Saturday, August 20, 2011

Scope & Ambit of First Appeal : The Law

Justice R.M. Lodha
Supreme Court of India
The Supreme Court in State Bank of India & Anr. v. M/s Emmsons International Ltd. & Ors. has reiterated the scope and ambit of a First Appeal, which involves re-appreciation of facts as well as law. While highlighting the broad principles evolved by previous judgments, the Supreme Court held as under;


20. Having regard to the controversy set up by the parties in the course of trial, in our view, it cannot be said that issue no. 5 is immaterial or finding of the trial court on that issue is inconsequential. The High Court was hearing the first appeal and, as a first appellate court it ought to have considered and addressed itself to all the issues of fact and law before setting aside the judgment of the trial court. The judgment of the High Court suffers from a grave error as it ignored and overlooked the finding of the trial court on issue no. 5 that the seller accepted the encashment of bill and document on collection basis. The High Court was required to address itself to issue no. 5 which surely had bearing on the final outcome of the case.
21. In Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari (Deceased) by L.Rs., this Court held (at pages 188-189) as under :
........The appellate court has jurisdiction to reverse or affirm the findings of the trial court. First appeal is a valuable right of the parties and unless restricted by law, the whole case is therein open for rehearing both on questions of fact and law. The judgment of the appellate court must, therefore, reflect its conscious application of mind and record findings supported by reasons, on all the issues arising along with the contentions put forth, and pressed by the parties for decision of the appellate court. ... while reversing a finding of fact the appellate court must come into close quarters with the reasoning assigned by the trial court and then assign its own reasons for arriving at a different finding. This would satisfy the court hearing a further appeal that the first appellate court had discharged the duty expected of it......;
22. The above view has been followed by a 3-Judge Bench decision of this Court in Madhukar and Others v. Sangram and Others, wherein it was reiterated that sitting as a court of first appeal, it is the duty of the High Court to deal with all the issues and the evidence led by the parties before recording its findings.
23. In the case of H.K.N. Swami v. Irshad Basith (Dead) by LRs., this Court (at pages 243-244) stated as under :
The first appeal has to be decided on facts as well as on law. In the first appeal parties have the right to be heard both on questions of law as also on facts and the first appellate court is required to address itself to all issues and decide the case by giving reasons. Unfortunately, the High Court, in the present case has not recorded any finding either on facts or on law. Sitting as the first appellate court it was the duty of the High Court to deal with all the issues and the evidence led by the parties before recording the finding regarding title..........
24. Again in Jagannath v. Arulappa and Another while considering the scope of Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, this Court (at pages 303-304) observed as follows:
2. A court of first appeal can reappreciate the entire evidence and come to a different conclusion. In the present case, we find that the High Court has not adverted to many of the findings which had been recorded by the trial court. For instance, while dismissing the suits filed by the respondents, the trial court had recorded a finding on Issue 5 that the defendant-appellant had taken actual possession of the suit properties in Execution Petition No. 137 of 1980 arising out of OS No. 224 of 1978. Without reversing this finding, the High Court simply allowed the appeals and decreed the suits filed by the plaintiff-respondents in toto. Similarly, there are other issues on which findings recorded by the trial court have not been set aside by the High Court. The points involved in the appeals before the High Court required a deeper consideration of the findings recorded by the trial court as well as the evidence and the pleadings on record.
25. The decided cases of this Court in Jagannath and H.K.N. Swami were noticed by this Court in a later decision in the case of Chinthamani Ammal v. Nandagopal Gounder and Another.
26. In our view, the High Court failed to follow the fundamental rule governing the exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 that where the first appellate court reverses the judgment of the trial court, it is required to consider all the issues of law and fact. This flaw vitiates the entire judgment of the High Court. The judgment of the High Court, therefore, cannot be sustained.

Thursday, August 18, 2011

'Trespass' - Definition and Concept : The Law

Justice R.M. Lodha
Supreme Court of India
The Supreme Court in Laxmi Ram Pawar Vs. Sitabai Balu Dhotre has examined the definition and meaning of the term 'tresspasser' in the context of the Maharashtra Slum Areas (Improvement, Clearance and Redevelopment) Act, 1971. While relying on various judicial precedents the Supreme Court held as under;

