Sunday, August 14, 2011

Scope of Right to Information : Students Can Inspect Answer Sheets

Justice R.V. Raveendran
Supreme Court of India
The Supreme Court in Central Board of Secondary Education Vs. Aditya Bandopadhyay, has examined the relevant provisions of the Right to Information Act while deciding a matter relating to the denial of right of right of inspection and re-evaluation of question papers by the Central Board of Secondary Education. While referring to various judicial precedents on the subject, the Supreme Court held that students can inspect photocopies of their answer sheets under the Right to Information Act. The relevant extracts from this landmark judgment are reproduced hereinbelow;

Relevant Legal Provisions 

9. To consider these questions, it is necessary to refer to the statement of objects and reasons, the preamble and the relevant provisions of the RTI Act. RTI Act was enacted in order to ensure smoother, greater and more effective access to information and provide an effective framework for effectuating the right of information recognized under article 19 of the Constitution. The preamble to the Act declares the object sought to be achieved by the RTI Act thus: 
"An Act to provide for setting out the practical regime of right to information for citizens to secure access to information under the control of public authorities, in order to promote transparency and accountability in the working of every public authority, the constitution of a Central Information Commission and State Information Commissions and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto. Whereas the Constitution of India has established democratic Republic; And whereas democracy requires an informed citizenry and transparency of information which are vital to its functioning and also to contain corruption and to hold Governments and their instrumentalities accountable to the governed; And whereas revelation of information in actual practice is likely to conflict with other public interests including efficient operations of the Governments, optimum use of limited fiscal resources and the preservation of confidentiality of sensitive information; And whereas it is necessary to harmonise these conflicting interests while preserving the paramountcy of the democratic ideal." 
Chapter II of the Act containing sections 3 to 11 deals with right to information and obligations of public authorities. Section 3 provides for right to information and reads thus: 

"Subject to the provisions of this Act, all citizens shall have the right to information." 

This section makes it clear that the RTI Act gives a right to a citizen to only access information, but not seek any consequential relief based on such information. Section 4 deals with obligations of public authorities to maintain the records in the manner provided and publish and disseminate the information in the manner provided. Section 6 deals with requests for obtaining information. 

It provides that applicant making a request for information shall not be required to give any reason for requesting the information or any personal details except those that may be necessary for contacting him. Section 8 deals with exemption from disclosure of information and is extracted in its entirety: 

"8. Exemption from disclosure of information – 

(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, there shall be no obligation to give any citizen,- 

(a) information, disclosure of which would prejudicially affect the sovereignty and integrity of India, the security, strategic, scientific or economic interests of the State, relation with foreign State or lead to incitement of an offence; 

(b) information which has been expressly forbidden to be published by any court of law or tribunal or the disclosure of which may constitute contempt of court; 

(c) information, the disclosure of which would cause a breach of privilege of Parliament or the State Legislature; 

(d) information including commercial confidence, trade secrets or intellectual property, the disclosure of which would harm the competitive position of a third party, unless the competent authority is satisfied that larger public interest warrants the disclosure of such information; 

(e) information available to a person in his fiduciary relationship, unless the competent authority is satisfied that the larger public interest warrants the disclosure of such information; 

(f) information received in confidence from foreign Government; 

(g) information, the disclosure of which would endanger the life or physical safety of any person or identify the source of information or assistance given in confidence for law enforcement or security purposes; 

(h) information which would impede the process of investigation or apprehension or prosecution of offenders; 

(i) cabinet papers including records of deliberations of the Council of Ministers, Secretaries and other officers: Provided that the decisions of Council of Ministers, the reasons thereof, and the material on the basis of which the decisions were taken shall be made public after the decision has been taken, and the matter is complete, or over: Provided further that those matters which come under the exemptions specified in this section shall not be disclosed; 

(j) information which relates to personal information the disclosure of which has no relationship to any public activity or interest, or which would cause unwarranted invasion of the privacy of the individual unless the Central Public Information Officer or the State Public Information Officer or the appellate authority, as the case may be, is satisfied that the larger public interest justifies the disclosure of such information: Provided that the information which cannot be denied to the Parliament or a State Legislature shall not be denied to any person. 

(2) Notwithstanding anything in the Official Secrets Act, 1923 (19 of 1923) nor any of the exemptions permissible in accordance with sub-section (1), a public authority may allow access to information, if public interest in disclosure outweighs the harm to the protected interests. 

(3) Subject to the provisions of clauses (a), (c) and (i) of sub-section (1), any information relating to any occurrence, event or matter which has taken place, occurred or happened twenty years before the date on which any request is made under secton 6 shall be provided to any person making a request under that section: Provided that where any question arises as to the date from which the said period of twenty years has to be computed, the decision of the Central Government shall be final, subject to the usual appeals provided for in this Act." 

(emphasis supplied) 

Section 9 provides that without prejudice to the provisions of section 8, a request for information may be rejected if such a request for providing access would involve an infringement of copyright. Section 10 deals with severability of exempted information and sub-section (1) thereof is extracted below: 

"(1) Where a request for access to information is rejected on the ground that it is in relation to information which is exempt from disclosure, then, notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, access may be provided to that part of the record which does not contain any information which is exempt from disclosure under this Act and which can reasonably be severed from any part that contains exempt information." 

Section 11 deals with third party information and sub-section (1) thereof is extracted below: 

"(1) Where a Central Public Information Officer or a State Public Information Officer, as the case may be, intends to disclose any information or record, or part thereof on a request made under this Act, which relates to or has been supplied by a third party and has been treated as confidential by that third party, the Central Public Information Officer or State Public Information Officer, as the case may be, shall, within five days from the receipt of the request, give a written notice to such third party of the request and of the fact that the Central Public Information Officer or State Public Information Officer, as the case may be, intends to disclose the information or record, or part thereof, and invite the third party to make a submission in writing or orally, regarding whether the information should be disclosed, and such submission of the third party shall be kept in view while taking a decision about disclosure of information: Provided that except in the case of trade or commercial secrets protected by law, disclosure may be allowed if the public interest in disclosure outweighs in importance any possible harm or injury to the interests of such third party." 

The definitions of information, public authority, record and right to information in clauses (f), (h), (i) and (j) of section 2 of the RTI Act are extracted below: 

"(f) "information" means any material in any form, including records, documents, memos, e-mails, opinions, advices, press releases, circulars, orders, logbooks, contracts, reports, papers, samples, models, data material held in any electronic form and information relating to any private body which can be accessed by a public authority under any other law for the time being in force; 

(h) "public authority" means any authority or body or institution of self- government established or constituted- 

(a) by or under the Constitution; 

(b) by any other law made by Parliament; 

(c) by any other law made by State Legislature; 

(d) by notification issued or order made by the appropriate Government, and includes any- 

(i) body owned, controlled or substantially financed; 

(ii) non-Government organisation substantially financed, directly or indirectly by funds provided by the appropriate Government; 

(i) "record" includes- 

(a) any document, manuscript and file; 

(b) any microfilm, microfiche and facsimile copy of a document; 

(c) any reproduction of image or images embodied in such microfilm (whether enlarged or not); and 

(d) any other material produced by a computer or any other device; 

(j) "right to information" means the right to information accessible under this Act which is held by or under the control of any public authority and includes the right to- 

(i) inspection of work, documents, records; (ii) taking notes, extracts or certified copies of documents or records; (iii) taking certified samples of material; 

(iv) obtaining information in the form of diskettes, floppies, tapes, video cassettes or in any other electronic mode or through printouts where such information is stored in a computer or in any other device; 

Section 22 provides for the Act to have overriding effect and is extracted below: 

"The provisions of this Act shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in the Official Secrets Act, 1923 (19 of 1923), and any other law for the time being in force or in any instrument having effect by virtue of any law other than this Act." 

