The Stage has been set - Merger Regulations under the Competition Act

By Zerick Dastur, Senior Associate of J. Sagar & Associates, Advocates & Solicitors

The merger regulations under the Competition Act of 2002 will finally come into effect from June 1, 2011. This was done after a long wait and amidst opposition from various factions of the industry. Though the Competition Act was enacted in 2002, the provisions relating to anti competitive agreements and abuse of dominance were notified to take effect only in May 2009 and finally in March 2011 it has been announced that the provisions of the Act dealing with combination regulation will be brought into force.

Mergers, acquisitions, private equity investments and other like transactions which cross the prescribed thresholds of assets and turnover as provided under the Act will require prior approval of the Competition Commission of India. This includes transactions which are in progress, but are yet to be completed. The thresholds of assets and turnover have been enhanced by 50 percent. However, the general impression that the thresholds prescribed are perhaps on the lower side continues. In order to further facilitate the process, it has been decided that enterprises whose shares, assets or voting rights are being acquired, having assets and turnover of less than Rs. 250 crore and Rs. 750 crore respectively are exempted from the requirement of obtaining the prior approval of the Commission.

The draft combination regulations which prescribe the details relating to filings for approvals and the forms to be filled at the time of filing have been uploaded on the website of the Commission. It has been announced that these regulations may soon be amended. Comments and suggestions from various stakeholders have been invited and are being considered by the Commission. Further, to widen the scope of the consultative process, the Commission is in the process of organizing consultative meetings with various stakeholders which include the apex industry bodies and leading law firms dealing with competition law related matters. This is a step in the right direction which will enable the Commission to get on board the views of all concerned and address the concerns of all those who will be directly affected by the regulations coming into force. The process may also throw light on some of the prevailing ambiguities in the interpretation of the law.

One of the major grievances of all interested parties has always been the outer limit of, as long as 210 days - that the Commission may take to finally approve a combination. Though the Commission has expressed that it will endeavor for an expedited disposal in most cases, the statutory timeframe cannot be ignored. Other areas of concern include the calculation of assets and turnover which act as a triggering event for Commission to exercise discretion and the treatment of joint ventures. Further, the draft regulations provide for certain transactions which require the filing to be made with the Commission in terms of Form I. These include acquisition of shares upto 15 percent, acquisition of shares where the acquirer already controls the target enterprise, acquisitions made solely as investments and intra group acquisitions. All other transactions not covered in the category above are to be filed in terms of Form II which is more detailed. However it appears that Form I, in itself is much too detailed and calls for information which is substantially more than what is called upon for similar transactions in other jurisdictions. All these issues may be brought up at the time of the consultation process and hopefully a mutually acceptable solution is devised.

The draft regulations also provide for informal verbal consultations seeking clarifications about filing of notices. Such consultations shall be kept confidential and the views expressed during the consultation process shall not be binding on the commission. This process may indeed facilitate resolution of uncertainties of filing in certain cases and avoid unnecessary cost and expense. A similar process has been prescribed even for other regulators like the Securities and Exchange Board of India, the countries securities market regulator.

All that can be said is that the law is in its nascent stage and will continue to develop with experience and judicial precedents interpreting the various provisions of law. The right approach would be for the industry and the regulator to work closely and coordinate with each other to fill in every lacuna that presents itself and to jointly face the challenges that lay ahead in an effort to give effect the laudable objects that underline the anti trust regime. 

Zerick Dastur is a Senior Associate of J. Sagar & Associates, Advocates & Solicitors. He is a part of the Firms Competition Law practice and specializes in Corporate, Commercial & Securities Law

Competition Commission of India Finalises New Notification for Mergers & Acquisitions

Source : Indlaw

The Competition Commission of India (CCI) is going to finalise a new notification on Corporate Mergers & Acquisitions (M&A) at its meeting on April 29 and gazette it on May 1, 2011. 

Its objective is to promote competitiveness in the market and safeguard the consumer interest, keeping in view the economic growth of the country said Mr Dharendra Kumar CCI Chairman, addressing an interactive meeting of representatives of CII, FICCI, Assocham and Indian Merchants’ Chamber and Law Firms organized by IMC on April 25 to consider the Commission’s discussion paper on Regulation of Combinations. 

The Union Minister of Corporate Affairs (MCA) Mr. Murli Deora, chaired the meeting and the Secretary to MCA, Mr. D K Mittal and Mr Kumar interacted with a galaxy of industrialists and top legal experts specializing in M&A. IMC President, Mr. Dilip Dandekar, welcomed the Minister and other distinguished speakers and members of the audience. 

