquiry the woman may be subject to threat and aggression, she has been given the option to seek interim relief in the form of transfer either of her own or the respondent or seek leave from work.

6) The Complaint Committees are required to complete the enquiry within 90 days and a period of 60 days has been given to the employer/District Officer for implementation of the recommendations of the Committee.

7) The Bill provides for safeguards in case of false or malicious complaint of sexual harassment. However, mere inability to substantiate the complaint or provide adequate proof would not make the complainant liable for punishment.

The Original article can be found here.


The Entire Text of the Judgment in Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan is available here.

Bride Burning falls under 'Rarest of Rare' cases : Supreme Court

This snippet may be read in continuation of our previous post on the Law relating to Dowry Death. The Supreme Court, in a recent Judgment has stated that Bride Burning falls under the category of 'rarest of rare' cases and deserves the death penalty.

The Bench comprising Justice Markandey Katju and Justice Gyan Sudha Mishra, opened their judgment with the words "The hallmark of a healthy society is the respect it shows to women. Indian society has become a sick society. This is evident from the large number of cases coming up in this Court (and also in almost all courts in the country) in which young women are being killed by their husbands or by their in-laws by pouring kerosene on them and setting them on fire or by hanging/strangulating them. What is the level of civilsation of a society in which a large number of women are treated in this horrendous and barbaric manner? What has our society become - this is illustrated by this case."

The Bench went on to hold;

"We have carefully perused the impugned judgment and order of the High Court and the judgment of the trial court and other evidence on record. We see no reason to disagree with the judgment and order of the High Court convicting the appellants. In fact, it was really a case under Section 302 IPC and death sentence should have been imposed in such a case, but since no charge under Section 302 IPC was levelled, we cannot do so, otherwise, such cases of bride burning, in our opinion, fall in the category of rarest of rare cases, and hence deserve death sentence. Although bride burning or bride hanging cases have become common in our country, in our opinion, the expression "rarest of rare" as referred to in Bachan Singh Vs. State of Punjab, AIR 1980 SC 898 does not mean that the act is uncommon, it means that the act is brutal and barbaric. Bride killing is certainly barbaric.

Crimes against women are not ordinary crimes committed in a fit of anger or for property. They are social crimes. They disrupt the entire social fabric. Hence, they call for harsh punishment. Unfortunately, what is happening in our society is that out of lust for money people are often demanding dowry and after extracting as much money as they can they kill the wife and marry again and then again they commit the murder of their wife for the same purpose. This is because of total commercialization of our society, and lust for money which induces people to commit murder of the wife. The time has come when we have to stamp out this evil from our society, with an iron hand."

Find the Entire Judgment here.

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The Legal Blog.in

Live In Relationships & Alimony : Supreme Court View

A Supreme Court Bench has said, “An unmarried woman will not be able to claim maintenance by merely spending weekends together or a one night stand would not make it a domestic relationship. Not all live-in relationships will amount to a relationship in the nature of marriage to get the benefit of the Act of 2005 (The Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005) . To get such benefit the conditions mentioned must be satisfied, and this has to be proved by evidence. If a man has a ‘keep’ whom he maintains financially and uses mainly for sexual purpose and / or as a servant it would not, in our opinion, be a relationship in the nature of marriage”.

The Supreme Court stated that a ‘relationship in the nature of marriage’ is akin to a common law marriage. For the purposes of claiming benefits under the domestic violence law, the claimant must satisfy four requirements i.e. (a) the couple must hold themselves out to society as being akin to spouses; (b) they must be of legal age to marry; (c) they must be otherwise qualified to enter into a legal marriage, including being unmarried and (d) they must have voluntarily cohabited and held themselves out to the world as being akin to spouses for a significant period of time.

The entire text of the Judgment is available here.