10. It will also be useful to refer to a few decisions of this Court which considered the importance and scope of the right to information. In State of Uttar Pradesh v. Raj Narain - (1975) 4 SCC 428, this Court observed: 
"In a government of responsibility like ours, where all the agents of the public must be responsible for their conduct, there can but few secrets. The people of this country have a right to know every public act, everything, that is done in a public way, by their public functionaries. They are entitled to know the particulars of every public transaction in all its bearing. The right to know, which is derived from the concept of freedom of speech, though not absolute, is a factor which should make one wary, when secrecy is claimed for transactions which can, at any rate, have no repercussion on public security." 
(emphasis supplied) 

In Dinesh Trivedi v. Union of India - (1997) 4 SCC 306, this Court held: 
"In modern constitutional democracies, it is axiomatic that citizens have a right to know about the affairs of the Government which, having been elected by them, seeks to formulate sound policies of governance aimed at their welfare. However, like all other rights, even this right has recognised limitations; it is, by no means, absolute. ..................Implicit in this assertion is the proposition that in transaction which have serious repercussions on public security, secrecy can legitimately be claimed because it would then be in the public interest that such matters are not publicly disclosed or disseminated. To ensure the continued participation of the people in the democratic process, they must be kept informed of the vital decisions taken by the Government and the basis thereof. Democracy, therefore, expects openness and openness is a concomitant of a free society. Sunlight is the best disinfectant. But it is equally important to be alive to the dangers that lie ahead. It is important to realise that undue popular pressure brought to bear on decision-makers is Government can have frightening side-effects. If every action taken by the political or executive functionary is transformed into a public controversy and made subject to an enquiry to soothe popular sentiments, it will undoubtedly have a chilling effect on the independence of the decision-maker who may find it safer not to take any decision. It will paralyse the entire system and bring it to a grinding halt. So we have two conflicting situations almost enigmatic and we think the answer is to maintain a fine balance which would serve public interest." 
In People's Union for Civil Liberties v. Union of India - (2004) 2 SCC 476, this Court held that right of information is a facet of the freedom of "speech and expression" as contained in Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution of India and such a right is subject to any reasonable restriction in the interest of the security of the state and subject to exemptions and exceptions. 

Re : Question (i) 

11. The definition of `information' in section 2(f) of the RTI Act refers to any material in any form which includes records, documents, opinions, papers among several other enumerated items. The term `record' is defined in section 2(i) of the said Act as including any document, manuscript or file among others. When a candidate participates in an examination and writes his answers in an answer-book and submits it to the examining body for evaluation and declaration of the result, the answer-book is a document or record. When the answer-book is evaluated by an examiner appointed by the examining body, the evaluated answer-book becomes a record containing the `opinion' of the examiner. Therefore the evaluated answer-book is also an `information' under the RTI Act. 

12. Section 3 of RTI Act provides that subject to the provisions of this Act all citizens shall have the right to information. The term `right to information' is defined in section 2(j) as the right to information accessible under the Act which is held by or under the control of any public authority. Having regard to section 3, the citizens have the right to access to all information held by or under the control of any public authority except those excluded or exempted under the Act. The object of the Act is to empower the citizens to fight against corruption and hold the Government and their instrumentalities accountable to the citizens, by providing them access to information regarding functioning of every public authority. Certain safeguards have been built into the Act so that the revelation of information will not conflict with other public interests which include efficient operation of the governments, optimum use of limited fiscal resources and preservation of confidential and sensitive information. The RTI Act provides access to information held by or under the control of public authorities and not in regard to information held by any private person. The Act provides the following exclusions by way of exemptions and exceptions (under sections 8, 9 and 24) in regard to information held by public authorities: 

(i) Exclusion of the Act in entirety under section 24 to intelligence and security organizations specified in the Second Schedule even though they may be "public authorities", (except in regard to information with reference to allegations of corruption and human rights violations). 

(ii) Exemption of the several categories of information enumerated in section 8(1) of the Act which no public authority is under an obligation to give to any citizen, notwithstanding anything contained in the Act [however, in regard to the information exempted under clauses (d) and (e), the competent authority, and in regard to the information excluded under clause (j), Central Public Information Officer/State Public Information Officer/the Appellate Authority, may direct disclosure of information, if larger public interest warrants or justifies the disclosure]. 

(iii) If any request for providing access to information involves an infringement of a copyright subsisting in a person other than the State, the Central/State Public Information Officer may reject the request under section 9 of RTI Act. 

Having regard to the scheme of the RTI Act, the right of the citizens to access any information held or under the control of any public authority, should be read in harmony with the exclusions/exemptions in the Act. 

13. The examining bodies (Universities, Examination Boards, CBSC etc.) are neither security nor intelligence organisations and therefore the exemption under section 24 will not apply to them. The disclosure of information with reference to answer-books does not also involve infringement of any copyright and therefore section 9 will not apply. 

Resultantly, unless the examining bodies are able to demonstrate that the evaluated answer-books fall under any of the categories of exempted `information' enumerated in clauses (a) to (j) of sub- section (1) section 8, they will be bound to provide access to the information and any applicant can either inspect the document/record, take notes, extracts or obtain certified copies thereof. 

14. The examining bodies contend that the evaluated answer-books are exempted from disclosure under section 8(1)(e) of the RTI Act, as they are `information' held in its fiduciary relationship. They fairly conceded that evaluated answer-books will not fall under any other exemptions in sub- section (1) of section 8. Every examinee will have the right to access his evaluated answer- books, by either inspecting them or take certified copies thereof, unless the evaluated answer- books are found to be exempted under section 8(1)(e) of the RTI Act. 

Re : Question (ii) 

15. In Maharashtra State Board, this Court was considering whether denial of re-evaluation of answer-books or denial of disclosure by way of inspection of answer books, to an examinee, under Rule 104(1) and (3) of the Maharashtra Secondary and Higher Secondary Board Rules, 1977 was violative of principles of natural justice and violative of Articles 14 and 19 of the Constitution of India. Rule 104(1) provided that no re-evaluation of the answer books shall be done and on an application of any candidate verification will be restricted to checking whether all the answers have been examined and that there is no mistake in the totalling of marks for each question in that subject and transferring marks correctly on the first cover page of the answer book. Rule 104(3) provided that no candidate shall claim or be entitled to re-evaluation of his answer-books or inspection of answer- books as they were treated as confidential. This Court while upholding the validity of Rule 104(3) held as under : 
".... the "process of evaluation of answer papers or of subsequent verification of marks" under Clause (3) of Regulation 104 does not attract the principles of natural justice since no decision making process which brings about adverse civil consequences to the examinees in involved. The principles of natural justice cannot be extended beyond reasonable and rational limits and cannot be carried to such absurd lengths as to make it necessary that candidates who have taken a public examination should be allowed to participate in the process of evaluation of their performances or to verify the correctness of the evaluation made by the examiners by themselves conducting an inspection of the answer-books and determining whether there has been a proper and fair valuation of the answers by the examiners." 
So long as the body entrusted with the task of framing the rules or regulations acts within the scope of the authority conferred on it, in the sense that the rules or regulations made by it have a rational nexus with the object and purpose of the statute, the court should not concern itself with the wisdom or efficaciousness of such rules or regulations.... The Legislature and its delegate are the sole repositories of the power to decide what policy should be pursued in relation to matters covered by the Act ... and there is no scope for interference by the Court unless the particular provision impugned before it can be said to suffer from any legal infirmity, in the sense of its being wholly beyond the scope of the regulation making power or its being inconsistent with any of the provisions of the parent enactment or in violation of any of the limitations imposed by the Constitution. 

It was perfectly within the competence of the Board, rather it was its plain duty, to apply its mind and decide as a matter of policy relating to the conduct of the examination as to whether disclosure and inspection of the answer books should be allowed to the candidates, whether and to what extent verification of the result should be permitted after the results have already been announced and whether any right to claim revaluation of the answer books should be recognised or provided for. All these are undoubtedly matters which have an intimate nexus with the objects and purposes of the enactment and are, therefore, with in the ambit of the general power to make regulations...." 