Mr Deora later told reporters that a new policy on corporate affairs would be chalked out soon.

He said that his Ministry would also consult the Union Finance Ministry, RBI and SEBI before finalizing the notification for laying down Rules for M&A by corporates.

CCI says “All izz Well” with Pre payment Penalty

By Zerick Dastur, Senior Associate of J. Sagar & Associates, Advocates & Solicitors

After nearly eighteen months from the date of notification of the substantive provisions of the Competition Act (Act) pertaining to anti competitive agreements and abuse of dominance by business enterprises, the Competition Commission has issued a comprehensive final order, after a thorough investigation by the Director General, the investigating authority under the Act. The order deals with issues involving the alleged anti-competitive agreements entered into and abuse of dominant position by banks while charging prepayment charge (PPC) on home loans. PPC currently ranges between 1-4 percent for most banks. The levy and the rate of such PPC is discretional. However, CCI, by a majority order of 4-2, has held that the practice of charging PPC is not violative of the provisions of the Act. Interestingly, the Chairman of the Commission recused himself in the case. It has been observed that owing to the extremely fragmented market shares of the banks in the area of home loans where no individual bank has a market share of more than 17 percent, the provisions relating to abuse of dominant position would not apply.

It is pertinent to note that the Director General had, in his report to the Commission stated that the practice of the banks levying PPC amounted to an agreement for the limiting or controlling the market, that levy of PPC made the exit for a borrower expensive and hence violated the provisions of the Act. The report further stated that the practice acted as a deterrent for borrowers seeking shift to other banks in order to avail the best prevailing interest rate offered by those banks.

The order serves as an authoritative interpretation on a number of issues under a law which is in its nascent stage. One of the issues which came up for determination before the Commission was the extent and scope of the term “agreement” which is a prerequisite in order to determine whether there was any violation. It was observed that for an agreement to exist there has to be an act in the nature of an arrangement, understanding or action in concert including existence of an identifiable practice or decision taken by an association of enterprises or persons. It was held in this case, the existence of any “agreement” between the banks cannot be conjectured or even circumstantially adduced as the practice of levying PPC was based upon individual discretion of each bank. The Commission noted that the practice of charging prepayment penalty cannot be said to be a concerted decision of all the banks as all of them had not started charging prepayment penalty at one point of time. Further, there was no evidence to suggest that that the banks had formed any internal or discrete association for the purpose of charging prepayment penalty. Thus, congruence of action, which is an integral part of any agreement, was not established. Whereas it has been found that some banks are imposing PPC, there is no evidence to establish that this practice is a result of some action in concert or emerges from a collusive decision but levying of such PPC has a reasonable economic justification.

Having said that, CCI seems to have raised the “bar” for proving the existence of an agreement and for it to qualify as anti competitive. It is true that in almost all countries, including India (even under the erstwhile MRTP Act), more evidence is required than just parallel behavior to support a prosecution for entering into an anti competitive agreement. US and European courts have adopted a “parallelism plus” approach, which requires the existence of “plus factors” beyond merely parallel behavior by firms in order to prove that the firms have indulged in anti competitive behavior. Having said that, normally there is no express agreement that is entered into by entities engaging in anti competitive conduct but the practice is usually in the form of a tacit understanding. Existence of such arrangements is usually proved by circumstantial evidence, and by setting up and proving a chain of events leading to a common understanding or plan. The underlying issue is what, at the minimum, constitutes that “meeting of the minds” which must be directly or circumstantially established to prove that there is a restrictive effect on competition. It can be argued that, the Commission should have given more importance to the meetings of the Indian Banks Association (IBA) where the decision to charge PPC was taken and should have scrupulously analyzed the actions of the banks to show how the common approach deliberated in meetings of IBA was actually implemented. Further, the perusal of the internal circulars of these banks may lead to a conclusion that the main purpose to introduce PPC was to dissuade the borrowers from shifting to other banks. Whether, the Commission should have attached more importance to such circumstances in arriving at the conclusion in its order remains a moot point.

Considering the fact that the informant did not present any views after the Director General presented its investigation report, it seems unlikely that he would pursue the matter before the appellate tribunal. However, the Act provides that “any person” who is aggrieved by the order of the Commission may appeal to the appellate tribunal. Hence, any consumer who may be aggrieved by the order may take recourse to the tribunal. The same remains to be seen, but as it stands the banks are free to charge PPC as has been done hitherto.

