Inherent Powers of Courts under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code

Justice P. Sathasivam
Supreme Court of India

The Supreme Court in Padal Venkata Rama Reddy @ Ramu Vs. Kovvuri Satyanarayana Reddy has examined various judicial pronouncements on the Inherent Powers of the Courts under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code. We have already dealt with a similar topic titled 'Power of Courts to Quash Criminal Proceedings : The Law', where Justice Dr. B.S. Chauhan of the Supreme Court of India had examined the powers of the Court under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code in relation to quashing of criminal proceedings. 

The relevant extracts from this latest judgment are reproduced hereinbelow;

6. Section 482 of the Code deals with inherent power of High Court. It is under Chapter XXXVII of the Code titled "Miscellaneous" which reads as under: 

"482. Saving of inherent power of High Court- Nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent powers of the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under this Code, or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice." 

This section was added by the Code of Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Act of 1923 as the High Courts were unable to render complete justice even if in a given case the illegality was palpable and apparent. This section envisages three circumstances in which the inherent jurisdiction may be exercised, namely: 

1. to give effect to any order under Cr.P.C., 2. to prevent abuse of the process of any court, 3. to secure the ends of justice. 

7. In R.P. Kapur Vs. State of Punjab AIR 1960 SC 866=(1960) 3 SCR 388, this Court laid down the following principles:- 

"(i) Where institution/continuance of criminal proceedings against an accused may amount to the abuse of the process of the court or that the quashing of the impugned proceedings would secure the ends of justice; 

(ii) where it manifestly appears that there is a legal bar against the institution or continuance of the said proceeding, e.g. want of sanction; 

(iii) where the allegations in the First Information Report or the complaint taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not constitute the offence alleged; and 

(iv) where the allegations constitute an offence alleged but there is either no legal evidence adduced or evidence adduced clearly or manifestly fails to prove the charge." 

8. In State of Karnataka vs. L. Muniswamy & Ors. AIR 1977 SC 1489, this Court has held as under:- 

"In the exercise of this wholesome power, the High Court is entitled to quash a proceeding if it comes to the conclusion that allowing the proceeding to continue would be an abuse of the process of the Court or that the ends of justice require that the proceeding ought to be quashed. The saving of the High Court's inherent powers, both in civil and criminal matters is designed to achieve a salutary public purpose which is that a court proceeding ought not to be permitted to degenerate into a weapon of harassment or persecution. In a criminal case, the veiled object behind a lame prosecution, the very nature of the material on which the structure of the prosecution rests and the like would justify the High Court in quashing the proceeding in the interest of justice. The ends of justice are higher than the ends of mere law though justice has got to be administered according to laws made by the legislature. The compelling necessity for making these observations is that without a proper realisation of the object and purpose of the provision which seeks to save the inherent powers of the High Court to do justice between the State and its subjects it would be impossible to appreciate the width and contours of that salient jurisdiction." 

Though the High Court has inherent power and its scope is very wide, it is a rule of practice that it will only be exercised in exceptional cases. Section 482 is a sort of reminder to the High Courts that they are not merely courts of law, but also courts of justice and possess inherent powers to remove injustice. The inherent power of the High Court is an inalienable attribute of the position it holds with respect to the courts subordinate to it. These powers are partly administrative and partly judicial. They are necessarily judicial when they are exercisable with respect to a judicial order and for securing the ends of justice. The jurisdiction under Section 482 is discretionary, therefore the High Court may refuse to exercise the discretion if a party has not approached it with clean hands. 

9. In a proceeding under Section 482, the High Court will not enter into any finding of facts, particularly, when the matter has been concluded by concurrent finding of facts of two courts below. Inherent powers under Section 482 include powers to quash FIR, investigation or any criminal proceedings pending before the High Court or any court subordinate to it and are of wide magnitude and ramification. Such powers can be exercised to secure ends of justice, prevent abuse of the process of any court and to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under this Code, depending upon the facts of a given case. Court can always take note of any miscarriage of justice and prevent the same by exercising its powers under Section 482 of the Code. These powers are neither limited nor curtailed by any other provisions of the Code. However such inherent powers are to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with caution. 

10. It is well settled that the inherent powers under Section 482 can be exercised only when no other remedy is available to the litigant and not in a situation where a specific remedy is provided by the statute. It cannot be used if it is inconsistent with specific provisions provided under the Code.- (vide Kavita v. State (2000 Cr LJ 315) and B.S. Joshi v. State of Haryana & Anr. ((2003) 4 SCC 675). 

If an effective alternative remedy is available, the High Court will not exercise its powers under this section, specially when the applicant may not have availed of that remedy. 