This Court held that Regulation 104(3) cannot be held to be unreasonable merely because in certain stray instances, errors or irregularities had gone unnoticed even after verification of the concerned answer books according to the existing procedure and it was only after further scrutiny made either on orders of the court or in the wake of contentions raised in the petitions filed before a court, that such errors or irregularities were ultimately discovered. This court reiterated the view that "the test of reasonableness is not applied in vacuum but in the context of life's realities" and concluded that realistically and practically, providing all the candidates inspection of their answer books or re-evaluation of the answer books in the presence of the candidates would not be feasible. Dealing with the contention that every student is entitled to fair play in examination and receive marks matching his performance, this court held : 
"What constitutes fair play depends upon the facts and circumstances relating to each particular given situation. If it is found that every possible precaution has been taken and all necessary safeguards provided to ensure that the answer books inclusive of supplements are kept in safe custody so as to eliminate the danger of their being tampered with and that the evaluation is done by the examiners applying uniform standards with checks and crosschecks at different stages and that measures for detection of malpractice, etc. have also been effectively adopted, in such cases it will not be correct on the part of the Courts to strike down, the provision prohibiting revaluation on the ground that it violates the rules of fair play. It appears that the procedure evolved by the Board for ensuring fairness and accuracy in evaluation of the answer books has made the system as fool proof as can be possible and is entirely satisfactory. The Board is a very responsible body. The candidates have taken the examination with full awareness of the provisions contained in the Regulations and in the declaration made in the form of application for admission to the examination they have solemnly stated that they fully agree to abide by the regulations issued by the Board. In the circumstances, when we find that all safeguards against errors and malpractices have been provided for, there cannot be said to be any denial of fair play to the examinees by reason of the prohibition against asking for revaluation.... " 
This Court concluded that if inspection and verification in the presence of the candidates, or revaluation, have to be allowed as of right, it may lead to gross and indefinite uncertainty, particularly in regard to the relative ranking etc. of the candidate, besides leading to utter confusion on account of the enormity of the labour and time involved in the process. This court concluded : 
"... the Court should be extremely reluctant to substitute its own views as to what is wise, prudent and proper in relation to academic matters in preference to those formulated by professional men possessing technical expertise and rich experience of actual day-to-day working of educational institutions and the departments controlling them. It will be wholly wrong for the court to make a pedantic and purely idealistic approach to the problems of this nature, isolated from the actual realities and grass root problems involved in the working of the system and unmindful of the consequences which would emanate if a purely idealistic view as opposed to a pragmatic one were to be propounded." 
16. The above principles laid down in Maharashtra State Board have been followed and reiterated in several decisions of this Court, some of which are referred to in para (6) above. But the principles laid down in decisions such as Maharashtra State Board depend upon the provisions of the rules and regulations of the examining body. If the rules and regulations of the examining body provide for re-evaluation, inspection or disclosure of the answer-books, then none of the principles in Maharashtra State Board or other decisions following it, will apply or be relevant. There has been a gradual change in trend with several examining bodies permitting inspection and disclosure of the answer-books. 

17. It is thus now well settled that a provision barring inspection or disclosure of the answer- books or re-evaluation of the answer-books and restricting the remedy of the candidates only to re-totalling is valid and binding on the examinee. In the case of CBSE, the provisions barring re- evaluation and inspection contained in Bye-law No.61, are akin to Rule 104 considered in Maharashtra State Board. As a consequence if an examination is governed only by the rules and regulations of the examining body which bar inspection, disclosure or re-evaluation, the examinee will be entitled only for re-totalling by checking whether all the answers have been evaluated and further checking whether there is no mistake in totaling of marks for each question and marks have been transferred correctly to the title (abstract) page. The position may however be different, if there is a superior statutory right entitling the examinee, as a citizen to seek access to the answer books, as information. 

18. In these cases, the High Court has rightly denied the prayer for re- evaluation of answer-books sought by the candidates in view of the bar contained in the rules and regulations of the examining bodies. It is also not a relief available under the RTI Act. Therefore the question whether re- evaluation should be permitted or not, does not arise for our consideration. What arises for consideration is the question whether the examinee is entitled to inspect his evaluated answer-books or take certified copies thereof. This right is claimed by the students, not with reference to the rules or bye-laws of examining bodies, but under the RTI Act which enables them and entitles them to have access to the answer-books as `information' and inspect them and take certified copies thereof. Section 22 of RTI Act provides that the provisions of the said Act will have effect, notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any other law for the time being in force. Therefore the provisions of the RTI Act will prevail over the provisions of the bye-laws/rules of the examining bodies in regard to examinations. As a result, unless the examining body is able to demonstrate that the answer-books fall under the exempted category of information described in clause (e) of section 8(1) of RTI Act, the examining body will be bound to provide access to an examinee to inspect and take copies of his evaluated answer-books, even if such inspection or taking copies is barred under the rules/bye-laws of the examining body governing the examinations. Therefore, the decision of this Court in Maharashtra State Board (supra) and the subsequent decisions following the same, will not affect or interfere with the right of the examinee seeking inspection of answer-books or taking certified copies thereof. 

Re : Question (iii) 

19. Section 8(1) enumerates the categories of information which are exempted from disclosure under the provisions of the RTI Act. The examining bodies rely upon clause (e) of section 8(1) which provides that there shall be no obligation on any public authority to give any citizen, information available to it in its fiduciary relationship. This exemption is subject to the condition that if the competent authority (as defined in section 2(e) of RTI Act) is satisfied that the larger public interest warrants the disclosure of such information, the information will have to be disclosed. Therefore the question is whether the examining body holds the evaluated answer- books in its fiduciary relationship. 

20. The term `fiduciary' and `fiduciary relationship' refer to different capacities and relationship, involving a common duty or obligation. 

(20.1) Black's Law Dictionary (7th Edition, Page 640) defines `fiduciary relationship' thus: 
"A relationship in which one person is under a duty to act for the benefit of the other on matters within the scope of the relationship. Fiduciary relationships - such as trustee-beneficiary, guardian-ward, agent-principal, and attorney-client - require the highest duty of care. Fiduciary relationships usually arise in one of four situations : 
(1) when one person places trust in the faithful integrity of another, who as a result gains superiority or influence over the first, 
(2) when one person assumes control and responsibility over another, 
(3) when one person has a duty to act for or give advice to another on matters falling within the scope of the relationship, or 
(4) when there is a specific relationship that has traditionally been recognized as involving fiduciary duties, as with a lawyer and a client or a stockbroker and a customer." 
(20.2) The American Restatements (Trusts and Agency) define `fiduciary' as one whose intention is to act for the benefit of another as to matters relevant to the relation between them. The Corpus Juris Secundum (Vol. 36A page 381) attempts to define fiduciary thus: 
"A general definition of the word which is sufficiently comprehensive to embrace all cases cannot well be given. The term is derived from the civil, or Roman, law. It connotes the idea of trust or confidence, contemplates good faith, rather than legal obligation, as the basis of the transaction, refers to the integrity, the fidelity, of the party trusted, rather than his credit or ability, and has been held to apply to all persons who occupy a position of peculiar confidence toward others, and to include those informal relations which exist whenever one party trusts and relies on another, as well as technical fiduciary relations. The word `fiduciary,' as a noun, means one who holds a thing in trust for another, a trustee, a person holding the character of a trustee, or a character analogous to that of a trustee, with respect to the trust and confidence involved in it and the scrupulous good faith and candor which it requires; a person having the duty, created by his undertaking, to act primarily for another's benefit in matters connected with such undertaking. Also more specifically, in a statute, a guardian, trustee, executor, administrator, receiver, conservator, or any person acting in any fiduciary capacity for any person, trust, or estate. Some examples of what, in particular connections, the term has been held to include and not to include are set out in the note." 
(20.3) Words and Phrases, Permanent Edition (Vol. 16A, Page 41) defines `fiducial relation' thus : 
"There is a technical distinction between a `fiducial relation' which is more correctly applicable to legal relationships between parties, such as guardian and ward, administrator and heirs, and other similar relationships, and `confidential relation' which includes the legal relationships, and also every other relationship wherein confidence is rightly reposed and is exercised. Generally, the term `fiduciary' applies to any person who occupies a position of peculiar confidence towards another. It refers to integrity and fidelity. It contemplates fair dealing and good faith, rather than legal obligation, as the basis of the transaction. The term includes those informal relations which exist whenever one party trusts and relies upon another, as well as technical fiduciary relations." 
(20.4) In Bristol and West Building Society vs. Mothew [1998 Ch. 1] the term fiduciary was defined thus : 
"A fiduciary is someone who has undertaken to act for and on behalf of another in a particular matter in circumstances which give rise to a relationship of trust and confidence. The distinguishing obligation of a fiduciary is the obligation of loyalty..... A fiduciary must act in good faith; he must not make a profit out of his trust; he must not place himself in a position where his duty and his interest may conflict; he may not act for his own benefit or the benefit of a third person without the informed consent of his principal." 
(20.5) In Wolf vs. Superior Court [2003 (107) California Appeals, 4th 25] the California Court of Appeals defined fiduciary relationship as under : 
"any relationship existing between the parties to the transaction where one of the parties is duty bound to act with utmost good faith for the benefit of the other party. Such a relationship ordinarily arises where confidence is reposed by one person in the integrity of another, and in such a relation the party in whom the confidence is reposed, if he voluntarily accepts or assumes to accept the confidence, can take no advantage from his acts relating to the interests of the other party without the latter's knowledge and consent." 
21. The term `fiduciary' refers to a person having a duty to act for the benefit of another, showing good faith and condour, where such other person reposes trust and special confidence in the person owing or discharging the duty. The term `fiduciary relationship' is used to describe a situation or transaction where one person (beneficiary) places complete confidence in another person (fiduciary) in regard to his affairs, business or transaction/s. The term also refers to a person who holds a thing in trust for another (beneficiary). The fiduciary is expected to act in confidence and for the benefit and advantage of the beneficiary, and use good faith and fairness in dealing with the beneficiary or the things belonging to the beneficiary. If the beneficiary has entrusted anything to the fiduciary, to hold the thing in trust or to execute certain acts in regard to or with reference to the entrusted thing, the fiduciary has to act in confidence and expected not to disclose the thing or information to any third party. There are also certain relationships where both the parties have to act in a fiduciary capacity treating the other as the beneficiary. Examples of these are : a partner vis-`-vis another partner and an employer vis-`-vis employee. An employee who comes into possession of business or trade secrets or confidential information relating to the employer in the course of his employment, is expected to act as a fiduciary and cannot disclose it to others. Similarly, if on the request of the employer or official superior or the head of a department, an employee furnishes his personal details and information, to be retained in confidence, the employer, the official superior or departmental head is expected to hold such personal information in confidence as a fiduciary, to be made use of or disclosed only if the employee's conduct or acts are found to be prejudicial to the employer. 