Zerick Dastur is a Senior Associate of J. Sagar & Associates, Advocates & Solicitors. He is a part of the Firms Competition Law practice and specializes in Corporate, Commercial & Securities Law.

A Shot in the Arm for the Competition Commission

By Zerick Dastur, Senior Associate of J. Sagar & Associates, Advocates & Solicitors

The Competition Commission of India is up and rolling. Recent judicial pronouncements in the field have acted as a shot in the arm for the regulator entrusted to promote economic efficiency and free and fair competition within the economy. The Commission has already commenced investigations in sectors including civil aviation, stock markets, private sector banks, housing finance companies, DTH service providers and disputes between film producers and multiplex owners. Recently, the Director General i.e. the investigating authority under the Act, has stated in its report that it appeared that the reality major DLF Ltd had violated the provisions of the Competition Act. Appropriate proceedings may be adopted by the Commission and action may be taken after completion of inquiry and affording the concerned party an opportunity to be heard. An order passed by the Competition Commission may be appealed before the Competition Appellate Tribunal constituted under the Competition Act, 2002. Any appeal against an order of the Appellate Tribunal will lie directly before the Supreme Court.

The recent judgment of the Supreme Court in an appeal filed by Competition Commission of India against the order of the Appellate Tribunal in the matter of Steel Authority of India Ltd. serves as an authoritative interpretation on a number of open issues. The judgment in effect enables the regulator to overcome a number of hurdles in conducting the process of investigation in a time bound manner. Not only does it provide that the a direction of the Commission to cause an investigation to be made on formation of an opinion by the Commission cannot be appealed before the Tribunal, it also provides that it is not mandatory for the commission to hear the parties affected prior to arriving at such a prima facie opinion. Thus the possibility of investigations being interrupted at the threshold with long drawn legal battles in the form of appeals to the Tribunal have been done away with. It has also been held that the Commission is a necessary and /or a proper party in every case before the Appellate Tribunal, thus giving the Commission an opportunity to put forth its perspective in every appeal before the Tribunal. The ruling could assist the Tribunal to arrive at a just and fair conclusion after hearing all concerned.

Similarly, the recent decision of the Bombay High Court in the writ petition filed by Kingfisher Airlines Limited is a landmark judicial pronouncement in context of a legislation which is in its nascent stage. The writ petition had been filed challenging the notices issued by the Commission in respect of an alliance between Kingfisher Airlines Limited and Jet Airways. While dismissing the writ petition the court observed that, though the Competition Act is not retrospective, it would cover all agreements entered into prior to the commencement of the Act which are sought to be acted upon by the parties after the commencement of the Act. The implications of this judgment could be widespread, covering a range of similar arrangements between corporate business houses. A special leave petition filed before the Supreme Court by Kingfisher was recently dismissed as withdrawn. 

Though the Competition Act was enacted in 2002, substantive provisions of the Act relating to anti competitive agreements and abuse of dominance were brought into force only on May 20, 2009. The Act inter alia provides that any agreement having an appreciable adverse effect on competition in India is void. The thrust of the Competition policy relating to anti competitive agreements is directed towards detecting and combating cartels. Agreements fixing prices or limiting or control production, supply or output of goods or services and market sharing arrangements are presumed to be void.

The Act empowers the Commission to initiate inquiry suo moto on its own motion or on receipt of any information from any person. Stringent penalty provisions have been prescribed. For instance, the Commission may impose penalties not exceeding 10% of the average turnover of the offender for the three preceding financial years. In case of a cartel, the Commission may impose upon each member of the cartel a penalty of up to three times the profits for each year of the continuance of the agreement, or 10% of turnover for each year of continuance of the agreement, whichever is higher. The Commission is also empowered to direct enterprises to terminate an agreement which is found to be anti competitive and direct the parties not re-enter into such an agreement. The Commission may further direct modification of an agreement which is perceived to have an anti competitive effect.

Like other developed economies, now India too has a comprehensive anti trust regime. The law will continue to evolve with experience in order to meet with the needs of a dynamic market and the then prevailing market situation. A lot has to be learnt from the experience of countries like the United Kingdom and the United States in dealing with similar situations. It can perhaps be said that the advent of the new law has opened up new dimensions to commercial law, regulatory practice and corporate compliances.

Zerick Dastur is a Senior Associate of J. Sagar & Associates, Advocates & Solicitors. He is a part of the Firms Competition Law practice and specializes in Corporate, Commercial & Securities Law.