The Law relating to Dowry Death : Supreme Court Explains

Justice Dr. B.S. Chauhan
Supreme Court of India

The Supreme Court Bench comprising Justice B.S. Chauhan and Justice Swatanter Kumar had the opportunity to deal with provisions of Section 304 B of the Criminal Procedure Code relating to 'Dowry Deaths', in Ashok Kumar v. State of Haryana. The bench, while examining a plethora of judgments on the aspect, examined the law relating to dowry deaths, as it stands today. Some excerpts from the Judgment are given below;

10. The appellant was charged with an offence under Section 304-B of the Code. This penal section clearly spells out the basic ingredients as well as the matters which required to be construed strictly and with significance to the cases where death is caused by burns, bodily injury or the death occurring otherwise than under normal circumstances, in any manner, within 7 years of a marriage. It is the first criteria which the prosecution must prove. Secondly, that ‘soon before her death’ she had been subjected to cruelty or harassment by the husband or any of the relatives of the husband for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry then such a death shall be called ‘dowry death’ and the husband or the relative, as the case may be, will be deemed to have caused such a death. Explanation to this section requires that the expression ‘dowry’ shall have the same meaning as in Section 2 of the Act. The definition of dowry under Section 2 of the Act reads as under : 

“In this Act, "dowry" means any property or valuable security given or agreed to be given either directly or indirectly--

(a) by one party to a marriage to the other party to the marriage; or

(b) by the parent of either party to a marriage or by any other person, to either party to the marriage or to any other person, at or before or any time after the marriage in connection with the marriage of the said parties, but does not include dower or mahr in the case of persons to whom the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) applies.

Explanation II.--The expression "valuable security" has the same meaning as in section 30 of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860).”

11. From the above definition it is clear that, ‘dowry’ means any property or valuable security given or agreed to be given either directly or indirectly by one party to another, by parents of either party to each other or any other person at, before, or at any time after the marriage and in connection with the marriage of the said parties but does not include dower or mahr under the Muslim Personal Law. All the expressions used under this Section are of a very wide magnitude. The expressions ‘or any time after marriage’ and ‘in connection with the marriage of the said parties’ were introduced by amending Act 63 of 1984 and Act 43 of 1986 with effect from 02.10.1985 and 19.11.1986 respectively. These amendments appear to have been made with the intention to cover all demands at the time, before and even after the marriage so far they were in connection with the marriage of the said parties. This clearly shows the intent of the legislature that these expressions are of wide meaning and scope. The expression ‘in connection with the marriage’ cannot be given a restricted or a narrower meaning. The expression ‘in connection with the marriage’ even in common parlance and on its plain language has to be understood generally. The object being that everything, which is offending at any time i.e. at, before or after the marriage, would be covered under this definition, but the demand of dowry has to be ‘in connection with the marriage’ and not so customary that it would not attract, on the face of it, the provisions of this section.

12. At this stage, it will be appropriate to refer to certain examples showing what has and has not been treated by the Courts as ‘dowry’. This Court, in the case of Ram Singh v. State of Haryana [(2008) 4 SCC 70], held that the payments which are customary payments, for example, given at the time of birth of a child or other ceremonies as are prevalent in the society or families to the marriage, would not be covered under the expression ‘dowry’. Again, in the case of Satbir Singh v. State of Punjab [AIR 2001 SC 2828], this Court held that the word ‘dowry’ should be any property or valuable given or agreed to be given in connection with the marriage. The customary payments in connection with birth of a child or other ceremonies are not covered within the ambit of the word ‘dowry’. This Court, in the case of Madhu Sudan Malhotra v. K.C. Bhandari [(1988) Supp. 1 SCC 424], held that furnishing of a list of ornaments and other household articles such as refrigerator, furniture and electrical appliances etc., to the parents or guardians of the bride, at the time of settlement of the marriage, prima facie amounts to demand of dowry within the meaning of Section 2 of the Act. The definition of ‘dowry’ is not restricted to agreement or demand for payment of dowry before and at the time of marriage but even include subsequent demands, was the dictum of this Court in the case of State of Andhra Pradesh v. Raj Gopal Asawa [(2004) 4 SCC 470].