22. In a philosophical and very wide sense, examining bodies can be said to act in a fiduciary capacity, with reference to students who participate in an examination, as a government does while governing its citizens or as the present generation does with reference to the future generation while preserving the environment. But the words `information available to a person in his fiduciary relationship' are used in section 8(1)(e) of RTI Act in its normal and well recognized sense, that is to refer to persons who act in a fiduciary capacity, with reference to a specific beneficiary or beneficiaries who are to be expected to be protected or benefited by the actions of the fiduciary - a trustee with reference to the beneficiary of the trust, a guardian with reference to a minor/physically/infirm/mentally challenged, a parent with reference to a child, a lawyer or a chartered accountant with reference to a client, a doctor or nurse with reference to a patient, an agent with reference to a principal, a partner with reference to another partner, a director of a company with reference to a share-holder, an executor with reference to a legatee, a receiver with reference to the parties to a lis, an employer with reference to the confidential information relating to the employee, and an employee with reference to business dealings/transaction of the employer. We do not find that kind of fiduciary relationship between the examining body and the examinee, with reference to the evaluated answer-books, that come into the custody of the examining body. 

23. The duty of examining bodies is to subject the candidates who have completed a course of study or a period of training in accordance with its curricula, to a process of verification/examination/testing of their knowledge, ability or skill, or to ascertain whether they can be said to have successfully completed or passed the course of study or training. Other specialized Examining Bodies may simply subject candidates to a process of verification by an examination, to find out whether such person is suitable for a particular post, job or assignment. An examining body, if it is a public authority entrusted with public functions, is required to act fairly, reasonably, uniformly and consistently for public good and in public interest. This Court has explained the role of an examining body in regard to the process of holding examination in the context of examining whether it amounts to `service' to a consumer, in Bihar School Examination Board vs. Suresh Prasad Sinha - (2009) 8 SCC 483, in the following manner: 
"The process of holding examinations, evaluating answer scripts, declaring results and issuing certificates are different stages of a single statutory non-commercial function. It is not possible to divide this function as partly statutory and partly administrative. When the Examination Board conducts an examination in discharge of its statutory function, it does not offer its "services" to any candidate. Nor does a student who participates in the examination conducted by the Board, hires or avails of any service from the Board for a consideration. On the other hand, a candidate who participates in the examination conducted by the Board, is a person who has undergone a course of study and who requests the Board to test him as to whether he has imbibed sufficient knowledge to be fit to be declared as having successfully completed the said course of education; and if so, determine his position or rank or competence vis-a- vis other examinees. The process is not therefore availment of a service by a student, but participation in a general examination conducted by the Board to ascertain whether he is eligible and fit to be considered as having successfully completed the secondary education course. The examination fee paid by the student is not the consideration for availment of any service, but the charge paid for the privilege of participation in the examination.......... The fact that in the course of conduct of the examination, or evaluation of answer-scripts, or furnishing of mark-books or certificates, there may be some negligence, omission or deficiency, does not convert the Board into a service-provider for a consideration, nor convert the examinee into a consumer ........." 
It cannot therefore be said that the examining body is in a fiduciary relationship either with reference to the examinee who participates in the examination and whose answer-books are evaluated by the examining body. 

24. We may next consider whether an examining body would be entitled to claim exemption under section 8(1)(e) of the RTI Act, even assuming that it is in a fiduciary relationship with the examinee. That section provides that notwithstanding anything contained in the Act, there shall be no obligation to give any citizen information available to a person in his fiduciary relationship. This would only mean that even if the relationship is fiduciary, the exemption would operate in regard to giving access to the information held in fiduciary relationship, to third parties. There is no question of the fiduciary withholding information relating to the beneficiary, from the beneficiary himself. One of the duties of the fiduciary is to make thorough disclosure of all relevant facts of all transactions between them to the beneficiary, in a fiduciary relationship. By that logic, the examining body, if it is in a fiduciary relationship with an examinee, will be liable to make a full disclosure of the evaluated answer-books to the examinee and at the same time, owe a duty to the examinee not to disclose the answer-books to anyone else. If A entrusts a document or an article to B to be processed, on completion of processing, B is not expected to give the document or article to anyone else but is bound to give the same to A who entrusted the document or article to B for processing. Therefore, if a relationship of fiduciary and beneficiary is assumed between the examining body and the examinee with reference to the answer-book, section 8(1)(e) would operate as an exemption to prevent access to any third party and will not operate as a bar for the very person who wrote the answer-book, seeking inspection or disclosure of it. 

25. An evaluated answer book of an examinee is a combination of two different `informations'. The first is the answers written by the examinee and second is the marks/assessment by the examiner. When an examinee seeks inspection of his evaluated answer-books or seeks a certified copy of the evaluated answer-book, the information sought by him is not really the answers he has written in the answer-books (which he already knows), nor the total marks assigned for the answers (which has been declared). What he really seeks is the information relating to the break- up of marks, that is, the specific marks assigned to each of his answers. When an examinee seeks `information' by inspection/certified copies of his answer-books, he knows the contents thereof being the author thereof. When an examinee is permitted to examine an answer-book or obtain a certified copy, the examining body is not really giving him some information which is held by it in trust or confidence, but is only giving him an opportunity to read what he had written at the time of examination or to have a copy of his answers. Therefore, in furnishing the copy of an answer-book, there is no question of breach of confidentiality, privacy, secrecy or trust. The real issue therefore is not in regard to the answer-book but in regard to the marks awarded on evaluation of the answer-book. Even here the total marks given to the examinee in regard to his answer-book are already declared and known to the examinee. What the examinee actually wants to know is the break-up of marks given to him, that is how many marks were given by the examiner to each of his answers so that he can assess how is performance has been evaluated and whether the evaluation is proper as per his hopes and expectations. Therefore, the test for finding out whether the information is exempted or not, is not in regard to the answer book but in regard to the evaluation by the examiner. 