Competition Laws : Powers and Functions of the Competition Commission of India : The Law

Swatanter Kumar

The Supreme Court has examined and explained the Law relating to Competition in India. The Bench comprising the Chief Justice of India, Justice Swatanter Kumar and Justice KS Radhakrishnan has discussed in great detail the law of competition, its aims and objectives, as understood around the world. The Bench observed as under;

The decision of the Government of India to liberalize its economy with the intention of removing controls persuaded the Indian Parliament to enact laws providing for checks and balances in the free economy. The laws were required to be enacted, primarily, for the objective of taking measures to avoid anti-competitive agreements and abuse of dominance as well as to regulate mergers and takeovers which result in distortion of the market. The earlier Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 1969 was not only found to be inadequate but also obsolete in certain respects, particularly, in the light of international economic developments relating to competition law. Most countries in the world have enacted competition laws to protect their free market economies- an economic system in which the allocation of resources is determined solely by supply and demand. The rationale of free market economy is that the competitive offers of different suppliers allow the buyers to make the best purchase. The motivation of each participant in a free market economy is to maximize self-interest but the result is favourable to society. As Adam Smith observed: "there is an invisible hand at work to take care of this".

As far as American law is concerned, it is said that the Sherman Act, 1890, is the first codification of recognized common law principles of competition law. With the progress of time, even there the competition law has attained new dimensions with the enactment of subsequent laws, like the Clayton Act, 1914, the Federal Trade Commission Act, 1914 and the Robinson-Patman Act, 1936. The United Kingdom, on the other hand, introduced the considerably less stringent Restrictive Practices Act, 1956, but later on more elaborate legislations like the Competition Act, 1998 and the Enterprise Act, 2002 were introduced. Australia introduced its current Trade Practices Act in 1974. The overall intention of competition law policy has not changed markedly over the past century. Its intent is to limit the role of market power that might result from substantial concentration in a particular industry. The major concern with monopoly and similar kinds of concentration is not that being big is necessarily undesirable. However, because of the control exerted by a monopoly over price, there are economic efficiency losses to society and product quality and diversity may also be affected. Thus, there is a need to protect competition. The primary purpose of competition law is to remedy some of those situations where the activities of one firm or two lead to the breakdown of the free market system, or, to prevent such a breakdown by laying down rules by which rival businesses can compete with each other. The model of perfect competition is the `economic model' that usually comes to an economist's mind when thinking about the competitive markets. As far as the objectives of competition laws are concerned, they vary from country to country and even within a country they seem to change and evolve over the time. However, it will be useful to refer to some of the common objectives of competition law. The main objective of competition law is to promote economic efficiency using competition as one of the means of assisting the creation of market responsive to consumer preferences. The advantages of perfect competition are three- fold: allocative efficiency, which ensures the effective allocation of resources, productive efficiency, which ensures that costs of production are kept at a minimum and dynamic efficiency, which promotes innovative practices. These factors by and large have been accepted all over the world as the guiding principles for effective implementation of competition law.

In India, a High Level Committee on Competition Policy and Law was constituted to examine its various aspects and make suggestions keeping in view the competition policy of India. This Committee made recommendations and submitted its report on 22nd of May, 2002. After completion of the consultation process, the Competition Act, 2002 (for short, the `Act') as Act 12 of 2003, dated 12th December, 2003, was enacted. As per the statement of objects and reasons, this enactment is India's response to the opening up of its economy, removing controls and resorting to liberalization. The natural corollary of this is that the Indian market should be geared to face competition from within the country and outside. The Bill sought to ensure fair competition in India by prohibiting trade practices which cause appreciable adverse effect on the competition in market within India and for this purpose establishment of a quasi judicial body was considered essential. The other object was to curb the negative aspects of competition through such a body namely, the `Competition Commission of India' (for short, the `Commission') which has the power to perform different kinds of functions, including passing of interim orders and even awarding compensation and imposing penalty. The Director General appointed under Section 16(1) of the Act is a specialized investigating wing of the Commission. In short, the establishment of the Commission and enactment of the Act was aimed at preventing practices having adverse effect on competition, to protect the interest of the consumer and to ensure fair trade carried out by other participants in the market in India and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto.