10. A `trespass' is an unlawful interference with one's person, property or rights. With reference to property, it is a wrongful invasion of another's possession. In Words and Phrases, Permanent Edition (West Publishing Company), pages 108, 109 and 115, in general, a `trespasser' is described, inter alia, as follows: 
"A "trespasser" is a person who enters or remains upon land in the possession of another without a privilege to do so created by the possessor's consent or otherwise. In re Wimmer's Estate, 182 P.2d 119, 121, 111 Utah 444." 
"A "trespasser" is one entering or remaining on land in another's possession without a privilege to do so created by possessor's consent, express or implied, or by law. Keesecker v. G.M. Mckelvey Co., 42 N.E. 2d 223, 226, 227, 68 Ohio App. 505. 
" ................................ "A "trespass" is a transgression or wrongful act, and in its most extensive signification includes every description of wrong, and a `trespasser" is one who does an unlawful act, or a lawful act in an unlawful manner, to the injury of the person or property of another. Carter v. Haynes, Tex., 269 S.W. 216, 220." 
11. In Black's Law Dictionary (Sixth Edition), 1990, page 1504, the term `trespasser' is explained as follows : 
"Trespasser. One who has committed trespass. One who intentionally and without consent or privilege enters another's property. One who enters upon property of another without any right, lawful authority, or express or implied invitation, permission, or license, not in performance of any duties to owner, but merely for his own purpose, pleasure or convenience". 
12. In Halsbury's Laws of England; Volume 45 (Fourth Edition), pages 631-632, the following statement is made under the title `What Constitutes Trespass to Land'. 
"Every unlawful entry by one person on land in the possession of another is a trespass for which an action lies, even though no actual damage is done. A person trespasses upon land if he wrongfully sets foot on it, rides or drives over it or takes possession of it, or expels the person in possession, or pulls down or destroys anything permanently fixed to it, or wrongfully takes minerals from it, or places or fixes anything on it or in it, or if he erects or suffers to continue on his own land anything which invades the airspace of another, or if he discharges water upon another's land, or sends filth or any injurious substance which has been collected by him on his own land onto another's land." 
In the same volume, page 634, under the title `trespass ab initio', the legal position is stated thus : 
"If a person enters on the land of another under an authority given him by law, and, while there, abuses the authority by an act which amounts to a trespass, he becomes a trespasser ab initio, and may be sued as if his original entry were unlawful. Instances of an entry under the authority of the law are the entry of a customer into a common inn, of a reversioner to see if waste has been done, or of a commoner to see his cattle. To make a person a trespasser ab initio there must be a wrongful act committed; a mere nonfeasance is not enough." 
The aforesaid statement takes into consideration the Six Carpenters' case1 wherein the general rule given is this, `when entry, authority or licence is given to any one by the law, and he doth abuse it, he shall be a trespasser ab initio'. 

13. In Law Lexicon, The Encyclopaedic Law Dictionary by P. Ramanatha Aiyar, 2nd Edition, Reprint 2000, page 1917, the word `trespass' is explained by relying upon Tomlins Dictionary of Law Terms as follows: 
"Trespass, in its largest and most extensive sense, signifies any transgression or offence against the law of nature, of society, or the country in which we live; whether it relates to a man's person or his property. Therefore beating another is a trespass; for which an action of trespass in assault and battery will lie. Taking or detaining a man's goods are respectively trespasses, for which an action of trespass on the case in trover and conversion, is given by the Law; so, also, non- performance of promises or undertakings is a trespass, upon which an action of Trespass on the case in assumesit is grounded: and, in general, any 1 (1610) 8 Co Rep 146 misfeasance, or act of one man, whereby another is injuriously affected or damnified, is a transgression, or trespass, in its largest sense; for which an action will lie." 
14. In Salmond on the Law of Torts, 17th Edition by R.F.V. Heuston, 1977, page 41, the expression, `Trespass by remaining on land' is explained in the following manner : 
"Even a person who has lawfully entered on land in the possession of another commits a trespass if he remains there after his right of entry has ceased. To refuse or omit to leave the plaintiff's land or vehicle is as much a trespass as to enter originally without right. Thus, any person who is present by the leave and licence of the occupier may, as a general rule, when the licence has been properly terminated, be sued or ejected as a trespasser, if after request and after the lapse of a reasonable time he fails to leave the premises." 
Under the title `Continuing Trespasses', page 42, it is stated: 
"That trespass by way of personal entry is a continuing injury, lasting as long as the personal presence of the wrong doer, and giving rise to actions de die in diem so long as it lasts, is sufficiently obvious. It is well-settled, however, that the same characteristic belongs in law even to those trespasses which consist in placing things upon the plaintiff's land. Such a trespass continues until it has been abated by the removal of the thing which is thus trespassing; successive actions will lie from day to day until it is so removed; and in each action damages (unless awarded in lieu of an injunction) are assessed only upto the date of the action. Whether this doctrine is either logical or convenient may be a question, but it has been repeatedly decided to be the law." 
15. Insofar as the definition of `occupier' in Section 2(e) of the 1971 Act is concerned, it must be immediately stated that the said definition is not exhaustive but inclusive. Clauses (i) to (iv) of Section 2(e) definitely do not embrace within itself a trespasser but Clause (v) that reads, `occupier' includes `any person who is liable to pay to the owner damages for the use and occupation of any land or building' would surely take within its fold and sweep a trespasser since such person is not only liable for damages for an act of trespass but also liable to pay to the owner damages for the use and occupation of any land or building trespassed by him. It is immaterial whether damages for the use and occupation are in fact claimed or not by the owner in an action against the trespasser. By no stretch of imagination, a trespasser could be taken out of the definition of `occupier' in Section 2(e)(v) of the 1971 Act. Clause (v), in our opinion, includes a person who enters the land or building in possession of another with permission or consent but remains upon such land or building after such permission or consent has been revoked since after revocation of permission or consent, he is liable to pay damages for unauthorised use of land or building. The Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in Taj Mohamed Yakub v. Abdul Gani Bhikan has taken the view that a trespasser is included in the definition of `occupier' under Section 2(e)(v) of the 1971 Act which, we hold, is the correct view. The contrary view taken by a Single Bench of the Bombay High Court in Shankar Dagadu Bakade and Ors. v. Bajirao Balaji Darwatkar is not right on this point and has rightly been overruled by the Division Bench in Taj Mohamed Yakub. Strangely, the first appellate court relied upon Shanker Dagadu Bakade's case3 which has already been overruled in Taj Mohamed Yakub and distinguished Taj Mohamed Yakub on superficial reasoning without properly appreciating the statement of law exposited therein. The High Court, unfortunately, failed to notice such grave error in the judgment of the first appellate court. 