26. This takes us to the crucial issue of evaluation by the examiner. The examining body engages or employs hundreds of examiners to do the evaluation of thousands of answer books. The question is whether the information relating to the `evaluation' (that is assigning of marks) is held by the examining body in a fiduciary relationship. The examining bodies contend that even if fiduciary relationship does not exist with reference to the examinee, it exists with reference to the examiner who evaluates the answer-books. On a careful examination we find that this contention has no merit. The examining body entrusts the answer-books to an examiner for evaluation and pays the examiner for his expert service. The work of evaluation and marking the answer-book is an assignment given by the examining body to the examiner which he discharges for a consideration. Sometimes, an examiner may assess answer-books, in the course of his employment, as a part of his duties without any specific or special remuneration. In other words the examining body is the `principal' and the examiner is the agent entrusted with the work, that is, evaluation of answer- books. Therefore, the examining body is not in the position of a fiduciary with reference to the examiner. On the other hand, when an answer-book is entrusted to the examiner for the purpose of evaluation, for the period the answer-book is in his custody and to the extent of the discharge of his functions relating to evaluation, the examiner is in the position of a fiduciary with reference to the examining body and he is barred from disclosing the contents of the answer-book or the result of evaluation of the answer-book to anyone other than the examining body. Once the examiner has evaluated the answer books, he ceases to have any interest in the evaluation done by him. He does not have any copy-right or proprietary right, or confidentiality right in regard to the evaluation. Therefore it cannot be said that the examining body holds the evaluated answer books in a fiduciary relationship, qua the examiner. 

27. We, therefore, hold that an examining body does not hold the evaluated answer-books in a fiduciary relationship. Not being information available to an examining body in its fiduciary relationship, the exemption under section 8(1)(e) is not available to the examining bodies with reference to evaluated answer-books. As no other exemption under section 8 is available in respect of evaluated answer books, the examining bodies will have to permit inspection sought by the examinees. 

Re : Question (iv) 

28. When an examining body engages the services of an examiner to evaluate the answer-books, the examining body expects the examiner not to disclose the information regarding evaluation to anyone other than the examining body. Similarly the examiner also expects that his name and particulars would not be disclosed to the candidates whose answer-books are evaluated by him. In the event of such information being made known, a disgruntled examinee who is not satisfied with the evaluation of the answer books, may act to the prejudice of the examiner by attempting to endanger his physical safety. Further, any apprehension on the part of the examiner that there may be danger to his physical safety, if his identity becomes known to the examinees, may come in the way of effective discharge of his duties. The above applies not only to the examiner, but also to the scrutiniser, co-ordinator, and head-examiner who deal with the answer book. The answer book usually contains not only the signature and code number of the examiner, but also the signatures and code number of the scrutiniser/ co-ordinator/ head examiner. The information as to the names or particulars of the examiners/co-ordinators/ scrutinisers/ head examiners are therefore exempted from disclosure under section 8(1)(g) of RTI Act, on the ground that if such information is disclosed, it may endanger their physical safety. Therefore, if the examinees are to be given access to evaluated answer- books either by permitting inspection or by granting certified copies, such access will have to be given only to that part of the answer-book which does not contain any information or signature of the examiners/co-ordinators/ scrutinisers/ head examiners, exempted from disclosure under section 8(1)(g) of RTI Act. Those portions of the answer-books which contain information regarding the examiners/co-ordinators/ scrutinisers/ head examiners or which may disclose their identity with reference to signature or initials, shall have to be removed, covered, or otherwise severed from the non-exempted part of the answer- books, under section 10 of RTI Act. 

29. The right to access information does not extend beyond the period during which the examining body is expected to retain the answer-books. In the case of CBSE, the answer-books are required to be maintained for a period of three months and thereafter they are liable to be disposed of/destroyed. Some other examining bodies are required to keep the answer- books for a period of six months. The fact that right to information is available in regard to answer-books does not mean that answer-books will have to be maintained for any longer period than required under the rules and regulations of the public authority. The obligation under the RTI Act is to make available or give access to existing information or information which is expected to be preserved or maintained. If the rules and regulations governing the functioning of the respective public authority require preservation of the information for only a limited period, the applicant for information will be entitled to such information only if he seeks the information when it is available with the public authority. For example, with reference to answer-books, if an examinee makes an application to CBSE for inspection or grant of certified copies beyond three months (or six months or such other period prescribed for preservation of the records in regard to other examining bodies) from the date of declaration of results, the application could be rejected on the ground that such information is not available. The power of the Information Commission under section 19(8) of the RTI Act to require a public authority to take any such steps as may be necessary to secure compliance with the provision of the Act, does not include a power to direct the public authority to preserve the information, for any period larger than what is provided under the rules and regulations of the public authority. 

30. On behalf of the respondents/examinees, it was contended that having regard to sub-section (3) of section 8 of RTI Act, there is an implied duty on the part of every public authority to maintain the information for a minimum period of twenty years and make it available whenever an application was made in that behalf. This contention is based on a complete misreading and misunderstanding of section 8(3). The said sub-section nowhere provides that records or information have to be maintained for a period of twenty years. The period for which any particular records or information has to be maintained would depend upon the relevant statutory rule or regulation of the public authority relating to the preservation of records. Section 8(3) provides that information relating to any occurrence, event or matters which has taken place and occurred or happened twenty years before the date on which any request is made under section 6, shall be provided to any person making a request. This means that where any information required to be maintained and preserved for a period beyond twenty years under the rules of the public authority, is exempted from disclosure under any of the provisions of section 8(1) of RTI Act, then, notwithstanding such exemption, access to such information shall have to be provided by disclosure thereof, after a period of twenty years except where they relate to information falling under clauses (a), (c) and (i) of section 8(1). In other words, section 8(3) provides that any protection against disclosure that may be available, under clauses (b), (d) to (h) and (j) of section 8(1) will cease to be available after twenty years in regard to records which are required to be preserved for more than twenty years. Where any record or information is required to be destroyed under the rules and regulations of a public authority prior to twenty years, section 8(3) will not prevent destruction in accordance with the Rules. Section 8(3) of RTI Act is not therefore a provision requiring all `information' to be preserved and maintained for twenty years or more, nor does it override any rules or regulations governing the period for which the record, document or information is required to be preserved by any public authority. 

31. The effect of the provisions and scheme of the RTI Act is to divide `information' into the three categories. They are : 

(i) Information which promotes transparency and accountability in the working of every public authority, disclosure of which may also help in containing or discouraging corruption (enumerated in clauses (b) and (c) of section 4(1) of RTI Act). 

(ii) Other information held by public authority (that is all information other than those falling under clauses (b) and (c) of section 4(1) of RTI Act). 

(iii) Information which is not held by or under the control of any public authority and which cannot be accessed by a public authority under any law for the time being in force. 

Information under the third category does not fall within the scope of RTI Act. Section 3 of RTI Act gives every citizen, the right to `information' held by or under the control of a public authority, which falls either under the first or second category. In regard to the information falling under the first category, there is also a special responsibility upon public authorities to suo moto publish and disseminate such information so that they will be easily and readily accessible to the public without any need to access them by having recourse to section 6 of RTI Act. There is no such obligation to publish and disseminate the other information which falls under the second category. 

32. The information falling under the first category, enumerated in sections 4(1)(b) & (c) of RTI Act are extracted below : 

"4. Obligations of public authorities.- (1) Every public authority shall— (a) xxxxxx (b) publish within one hundred and twenty days from the enactment of this Act,-- 

(i) the particulars of its organisation, functions and duties; (ii) the powers and duties of its officers and employees; 

(iii) the procedure followed in the decision making process, including channels of supervision and accountability; 

(iv) the norms set by it for the discharge of its functions; 

(v) the rules, regulations, instructions, manuals and records, held by it or under its control or used by its employees for discharging its functions; 

(vi) a statement of the categories of documents that are held by it or under its control; 

(vii) the particulars of any arrangement that exists for consultation with, or representation by, the members of the public in relation to the formulation of its policy or implementation thereof; 

(viii) a statement of the boards, councils, committees and other bodies consisting of two or more persons constituted as its part or for the purpose of its advice, and as to whether meetings of those boards, councils, committees and other bodies are open to the public, or the minutes of such meetings are accessible for public; 

(ix) a directory of its officers and employees; 

(x) the monthly remuneration received by each of its officers and employees, including the system of compensation as provided in its regulations; 

(xi) the budget allocated to each of its agency, indicating the particulars of all plans, proposed expenditures and reports on disbursements made; 

(xii) the manner of execution of subsidy programmes, including the amounts allocated and the details of beneficiaries of such programmes; 

(xiii) particulars of recipients of concessions, permits or authorisations granted by it; (xiv) details in respect of the information, available to or held by it, reduced in an electronic form; 

(xv) the particulars of facilities available to citizens for obtaining information, including the working hours of a library or reading room, if maintained for public use; 

(xvi) the names, designations and other particulars of the Public Information Officers; 

(xvii) such other information as may be prescribed; and thereafter update these publications every year; (c) publish all relevant facts while formulating important policies or announcing the decisions which affect public; 

(emphasis supplied) 

Sub-sections (2), (3) and (4) of section 4 relating to dissemination of information enumerated in sections 4(1)(b) & (c) are extracted below: 

"(2) It shall be a constant endeavour of every public authority to take steps in accordance with the requirements of clause (b) of sub-section (1) to provide as much information suo motu to the public at regular intervals through various means of communications, including internet, so that the public have minimum resort to the use of this Act to obtain information. 