11. The inherent power is to be exercised ex debito justitiae, to do real and substantial justice, for administration of which alone Courts exist. Wherever any attempt is made to abuse that authority so as to produce injustice, the Court has power to prevent the abuse. It is, however, not necessary that at this stage there should be a meticulous analysis of the case before the trial to find out whether the case ends in conviction or acquittal. (Vide Mrs. Dhanalakshmi vs. R. Prasanna Kumar & Ors. AIR 1990 SC 494; Ganesh Narayan Hegde vs. S. Bangarappa & Ors. (1995) 4 SCC 41; and M/s Zandu Pharmaceutical Works Ltd. & Ors. vs. Md. Sharaful Haque & Ors. AIR 2005 SC 9). 

12. It is neither feasible nor practicable to lay down exhaustively as to on what ground the jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 482 of the Code should be exercised. But some attempts have been made in that behalf in some of the decisions of this Court vide State of Haryana vs. Bhajan Lal (1992 Supp (1) SCC 335), Janata Dal vs. H.S. Chowdhary and Others (1992 (4) SCC 305), Rupan Deol Bajaj (Mrs.) and Another vs. Kanwar Pal Singh Gill and Another (1995 (6) SCC 194), and Indian Oil Corp. vs. NEPC India Ltd. and Others (2006 (6) SCC 736). 

13. In the landmark case of State of Haryana vs. Bhajan Lal (1992 Supp.(1) SCC 335) this Court considered in detail the provisions of Section 482 and the power of the High Court to quash criminal proceedings or FIR. This Court summarized the legal position by laying down the following guidelines to be followed by High Courts in exercise of their inherent powers to quash a criminal complaint: 

"(1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. 

(2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. 

(3) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. 

(4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non- cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. 

(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. 

(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. 

(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge." 

14. In Indian Oil Corporation vs. NEPC India Ltd. and Others (2006) 6 SCC 736 a petition under Section 482 was filed to quash two criminal complaints. The High Court by a common judgment allowed the petition and quashed both the complaints. The order was challenged in appeal to this Court. While deciding the appeal, this Court laid down the following principles: 

"1. The High courts should not exercise their inherent powers to repress a legitimate prosecution. The power to quash criminal complaints should be used sparingly and with abundant caution. 

2. The criminal complaint is not required to verbatim reproduce the legal ingredients of the alleged offence. If the necessary factual foundation is laid in the criminal complaint, merely on the ground that a few ingredients have not been stated in detail, the criminal proceedings should not be quashed. Quashing of the complaint is warranted only where the complaint is bereft of even the basic facts which are absolutely necessary for making out the alleged offence. 

3. It was held that a given set of facts may make out (a) purely a civil wrong, or (b) purely a criminal offence or (c) a civil wrong as also a criminal offence. A commercial transaction or a contractual dispute, apart from furnishing a cause of action for seeking remedy in civil law, may also involve a criminal offence." 

15. In State of Orissa & Anr. vs. Saroj Kumar Sahoo (2005) 13 SCC 540, it has been held that probabilities of the prosecution version cannot be analysed at this stage. Likewise the allegations of mala fides of the informant are of secondary importance. The relevant passage reads thus: 

"It would not be proper for the High Court to analyse the case of the complainant in the light of all probabilities in order to determine whether a conviction would be sustainable and on such premises arrive at a conclusion that the proceedings are to be quashed. It would be erroneous to assess the material before it and conclude that the complaint cannot be proceeded with." 

16. In Madhavrao Jiwaji Rao Scindia & Anr. vs. Sambhajirao Chandrojirao Angre & Ors. AIR 1988 SC 709, this Court held as under:- 

"The legal position is well-settled that when a prosecution at the initial stage is asked to be quashed, the test to be applied by the court is as to whether the uncontroverted allegations as made prima facie establish the offence. It is also for the court to take into consideration any special features which appear in a particular case to consider whether it is expedient and in the interest of justice to permit a prosecution to continue. This is so on the basis that the court cannot be utilised for any oblique purpose and where in the opinion of the court chances of an ultimate conviction is bleak and, therefore, no useful purpose is likely to be served by allowing a criminal prosecution to continue, the court may while taking into consideration the special facts of a case also quash the proceeding even though it may be at a preliminary stage." 

17. This Court, while reconsidering the Judgment in Madhavrao Jiwaji Rao Scindia (supra), consistently observed that where matters are also of civil nature i.e. matrimonial, family disputes, etc., the Court may consider "special facts", "special features" and quash the criminal proceedings to encourage genuine settlement of disputes between the parties. 