16. Once it is held that a trespasser is included in the definition of `occupier' in Section 2(e)(v) of the 1971 Act, what necessarily follows is that before initiation of any suit or proceeding for eviction of such trespasser, the previous written permission of the Competent Authority is required as mandated by Section 22(1). Section 22(1) starts with non obstante clause and it is clear from the provision contained in clause (a) thereof that no person shall institute any suit or proceeding for obtaining any decree or order for eviction of the occupier from any building or land in a slum area or for recovery of any arrears of rent or compensation from any such occupier or for both without the previous written permission of the Competent Authority. The use of words `no' and `shall' in sub-section (1) of Section 22 makes it abundantly clear that prior written permission of the Competent Authority for an action under clause (a) thereof is a must. The role of the Competent Authority under the 1971 Act is extremely important as the legislature has conferred power on him to carry out execution of works in improvement of the slum. Sub-Section (2) of Section 22 requires the person desiring to obtain the permission to make an application in writing to the Competent Authority. As per sub- section (3) on receipt of such application, the Competent Authority by an order in writing may either grant or refuse to grant such permission after giving an opportunity to the parties of being heard and after making such summary enquiries into the circumstances of the case as it thinks fit. Sub-section (4) of Section 22 requires the Competent Authority to take into account the factors set out therein for granting or refusing the permission. These provisions contained in Section 22 are salutary in light of the scheme of 1971 Act and have to be followed. It has to be held, therefore, that for eviction of a trespasser who is `occupier' within the meaning of Section 2(e)(v) of 1971 Act from the land or building or any part thereof in a declared slum area, the written permission of the Competent Authority under Section 22(1)(a) is mandatorily required. 

17. Insofar as present case is concerned, the first respondent set up the case in the plaint that the appellant was a trespasser in the subject room. The first appellate court has also recorded a categorical finding, which has not been disturbed by the High Court, that the appellant was occupying the subject room as trespasser. In the circumstances, the suit was clearly not maintainable for want of written permission from the Competent Authority and was rightly dismissed by the trial court.

Wednesday, August 17, 2011

Elevation of New Judges to the Supreme Court

Three new judges have been cleared by the Collegium for appointment as Supreme Court Judges including Justice Ranjana Desai, who is currently presiding as a judge of the Bombay High Court. The other names cleared for elevation are Justice S. J. Mukhopadhaya, Chief Justice of Gujarat High Court and Justice J.S. Khehar, Chief Jusitce of Karnataka High Court.

The buzz says that the Union Law Ministry has received these proposals from the Supreme Court and the process of appointment is expected to be completed in two to three weeks. 

Here are the short bio's of the Judges being elevated:


Justice Ranjana Desai, Bombay High Court

She was born on 30.10.1949. She completed her graduation from the Elphinstone College Bombay in April 1970 with Economics & Politics as subjects. She took her law degree from Government Law College Bombay in April 1973. She was enrolled as an Advocate on 30.07.1973. She handled criminal and civil matters. She worked as a Junior of Justice S.C. Pratap when he was the bar. She was appointed Honorary Assistant Government Pleader in High Court in 1979 and thereafter she was appointed Assistant Government Pleader and Additional Public Prosecutor in High Court in 1983. In 1986, she was appointed as Special Public Prosecutor for Preventive Detention matters. From 1st November, 1995 she worked as Government Pleader, Appellate Side, High Court, Bombay.