(3) For the purposes of sub-section (1), every information shall be disseminated widely and in such form and manner which is easily accessible to the public. 

(4) All materials shall be disseminated taking into consideration the cost effectiveness, local language and the most effective method of communication in that local area and the information should be easily accessible, to the extent possible in electronic format with the Central Public Information Officer or State Public Information Officer, as the case may be, available free or at such cost of the medium or the print cost price as may be prescribed. Explanation.--For the purposes of sub-sections (3) and (4), "disseminated" means making known or communicated the information to the public through notice boards, newspapers, public announcements, media broadcasts, the internet or any other means, including inspection of offices of any public authority." 

(emphasis supplied) 

33. Some High Courts have held that section 8 of RTI Act is in the nature of an exception to section 3 which empowers the citizens with the right to information, which is a derivative from the freedom of speech; and that therefore section 8 should be construed strictly, literally and narrowly. This may not be the correct approach. The Act seeks to bring about a balance between two conflicting interests, as harmony between them is essential for preserving democracy. One is to bring about transparency and accountability by providing access to information under the control of public authorities. 

The other is to ensure that the revelation of information, in actual practice, does not conflict with other public interests which include efficient operation of the governments, optimum use of limited fiscal resources and preservation of confidentiality of sensitive information. The preamble to the Act specifically states that the object of the Act is to harmonise these two conflicting interests. While sections 3 and 4 seek to achieve the first objective, sections 8, 9, 10 and 11 seek to achieve the second objective. Therefore when section 8 exempts certain information from being disclosed, it should not be considered to be a fetter on the right to information, but as an equally important provision protecting other public interests essential for the fulfilment and preservation of democratic ideals. 

34. When trying to ensure that the right to information does not conflict with several other public interests (which includes efficient operations of the governments, preservation of confidentiality of sensitive information, optimum use of limited fiscal resources, etc.), it is difficult to visualise and enumerate all types of information which require to be exempted from disclosure in public interest. The legislature has however made an attempt to do so. The enumeration of exemptions is more exhaustive than the enumeration of exemptions attempted in the earlier Act that is section 8 of Freedom to Information Act, 2002. The Courts and Information Commissions enforcing the provisions of RTI Act have to adopt a purposive construction, involving a reasonable and balanced approach which harmonises the two objects of the Act, while interpreting section 8 and the other provisions of the Act. 

35. At this juncture, it is necessary to clear some misconceptions about the RTI Act. The RTI Act provides access to all information that is available and existing. This is clear from a combined reading of section 3 and the definitions of `information' and `right to information' under clauses (f) and (j) of section 2 of the Act. If a public authority has any information in the form of data or analysed data, or abstracts, or statistics, an applicant may access such information, subject to the exemptions in section 8 of the Act. But where the information sought is not a part of the record of a public authority, and where such information is not required to be maintained under any law or the rules or regulations of the public authority, the Act does not cast an obligation upon the public authority, to collect or collate such non- available information and then furnish it to an applicant. A public authority is also not required to furnish information which require drawing of inferences and/or making of assumptions. It is also not required to provide `advice' or `opinion' to an applicant, nor required to obtain and furnish any `opinion' or `advice' to an applicant. The reference to `opinion' or `advice' in the definition of `information' in section 2(f) of the Act, only refers to such material available in the records of the public authority. Many public authorities have, as a public relation exercise, provide advice, guidance and opinion to the citizens. But that is purely voluntary and should not be confused with any obligation under the RTI Act. 

36. Section 19(8) of RTI Act has entrusted the Central/State Information Commissions, with the power to require any public authority to take any such steps as may be necessary to secure the compliance with the provisions of the Act. Apart from the generality of the said power, clause (a) of section 19(8) refers to six specific powers, to implement the provision of the Act. Sub-clause (i) empowers a Commission to require the public authority to provide access to information if so requested in a particular `form' (that is either as a document, micro film, compact disc, pendrive, etc.). This is to secure compliance with section 7(9) of the Act. Sub-clause (ii) empowers a Commission to require the public authority to appoint a Central Public Information Officer or State Public Information Officer. This is to secure compliance with section 5 of the Act. Sub- clause (iii) empowers the Commission to require a public authority to publish certain information or categories of information. This is to secure compliance with section 4(1) and (2) of RTI Act. Sub-clause (iv) empowers a Commission to require a public authority to make necessary changes to its practices relating to the maintenance, management and destruction of the records. This is to secure compliance with clause (a) of section 4(1) of the Act. Sub-clause (v) empowers a Commission to require the public authority to increase the training for its officials on the right to information. This is to secure compliance with sections 5, 6 and 7 of the Act. Sub-clause (vi) empowers a Commission to require the public authority to provide annual reports in regard to the compliance with clause (b) of section 4(1). This is to ensure compliance with the provisions of clause (b) of section 4(1) of the Act. The power under section 19(8) of the Act however does not extend to requiring a public authority to take any steps which are not required or contemplated to secure compliance with the provisions of the Act or to issue directions beyond the provisions of the Act. The power under section 19(8) of the Act is intended to be used by the Commissions to ensure compliance with the Act, in particular ensure that every public authority maintains its records duly catalogued and indexed in the manner and in the form which facilitates the right to information and ensure that the records are computerized, as required under clause (a) of section 4(1) of the Act; and to ensure that the information enumerated in clauses (b) and (c) of sections 4(1) of the Act are published and disseminated, and are periodically updated as provided in sub- sections (3) and (4) of section 4 of the Act. If the `information' enumerated in clause (b) of section 4(1) of the Act are effectively disseminated (by publications in print and on websites and other effective means), apart from providing transparency and accountability, citizens will be able to access relevant information and avoid unnecessary applications for information under the Act. 

37. The right to information is a cherished right. Information and right to information are intended to be formidable tools in the hands of responsible citizens to fight corruption and to bring in transparency and accountability. The provisions of RTI Act should be enforced strictly and all efforts should be made to bring to light the necessary information under clause (b) of section 4(1) of the Act which relates to securing transparency and accountability in the working of public authorities and in discouraging corruption. But in regard to other information,(that is information other than those enumerated in section 4(1)(b) and (c) of the Act), equal importance and emphasis are given to other public interests (like confidentiality of sensitive information, fidelity and fiduciary relationships, efficient operation of governments, etc.). Indiscriminate and impractical demands or directions under RTI Act for disclosure of all and sundry information (unrelated to transparency and accountability in the functioning of public authorities and eradication of corruption) would be counter-productive as it will adversely affect the efficiency of the administration and result in the executive getting bogged down with the non-productive work of collecting and furnishing information. The Act should not be allowed to be misused or abused, to become a tool to obstruct the national development and integration, or to destroy the peace, tranquility and harmony among its citizens. Nor should it be converted into a tool of oppression or intimidation of honest officials striving to do their duty. The nation does not want a scenario where 75% of the staff of public authorities spends 75% of their time in collecting and furnishing information to applicants instead of discharging their regular duties. The threat of penalties under the RTI Act and the pressure of the authorities under the RTI Act should not lead to employees of a public authorities prioritising `information furnishing', at the cost of their normal and regular duties.