The various provisions of the Act deal with the establishment, powers and functions as well as discharge of adjudicatory functions by the Commission. Under the scheme of the Act, this Commission is vested with inquisitorial, investigative, regulatory, adjudicatory and to a limited extent even advisory jurisdiction. Vast powers have been given to the Commission to deal with the complaints or information leading to invocation of the provisions of Sections 3 and 4 read with Section 19 of the Act. In exercise of the powers vested in it under Section 64, the Commission has framed Regulations called The Competition Commission of India (General) Regulations, 2009 (for short, the `Regulations'). The Act and the Regulations framed thereunder clearly indicate the legislative intent of dealing with the matters related to contravention of the Act, expeditiously and even in a time bound programme. Keeping in view the nature of the controversies arising under the provisions of the Act and larger public interest, the matters should be dealt with and taken to the logical end of pronouncement of final orders without any undue delay. In the event of delay, the very purpose and object of the Act is likely to be frustrated and the possibility of great damage to the open market and resultantly, country's economy cannot be ruled out. The present Act is quite contemporary to the laws presently in force in the United States of America as well as in the United Kingdom. In other words, the provisions of the present Act and Clayton Act, 1914 of the United States of America, The Competition Act, 1988 and Enterprise Act, 2002 of the United Kingdom have somewhat similar legislative intent and scheme of enforcement. However, the provisions of these Acts are not quite pari materia to the Indian legislation. In United Kingdom, the Office of Fair Trading is primarily regulatory and adjudicatory functions are performed by the Competition Commission and the Competition Appellate Tribunal. The U.S. Department of Justice Antitrust Division in United States, deals with all jurisdictions in the field. The competition laws and their enforcement in those two countries is progressive, applied rigorously and more effectively. The deterrence objective in these anti-trust legislations is clear from the provisions relating to criminal sanctions for individual violations, high upper limit for imposition of fines on corporate entities as well as extradition of individuals found guilty of formation of cartels. This is so, despite the fact that there are much larger violations of the provisions in India in comparison to the other two countries, where at the very threshold, greater numbers of cases invite the attention of the regulatory/adjudicatory bodies. Primarily, there are three main elements which are intended to be controlled by implementation of the provisions of the Act, which have been specifically dealt with under Sections 3, 4 and 6 read with Sections 19 and 26 to 29 of the Act. They are anti- competitive agreements, abuse of dominant position and regulation of combinations which are likely to have an appreciable adverse effect on competition. Thus, while dealing with respective contentions raised in the present appeal and determining the impact of the findings recorded by the Tribunal, it is necessary for us to keep these objects and background in mind.

The bench further dealt with the following important questions;

In order to examine the merit or otherwise of the contentions raised by the respective parties, it will be appropriate for us to formulate the following points for determination:--

1) Whether the directions passed by the Commission in exercise of its powers under Section 26(1) of the Act forming a prima facie opinion would be appealable in terms of Section 53A(1) of the Act?

2) What is the ambit and scope of power vested with the Commission under Section 26(1) of the Act and whether the parties, including the informant or the affected party, are entitled to notice or hearing, as a matter of right, at the preliminary stage of formulating an opinion as to the existence of the prima facie case?

3) Whether the Commission would be a necessary, or at least a proper, party in the proceedings before the Tribunal in an appeal preferred by any party?

4) At what stage and in what manner the Commission can exercise powers vested in it under Section 33 of the Act to pass temporary restraint orders?

5) Whether it is obligatory for the Commission to record reasons for formation of a prima facie opinion in terms of Section 26(1) of the Act?

6) What directions, if any, need to be issued by the Court to ensure proper compliance in regard to procedural requirements while keeping in mind the scheme of the Act and the legislative intent? 

Also to ensure that the procedural intricacies do not hamper in achieving the object of the Act, i.e., free market and competition. We would prefer to state our answers to the points of law argued before us at the very threshold. Upon pervasive analysis of the submissions made before us by the learned counsel appearing for the parties, we would provide our conclusions on the points noticed supra as follows:

1) In terms of Section 53A(1)(a) of the Act appeal shall lie only against such directions, decisions or orders passed by the Commission before the Tribunal which have been specifically stated under the provisions of Section 53A(1)(a). The orders, which have not been specifically made appealable, cannot be treated appealable by implication. For example taking a prima facie view and issuing a direction to the Director General for investigation would not be an order appealable under Section 53A.

2) Neither any statutory duty is cast on the Commission to issue notice or grant hearing, nor any party can claim, as a matter of right, notice and/or hearing at the stage of formation of opinion by the Commission, in terms of Section 26(1) of the Act that a prima facie case exists for issuance of a direction to the Director General to cause an investigation to be made into the matter.