13. The Courts have also taken the view that where the husband had demanded a specific sum from his father-in-law and upon not being given, harassed and tortured the wife and after some days she died, such cases would clearly fall within the definition of ‘dowry’ under the Act. Section 4 of the Act is the penal Section and demanding a ‘dowry’, as defined under Section 2 of the Act, is punishable under this section. As already noticed, we need not deliberate on this aspect, as the accused before us has neither been charged nor punished for that offence. We have examined the provisions of Section 2 of the Act in a very limited sphere to deal with the contentions raised in regard to the applicability of the provisions of Section 304-B of the Code.

14. We have already referred to the provisions of Section 304-B of the Code and the most significant expression used in the Section is ‘soon before her death’. In our view, the expressions ‘soon before her death’ cannot be given a restricted or a narrower meaning. They must be understood in their plain language and with reference to their meaning in common parlance. These are the provisions relating to human behaviour and, therefore, cannot be given such a narrower meaning, which would defeat the very purpose of the provisions of the Act. Of course, these are penal provisions and must receive strict construction. But, even the rule of strict construction requires that the provisions have to be read in conjunction with other relevant provisions and scheme of the Act. Further, the interpretation given should be one which would avoid absurd results on the one hand and would further the object and cause of the law so enacted on the other. 

15. We are of the considered view that the concept of reasonable time is the best criteria to be applied for appreciation and examination of such cases. This Court in the case of Tarsem Singh v. State of Punjab [AIR 2009 SC 1454], held that the legislative object in providing such a radius of time by employing the words ‘soon before her death’ is to emphasize the idea that her death should, in all probabilities, has been the aftermath of such cruelty or harassment. In other words, there should be a reasonable, if not direct, nexus between her death and the dowry related cruelty or harassment inflicted on her. Similar view was expressed by this Court in the case of Yashoda v. State of Madhya Pradesh [(2004) 3 SCC 98], where this Court stated that determination of the period would depend on the facts and circumstances of a given case. However, the expression would normally imply that there has to be reasonable time gap between the cruelty inflicted and the death in question. If this is so, the legislature in its wisdom would have specified any period which would attract the provisions of this Section. However, there must be existence of proximate link between the acts of cruelty along with the demand of dowry and the death of the victim. For want of any specific period, the concept of reasonable period would be applicable. Thus, the cruelty, harassment and demand of dowry should not be so ancient whereafter, the couple and the family members have lived happily and that it would result in abuse of the said protection. Such demand or harassment may not strictly and squarely fall within the scope of these provisions unless definite evidence was led to show to the contrary. These matters, of course, will have to be examined on the facts and circumstances of a given case. 

16. The cruelty and harassment by the husband or any relative could be directly relatable to or in connection with, any demand for dowry. The expression ‘demand for dowry’ will have to be construed ejusdem generis to the word immediately preceding this expression. Similarly, ‘in connection with the marriage’ is an expression which has to be given a wider connotation. It is of some significance that these expressions should be given appropriate meaning to avoid undue harassment or advantage to either of the parties. These are penal provisions but ultimately these are the social legislations, intended to control offences relating to the society as a whole. Dowry is something which existed in our country for a considerable time and the legislature in its wisdom considered it appropriate to enact the law relating to dowry prohibition so as to ensure that any party to the marriage is not harassed or treated with cruelty for satisfaction of demands in consideration and for subsistence of the marriage.

17. The Court cannot ignore one of the cardinal principles of criminal jurisprudence that a suspect in the Indian law is entitled to the protection of Article 20 of the Constitution of India as well as has a presumption of innocence in his favour. In other words, the rule of law requires a person to be innocent till proved guilty. The concept of deeming fiction is hardly applicable to the criminal jurisprudence. In contradistinction to this aspect, the legislature has applied the concept of deeming fiction to the provisions of Section 304-B. Where other ingredients of Section 304-B are satisfied, in that event, the husband or all relatives shall be deemed to have caused her death. In other words, the offence shall be deemed to have been committed by fiction of law. Once the prosecution proves its case with regard to the basic ingredients of Section 304-B, the Court will presume by deemed fiction of law that the husband or the relatives complained of, has caused her death. Such a presumption can be drawn by the Court keeping in view the evidence produced by the prosecution in support of the substantive charge under Section 304-B of the Code. 