She was appointed as an Additional Judge of the Bombay High Court for a period of 2 years w.e.f. 15.04.1996. She is appointed as Permanent Judge of this Hon'ble Court on 12th April, 1998.


Justice Khehar Singh, Chief Justice, Karnataka High Court

Justice Khehar was born on August 28, 1952. After graduating in science from Government College, Chandigarh in 1974, Justice Khehar was awarded the LL.B degree by the Panjab University, Chandigarh in 1977, he then acquired the LL.M. qualification from the same University in 1979, for the latter qualification, Justice Khehar was awarded the Gold Medal for having stood first in the University.

Justice Khehar was enrolled as an Advocate in 1979 and practiced mainly in the Punjab and Haryana High Court, Chandigarh, Himachal Pradesh High Court, Shimla and the Supreme Court of India, New Delhi. Justice Khehar was appointed as Additional Advocate General, Punjab, in January 1992, and then as Senior Standing Counsel, Union Territory, Chandigarh. Justice Khehar was designated as Senior Advocate in February, 1995. His Lordship remained standing counsel for Universities of the area, Corporate Bodies and a large number of companies and cooperative organizations.

Justice Khehar was elevated to the Bench of High Court of Punjab and Haryana, at Chandigarh, on February 8, 1999. Justice Khehar was appointed as Acting Chief Justice of the Punjab and Haryana High Court twice i.e., with effect from August 02, 2008, and again, with effect from November 17, 2009. Justice Khehar was elevated as Chief Justice of the High Court of Uttarakhand, at Nainital, on November 29, 2009 and thereafter he was transferred as Chief Justice of High Court of Karnataka, where he assumed hes office on August 8, 2010.

By a notification dated May 20, 2010 the Chairman of the Rajya Sabha appointed His Lordship as a member of the Judges Inquiry Committee for investigating the grounds on which the removal of Mr. Justice P.D. Dinakaran, Chief Justice of the Karnataka High Court, has been sought.

Justice Khehar is scheduled to retire on August 28, 2014.


Justice S.J. Mukhopadhaya, Chief Justice, Gujarat High Court

Mr. Justice S.J.Mukhopadhaya born on 15th March,1950, is the son of Late Sarojendu Mukherjee who was himself a leading practitioner specially in Service law in Patna High Court. He passed B.Sc. examination in 1971 from Magadh University. He obtained his LL.B Degree in 1979 from Patna University. Enrolled as an Advocate on 18th May 1979 and practised at Patna and Ranchi Bench of Patna High Court in Constitutional, Service, Civil and Criminal matters. He was designated as Senior Advocate in February, 1993

Appointed as a Permanent Judge of the Patna High Court on 8th November, 1994. As a Judge, decided several important civil and Constitutional cases including deciding the vires of Bihar Panchayat Raj Act, 1993, wherein held that the limit of reservation of 50% as upheld by the Supreme Court of India, is equally applicable, so far as article 243D and/or Panchayat Raj Act is concerned. Also held in the said judgment that reservation for the seat of "Mukhiya" or "Pramukh" or "Adhyakchh", reservation of solitary post amounts to 100% reservation which is not permissible. The permissible limit being 50%, therefore no reservation can be made for Mukhiya/Pramukh/Adhyakchh. By notification dated 14th November, 2000 became the Judge of the Jharkhand High Court w.e.f. 15th November 2000. Transferred to Madras High Court on 31.08.2006. Functioned as Acting Chief Justice of Madras High Court from 09.05.2008 to18.05.2008.

Mr. Justice S.J.Mukhopadhaya assumed charge as the Chief Justice of High Court of Gujarat on 09.12.2009.

The elevations come as the present strength of judges in the Supreme Court is 28 and in view of the fact that six judges are due to retire shortly. List judges retiring this year are as under;

Tuesday, August 16, 2011

ABA Journal : Top 100 Blawgs : Nominations

Dear Readers,


The American Bar Association ('ABA') Journal is working on its list of the 100 best legal blogs, and is seeking advice on which blawgs should be included and / or what practice areas should be represented in the Blawg 100.

Use the Blawg 100 Amici form to tell ABA about a blawg that you read regularly and you think other lawyers should know about. If there is more than one blawg you want to support, please send them additional amici through the form. Here's the link to nominate a blawg.

The Editors at ABA make the final decision about what's included in the Blawg 100 and the last date for nomination is Friday, September 9th, 2011.

I hope readers would nominate the Legal Blog for this prestigious list.

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