However, the Commission, being a statutory body exercising, inter alia, regulatory jurisdiction, even at that stage, in its discretion and in appropriate cases may call upon the concerned party(s) to render required assistance or produce requisite information, as per its directive. The Commission is expected to form such prima facie view without entering upon any adjudicatory or determinative process. The Commission is entitled to form its opinion without any assistance from any quarter or even with assistance of experts or others. The Commission has the power in terms of Regulation 17 (2) of the Regulations to invite not only the information provider but even `such other person' which would include all persons, even the affected parties, as it may deem necessary. In that event it shall be `preliminary conference', for whose conduct of business the Commission is entitled to evolve its own procedure.

3) The Commission, in cases where the inquiry has been initiated by the Commission suo moto, shall be a necessary party and in all other cases the Commission shall be a proper party in the proceedings before the Competition Tribunal. The presence of the Commission before the Tribunal would help in complete adjudication and effective and expeditious disposal of matters. Being an expert body, its views would be of appropriate assistance to the Tribunal. Thus, the Commission in the proceedings before the Tribunal would be a necessary or a proper party, as the case may be.

4) During an inquiry and where the Commission is satisfied that the act is in contravention of the provisions stated in Section 33 of the Act, it may issue an order temporarily restraining the party from carrying on such act, until the conclusion of such inquiry or until further orders without giving notice to such party, where it deems it necessary. This power has to be exercised by the Commission sparingly and under compelling and exceptional circumstances. The Commission, while recording a reasoned order inter alia should : (a) record its satisfaction (which has to be of much higher degree than formation of a prima facie view under Section 26(1) of the Act) in clear terms that an act in contravention of the stated provisions has been committed and continues to be committed or is about to be committed; (b) It is necessary to issue order of restraint and (c) from the record before the Commission, it is apparent that there is every likelihood of the party to the lis, suffering irreparable and irretrievable damage or there is definite apprehension that it would have adverse effect on competition in the market.

The power under Section 33 of the Act to pass temporary restraint order can only be exercised by the Commission when it has formed prima facie opinion and directed investigation in terms of Section 26(1) of the Act, as is evident from the language of this provision read with Regulation 18(2) of the Regulations.

5) In consonance with the settled principles of administrative jurisprudence, the Commission is expected to record at least some reason even while forming a prima facie view. However, while passing directions and orders dealing with the rights of the parties in its adjudicatory and determinative capacity, it is required of the Commission to pass speaking orders, upon due application of mind, responding to all the contentions raised before it by the rival parties.

The Bench further observed that;

The scheme of the Act and the Regulations framed thereunder clearly demonstrate the legislative intent that the investigations and inquiries under the provisions of the Act should be concluded as expeditiously as possible. The various provisions and the Regulations, particularly Regulations 15 and 16, direct conclusion of the investigation/inquiry or proceeding within a "reasonable time". The concept of "reasonable time" thus has to be construed meaningfully, keeping in view the object of the Act and the larger interest of the domestic and international trade. In this backdrop, we are of the considered view that the following directions need to be issued:

A) Regulation 16 prescribes limitation of 15 days for the Commission to hold its first ordinary meeting to consider whether prima facie case exists or not and in cases of alleged anti-competitive agreements and/or abuse of dominant position, the opinion on existence of prima facie case has to be formed within 60 days. Though the time period for such acts of the Commission has been specified, still it is expected of the Commission to hold its meetings and record its opinion about existence or otherwise of a prima facie case within a period much shorter than the stated period.

B) All proceedings, including investigation and inquiry should be completed by the Commission/Director General most expeditiously and while ensuring that the time taken in completion of such proceedings does not adversely affect any of the parties as well as the open market in purposeful implementation of the provisions of the Act.

C) Wherever during the course of inquiry the Commission exercises its jurisdiction to pass interim orders, it should pass a final order in that behalf as expeditiously as possible and in any case not later than 60 days.

D) The Director General in terms of Regulation 20 is expected to submit his report within a reasonable time. No inquiry by the Commission can proceed any further in absence of the report by the Director General in terms of Section 26(2) of the Act. The reports by the Director General should be submitted within the time as directed by the Commission but in all cases not later than 45 days from the date of passing of directions in terms of Section 26(1) of the Act.

E) The Commission as well as the Director General shall maintain complete `confidentiality' as envisaged under Section 57 of the Act and Regulation 35 of the Regulations. Wherever the `confidentiality' is breached, the aggrieved party certainly has the right to approach the Commission for issuance of appropriate directions in terms of the provisions of the Act and the Regulations in force.

Find the Entire Judgment in Competition Commission Of India vs Steel Authority Of India & Anr.here.