Thursday, August 11, 2011

Powers of Courts under Section 319 of the Criminal Procedure Code

Justice R.M. Lodha
Supreme Court of India
The Supreme Court in Sarojben Ashwinkumar Shah v. State of Gujarat & Anr. has examined the provisions of Section 319 of the Criminal Procedure Code relating to the power of the court to prosecute any person, not being an accused, if evidence seems to suggest that such person has committed an offense. The relevant extracts from the judgment are reproduced hereinbelow;

7. Section 319 of the Code reads as under : 
S. 319. Power to proceed against other persons appearing to be guilty of offence.--(1) Where, in the course of any inquiry into, or trial of, an offence, it appears from the evidence that any person not being the accused has committed any offence for which such person could be tried together with the accused, the court may proceed against such person for the offence which he appears to have committed.
(2) Where such person is not attending the court, he may be arrested or summoned, as the circumstances of' the case may require, for the purpose aforesaid. 
(3) Any person attending the court although not under arrest or upon a summons, may be detained by such court for the purpose of the inquiry into, or trial of, the offence which he appears to have committed.
(4) Where the court proceeds against any person under sub-section (1), then-
(a) The proceedings in respect of such person shall be commenced afresh, and witnesses re-heard: (b) Subject to the provisions of clause (a), the case may proceed as if such person had been an accused person when the court took cognizance of the offence upon which the inquiry or trial was commenced.
8. The ambit and scope of the power of the Court under Section 319 of the Code has come up for consideration before this Court on more than one occasion.

9. In Joginder Singh and Another v. State of Punjab and Another, this Court stated that the power conferred under Section 319(1) of the Code is applicable to all courts including a Sessions Court and the Court has power to add any person, not being the accused before it, against whom there appears during trial sufficient evidence indicating his involvement in the offence, as an accused and direct him to be tried along with the other accused.

10. In the case of Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Ram Kishan Rohtagi and Others, this Court (at page 8) held as under : 
19. In these circumstances, therefore, if the prosecution can at any stage produce evidence which satisfies the court that the other accused or those who have not been arrayed as accused against whom proceedings have been quashed have also committed the offence the Court can take cognizance against them and try them along with the other accused. But, we would hasten to add that this is really an extraordinary power which is conferred on the court and should be used very sparingly and only if compelling reasons exist for taking cognizance against the other person against whom action has not been taken. More than this we would not like to say anything further at this stage. We leave the entire matter to the discretion of the court concerned so that it may act according to law. We would, however, make it plain that the mere fact that the proceedings have been quashed against respondents 2 to 5 will not prevent the court from exercising its discretion if it is fully satisfied that a case for taking cognizance against them has been made out on the additional evidence led before it.
11. In Michael Machado and Another v. Central Bureau of Investigation and Another, this Court on extensive consideration of the provision contained in Section 319 stated the (at pages 267-268) as follows :
11. The basic requirements for invoking the above section is that it should appear to the court from the evidence collected during trial or in the inquiry that some other person, who is not arraigned as an accused in that case, has committed an offence for which that person could be tried together with the accused already arraigned. It is not enough that the court entertained some doubt, from the evidence, about the involvement of another person in the offence. In other words, the court must have reasonable satisfaction from the evidence already collected regarding two aspects. First is that the other person has committed an offence. Second is that for such offence that other person could as well be tried along with the already arraigned accused.
12. But even then, what is conferred on the court is only a discretion as could be discerned from the words the court may proceed against such person. The discretionary power so conferred should be exercised only to achieve criminal justice. It is not that the court should turn against another person whenever it comes across evidence connecting that other person also with the offence. A judicial exercise is called for, keeping a conspectus of the case, including the stage at which the trial has proceeded already and the quantum of evidence collected till then, and also the amount of time which the court had spent for collecting such evidence. It must be remembered that there is no compelling duty on the court to proceed against other persons. 
14. The court while deciding whether to invoke the power under Section 319 of the Code, must address itself about the other constraints imposed by the first limb of sub-section (4), that proceedings in respect of newly-added persons shall be commenced afresh and the witnesses re-examined. The whole proceedings must be recommenced from the beginning of the trial, summon the witnesses once again and examine them and cross-examine them in order to reach the stage where it had reached earlier. If the witnesses already examined are quite large in number the court must seriously consider whether the objects sought to be achieved by such exercise are worth wasting the whole labour already undertaken. Unless the court is hopeful that there is a reasonable prospect of the case as against the newly-brought accused ending in being convicted of the offence concerned we would say that the court should refrain from adopting such a course of action.
12. In Shashikant Singh v. Tarkeshwar Singh and Another, this Court considered the scope of Section 319 of the Code at page 743 of the Report in the following words: 
9. The intention of the provision here is that where in the course of any enquiry into, or trial of, an offence, it appears to the court from the evidence that any person not being the accused has committed any offence, the court may proceed against him for the offence which he appears to have committed. At that stage, the court would consider that such a person could be tried together with the accused who is already before the court facing the trial. The safeguard provided in respect of such person is that, the proceedings right from the beginning have mandatorily to be commenced afresh and the witnesses reheard. In short, there has to be a de novo trial against him. The provision of de novo trial is mandatory. It vitally affects the rights of a person so brought before the court. It would not be sufficient to only tender the witnesses for the cross-examination of such a person. They have to be examined afresh. Fresh examination-in-chief and not only their presentation for the purpose of the cross-examination of the newly added accused is the mandate of Section 319(4). The words could be tried together with the accused in Section 319(1), appear to be only directory. Could be cannot under these circumstances be held to be must be. The provision cannot be interpreted to mean that since the trial in respect of a person who was before the court has concluded with the result that the newly added person cannot be tried together with the accused who was before the court when order under Section 319(1) was passed, the order would become ineffective and inoperative, nullifying the opinion earlier formed by the court on the basis of the evidence before it that the newly added person appears to have committed the offence resulting in an order for his being brought before the court.
13. In Krishnappa v. State of Karnataka, this Court reiterated what has been repeatedly stated that the power to summon an accused is an extraordinary power conferred on the court and should be used very sparingly and only if compelling reasons exist for taking cognizance against the other person against whom action has not been taken.

14. In Palanisamy Gounder and Another v. State represented by Inspector of Police, this Court referred to two earlier decisions of this Court in Michael Machado and Krishnappa and observed that power under Section 319 of the Code cannot be exercised so as to conduct a fishing inquiry.

15. In Guriya alias Tabassum Tauquir and Others v. State of Bihar and Another most of the above decisions were referred to and it was observed that the parameters for dealing with an application under Section 319 of the Code have been laid down in these cases.

16. The legal position that can be culled out from the material provisions of Section 319 of the Code and the decided cases of this Court is this :

(i) The Court can exercise the power conferred on it under Section 319 of the Code suo motu or on an application by someone.

(ii) The power conferred under Section 319(1) applies to all courts including the Sessions Court.

(iii) The phrase any person not being the accused occurring in Section 319 does not exclude from its operation an accused who has been released by the police under Section 169 of the Code and has been shown in Column 2 of the charge-sheet. In other words, the said expression covers any person who is not being tried already by the court and would include person or persons who have been dropped by the police during investigation but against whom evidence showing their involvement in the offence comes before the court.

(iv) The power to proceed against any person, not being the accused before the court, must be exercised only where there appears during inquiry or trial sufficient evidence indicating his involvement in the offence as an accused and not otherwise. The word `evidence' in Section 319 contemplates the evidence of witnesses given in court in the inquiry or trial. The court cannot add persons as accused on the basis of materials available in the charge- sheet or the case diary but must be based on the evidence adduced before it. In other words, the court must be satisfied that a case for addition of persons as accused, not being the accused before it, has been made out on the additional evidence let in before it.

(v) The power conferred upon the court is although discretionary but is not to be exercised in a routine manner. In a sense, it is an extraordinary power which should be used very sparingly and only if evidence has come on record which sufficiently establishes that the other person has committed an offence. A mere doubt about involvement of the other person on the basis of the evidence let in before the court is not enough. The Court must also be satisfied that circumstances justify and warrant that other person be tried with the already arraigned accused.

(vi) The court while exercising its power under Section 319 of the Code must keep in view full conspectus of the case including the stage at which the trial has proceeded already and the quantum of evidence collected till then. (vii) Regard must also be had by the court to the constraints imposed in Section 319 (4) that proceedings in respect of newly - added persons shall be commenced afresh from the beginning of the trial.

(viii) The court must, therefore, appropriately consider the above aspects and then exercise its judicial discretion.