18. Of course, deemed fiction would introduce a rebuttable presumption and the husband and his relatives may, by leading their defence and proving that the ingredients of Section 304-B were not satisfied, rebut the same. While referring to raising of presumption under Section 304-B of the Code, this Court, in the case of Kaliyaperumal v. State of Tamil Nadu [AIR 2003 SC 3828], stated the following ingredients which should be satisfied :

“4 ... 1) The question before the Court must be whether the accused has committed the dowry death of a woman. (This means that the presumption can be raised only if the accused is being tried for the offence under Section 304-B, IPC). 

2) The woman was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or his relatives.

3) Such cruelty or harassment was for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry. 

4) Such cruelty or harassment was soon before her death.” 

19. In light of the above essential ingredients, for constituting an offence under Section 304-B of the Code, the Court has to attach specific significance to the time of alleged cruelty and harassment to which the victim was subjected to and the time of her death, as well as whether the alleged demand of dowry was in connection with the marriage. Once these ingredients are satisfied, it would be called the ‘dowry death’ and then, by deemed fiction of law, the husband or the relatives would be deemed to have committed that offence. The learned counsel appearing for the appellant, while relying upon the case of Tarsem Singh (supra), contended that the concept of ‘soon before the death’ is not attracted in relation to the alleged harassment or cruelty inflicted upon the deceased, in the facts of the present case. The oral and documentary evidence produced by the prosecution does not suggest and satisfy the essential ingredients of the offence. 

20. Similarly, reference was also made to the judgment of this Court in the case of Appasaheb v. State of Maharashtra [(2007) 9 SCC 721], to substantiate the contention that there was no co-relation between giving or taking of the property with the marriage of the parties and, as such, the essential ingredients of Section 2 of the Act were missing. Accordingly, it is argued that there was no demand of dowry by the appellant but it was merely an understanding that for his better business, at best, the amounts could be given voluntarily by the father of the deceased. This fact was further sought to be substantiated while referring to the following abstracts of the judgment in the case of Appasaheb (supra):

“6.…….The learned trial Judge then sought clarification from the witnesses by putting the following question: 

“Question: What do you mean by ‘domestic cause’?

Answer: What I meant was that there was a demand for money for defraying expenses of manure, etc. and that was the cause."

In the very next paragraph she stated as under:

“It is not true to suggest that in my statement before the police I never said that ill-treatment was as a result of demand for money from us and its fulfilment. I cannot assign any reason why police did not write about it in my statement.” xxx xxx xxx xxx

9. Two essential ingredients of Section 304-B IPC, apart from others, are (i) death of woman is caused by any burns or bodily injury or occurs otherwise than under normal circumstances, and (ii) woman is subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband for, or in connection with, any demand for “dowry”. The explanation appended to sub-section (1) of Section 304-B IPC says that “dowry” shall have the same meaning as in Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961. xxx xxx xxx xxx

11. In view of the aforesaid definition of the word “dowry” any property or valuable security should be given or agreed to be given either directly or indirectly at or before or any time after the marriage and in connection with the marriage of the said parties. Therefore, the giving or taking of property or valuable security must have some connection with the marriage of the parties and a correlation between the giving or taking of property or valuable security with the marriage of the parties is essential. Being a penal provision it has to be strictly construed. Dowry is a fairly well-known social custom or practice in India. It is well-settled principle of interpretation of statute that if the Act is passed with reference to a particular trade, business or transaction and words are used which everybody conversant with that trade, business or transaction knows or understands to have a particular meaning in it, then the words are to be construed as having that particular meaning. (See Union of India v. Garware Nylons Ltd. and Chemical and Fibres of India Ltd. v. Union of India[(1997) 2 SCC 664].) A demand for money on account of some financial stringency or for meeting some urgent domestic expenses or for purchasing manure cannot be termed as a demand for dowry as the said word is normally understood. The evidence adduced by the prosecution does not, therefore, show that any demand for “dowry” as defined in Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act was made by the appellants as what was allegedly asked for was some money for meeting domestic expenses and for purchasing manure. Since an essential ingredient of Section 304-B IPC viz. demand for dowry is not established, the conviction of the appellants cannot be sustained.”