Wednesday, August 10, 2011

Doctrine of Lis Pendens and Effective Date : The Law

Justice P. Sathasivam
Supreme Court of India
The Bench comprising Justice P. Sathasivam and Justice B.S. Chauhan, in Har Narain (D) By LRs v. Mam Chand (D) By LRs, has explained the concept of Lis Pendens, embodied in Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, which provides that during the pendency of a lis, in which any right to immovable property in is question, the property cannot be transferred by any party to the suit so as to affect the rights of other parties. Lis pendens literary means a pending suit; and the doctrine of lis pendens has been defined as the jurisdiction, power or control which a Court acquires over property involved in a suit pending the continuance of the action and until final judgment thereunder.

Lis pendens is based on the doctrine of expediency but for this it would be impossible for an action to be brought to a successful termination if crafty defendants alienate the suit property before judgment and the plaintiff is driven to commence de novo proceedings, public policy requires sanctity qua judicial proceedings to be maintained. It is immaterial whether the alienee pendente lite had or had no notice of the pending proceedings (Rappal v. Gopal AIR 1970 Kerala 180).

In the decision reported as 1972 (2) SCC 200 Jaya Ram Mudaliar vs. Ayya Swami and Ors. the scope of lis pendens was explained as under:- “Expositions of the doctrine indicate that the need for it arises from the very nature of the jurisdiction of Courts and their control over the subject matter of litigation so that parties litigating before it may not remove any part of the subject matter outside the power of the Court to deal with it and thus make the proceedings infructuous.”

In decision reported as AIR 1973 SC 2537 : Rajender Singh and Ors. vs. Santa Singh and Ors., referring to the doctrine of lis pendens it was observed as under:- 
“15. The doctrine of lis pendens was intended to strike at attempts by parties to a litigation to circumvent the jurisdiction of a Court, in which a dispute on rights or interests in immovable property is pending, by private dealings which may remove the subject matter of litigation from the ambit of the court's power to decide a pending dispute or frustrate its decree. Alienees acquiring any immovable property during a litigation over it are held to be bound by an application of the doctrine, by the decree passed in the suit even though they may not have been impleaded in it. The whole object of the doctrine of lis pendens is to subject parties to the litigation as well as others, who seek to acquire rights in immovable property, which are the subject matter of a litigation, to the power and jurisdiction of the Court so as to prevent the object of a pending action from being defeated. (Emphasis supplied)”
The question that arose for the Court's consideration, in the present case, was the 'effective date' from which the Doctrine of Lis Pendens was to apply; whether it was the date of execution of the sale deed or was it the date of registration of the document? The Supreme Court while reversing the Judgment of the Trial court held that;

"The basic questions arise as to whether in the fact- situation of this case, the sale deed executed by the respondent No.1 in favour of respondent nos.2 to 6 could be subject to the doctrine of lis pendens and in case the appellant had been in possession of the suit land being mortgagee since 1970, the respondent nos.2 to 6 can be held to be vendees without notice of an agreement to sell in favour of the appellant by the respondent no.1.

8. All the courts below have proceeded on the presumption that as the registration of a document relates back to the date of execution and in the instant case though the registration was subsequent to institution of the suit, it would relate back to the execution of the deed and the doctrine of lis pendens would not apply. Further, without considering the fact that the appellant had been in possession of the suit land since 1970, though, this fact had been mentioned in the sale deed in favour of respondent nos.2 to 6 by the respondent No.1 whether it could be held that they were not put to notice of the fact that the appellant had some interest in the property and whether in such fact- situation the respondent nos.2 to 6 may be entitled for benefit of the provisions of Section 19 of the Act, 1963.

9. Section 54 of the Act, 1882, mandatorily requires that the sale of any immovable property of the value of hundred rupees and upward can be made only by a registered instrument. Section 47 of the Act, 1908, provides that registration of the document shall relate back to the date of the execution of the document. Thus, the aforesaid two provisions make it crystal clear that sale deed in question requires registration. Even if registration had been done subsequent to the filing of Suit, it related back to the date of execution of the sale deed, which was prior to institution of the Suit. A similar issue though in a case of right of pre-emption was considered by the Constitution Bench of this Court in Ram Saran Lall & Ors. v. Mst. Domini Kuer & Ors., AIR 1961 SC 1747, by the majority of 3:2, the Court came to the conclusion that as the mere execution of the sale deed could not make the same effective and registration thereof was necessary, it was of no consequence unless the registration was made. Thus, in spite of the fact that the Act, 1908, could relate back to the date of execution in view of provisions of Section 47 of the Act, 1908, the sale could not be given effect to prior to registration. However, as the sale was not complete until the registration of instrument of sale is complete, it was not completed prior to the date of its registration. The court held:
"Section 47 of the Registration Act does not, however, say when sale would be deemed to be complete. It only permits a document when registered, to operate from a certain date which may be earlier than the date when it was registered. The object of this section is to decide which of two or more registered instruments in respect of the same property is to have effect. The section applies to a document only after it has been registered. It has nothing to do with the completion of the registration and therefore, nothing to do with the completion of a sale when the instrument is one of sale. A sale which is admittedly not completed until the registration of the instrument of sale is completed, cannot be said to have been completed earlier because by virtue of Section 47 the instrument by which it is effected, after it has been registered, commences to operate from an earlier date. Therefore, we do not think that the sale in this case can be said, in view of Section 47 to have been completed on January 31, 1946." (Emphasis added).
10. This view has subsequently been followed and approved by this Court as is evident from the judgments in Hiralal Agrawal Etc. v. Rampadarath Singh & Ors. Etc., AIR 1969 SC 244; S.K. Mohammad Rafiq (Dead) by LRs. V. Khalilul Rehmad & Anr. Etc., AIR 1972 SC 2162; Thakur Kishan Singh (Dead) v. Arvind Kumar, 11 AIR 1995 SC 73; and Chandrika Singh (Dead) by LRs. V. Arvind Kumar Singh (Dead) by LRs. & Ors., AIR 2006 SCC 2199.

11. However, all these cases are related to right to pre- emption though the legal issue involved therein remained the same. In view of the above, we are of the considered opinion that in spite of the fact that the registration of the sale deed would relate back to the date of execution, the sale can not be termed as complete until its registration and it becomes effective only once it stands registered. Thus, the fiction created by Section 47 of the Act, 1908, does not come into play before the actual registration of the document takes place.

12. In Guruswamy Nadar v. P. Lakshmi Ammal (Dead) Through LRs. & Ors., (2008) 5 SCC 796, this Court dealt with a similar issue and considered the effect of doctrine of lis pendens and the provisions of Section 19(b) of the Act, 1963. Facts of the said case had been that an agreement to sell stood executed between the first purchaser and owner of the land on 4th July, 1974 for a sum of Rs.30,000/- and a sum of Rs.5,000/- was given as advance. The remaining amount was to be paid before 31st July, 1974. As the said amount was not paid, the owner again sold the suit property to another party (appellant) on 5th May, 1975 for a sum of Rs.45,000/- and possession of the suit property was handed over to the appellant therein. Thus, the first purchaser filed the suit for enforcement of the specific performance of the contract. The trial court dismissed the Suit holding that the agreement was genuine and appellant was a bona fide purchaser for value paid in good faith, without notice of the earlier agreement, therefore, no decree for specific performance could be passed in favour of the plaintiff therein. The First Appellate Court reversed the said judgment and decree. The Second Appeal was dismissed by the High Court. This Court considered the provisions of Section 52 of the Act, 1882, and Section 19 (b) of the Act, 1963, and held that as the subsequent sale was subsequent to the filing of the Suit, Section 19(b) of the Act 1963 read with Section 52 of the Act, 1882, could not grant any benefit to the subsequent purchaser and the subsequent sale was subject to the doctrine of lis pendens. Second sale could not have the overriding effect on the first sale. The Court held as under: "So far as the present case is concerned, it is apparent that the appellant who is a subsequent purchaser of the same property, has purchased in good faith but the principle of lis pendens will certainly be applicable to the present case notwithstanding the fact that under Section 19(b) of the Specific Relief Act his right could be protected."

13. In view of the above, it is evident that doctrine of lis pendens would apply in the present case as the registration of the sale deed was subsequent to filing of the Suit and subsequent purchasers i.e. respondent Nos. 2 to 6 cannot claim benefit of the provisions of Section 19(b) of the Act, 1963.

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