18. The said Judgment was reconsidered and explained by this Court in State of Bihar & Anr. vs. Shri P.P. Sharma & Anr. AIR 1991 SC 1260 which reads as under: 

"Madhaorao J. Scindhia v. Sambhaji Rao AIR 1988 SC 709, also does not help the respondents. In that case the allegations constituted civil wrong as the trustees created tenancy of Trust property to favour the third party. A private complaint was laid for the offence under Section 467 read with Section 34 and Section 120B I.P.C. which the High Court refused to quash under Section 482. This Court allowed the appeal and quashed the proceedings on the ground that even on its own contentions in the complaint, it would be a case of breach of trust or a civil wrong but no ingredients of criminal offences were made out. On those facts and also due to the relation of the settler, the mother, the appellant and his wife, as the son and daughter-in-law, this Court interfered and allowed the appeal. Therefore, the ratio therein is of no assistance to the facts in this case. It cannot be considered that this Court laid down as a proposition of law that in every case the court would examine at the preliminary stage whether there would be ultimate chances of conviction on the basis of allegation and exercise of the power under Section 482 or Article 226 to quash the proceedings or the charge-sheet." 

Thus, the judgment in Madhavrao Jiwaji Rao Scindia (supra) does not lay down a law of universal application. Even as per the law laid down therein, the Court can not examine the facts/evidence etc. in every case to find out as to whether there is sufficient material on the basis of which the case would end in conviction. The ratio of Madhavrao Jiwaji Rao Scindia (supra) is applicable in cases where the Court finds that the dispute involved therein is predominantly civil in nature and that the parties should be given a chance to reach a compromise e.g. matrimonial, property and family disputes etc. etc. The superior Courts have been given inherent powers to prevent the abuse of the process of court where the court finds that the ends of justice may be met by quashing the proceedings, it may quash the proceedings, as the end of achieving justice is higher than the end of merely following the law. It is not necessary for the court to hold a fullfledged inquiry or to appreciate the evidence, collected by the Investigating Agency to find out whether the case would end in conviction or acquittal.

Applicability of 'Spes Successionis' under Muslim Law : The Law

Justice Altamas Kabir
Supreme Court of India

The Supreme Court in Shehammal Vs. Hasan Khani Rawther has examined the applicability of the concept of 'Spes Successionis', as contained in Section 6 of the Transfer of Property Act, to persons governed by Muslim law. The relevant extracts of this judgment are reproduced hereinbelow;

16. From the submissions made on behalf of the respective parties and the facts of the case, three questions of importance emerge for decision, namely:- 

(i) Whether in view of the doctrine of spes successionis, as embodied in Section 6 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, and in paragraph 54 of Mulla's "Principles of Mahomedan Law", a Deed of Relinquishment executed by an expectant heir could operate as estoppel to a claim that may be set up by the Executor of such Deed after inheritance opens on the death of the owner of the property? 

(ii) Whether on execution of a Deed of Relinquishment after having received remuneration for such future share, the expectant heir could be estopped from claiming a share in the inheritance? 

(iii) Can a Mohammedan by means of a Family Settlement relinquish his right of spes successionis when he had still not acquired a right in the property?  

17. Chapter VI of Mulla's "Principles of Mahomedan Law" deals with the general rules of inheritance under Mohammedan law. Paragraph 54 which falls within the said Chapter relates to the concept of transfer of spes successionis which has also been termed as "renunciation of a chance of succession". The said paragraph provides that the chance of a Mohammedan heir- apparent succeeding to an estate cannot be said to be the subject of a valid transfer or release. The same is included in Section 6 of the Transfer of Property Act and the relevant portion thereof, namely, clause (a) is extracted below :- 

"6. What may be transferred.- Property of any kind may be transferred, except as otherwise provided by this Act or by any other law for the time being in force. (a) The chance of an heir-apparent succeeding to an estate, the chance of a relation obtaining a legacy on the death of a kinsman, or any other mere possibility of a like nature, cannot be transferred." 

The provisions of Section 6(a) have to be read along with Section 2 of the Act, which provides for repeal of Acts and saving of certain enactments, incidents, rights, liabilities etc. It specifically provides that nothing in Chapter II, in which Section 6 finds place, shall be deemed to affect any rule of Mohammedan Law. 

18. Inspite of the aforesaid provisions, both of the general law and the personal law, the Courts have held that the fetters imposed under the aforesaid provisions are capable of being removed in certain situations. Two examples in this regard are - 

(i) When an expectant heir willfully does something which has the effect of attracting the provisions of Section 115 of the Evidence Act, is he estopped from claiming the benefit of the doctrine of spes successionis, as provided for under Section 6(a) of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, and also under the Mohammedan Law as embodied in paragraph 54 of Mulla's "Principles of Mahomedan Law"? 

(ii) When a Mohammedan becomes a party to a family arrangement, does it also entail that he gives up his right of spes successionis. 

The answer to the said two propositions is also the answer to the questions formulated hereinbefore in paragraph 16. 

19. The Mohammedan Law enjoins in clear and unequivocal terms that a chance of a Mohammedan heir-apparent succeeding to an estate cannot be the subject of a valid transfer or release. Section 6(a) of the Transfer of Property Act was enacted in deference to the customary law and law of inheritance prevailing among Mohammedans. 

20. As opposed to the above, are the general principles of estoppel as contained in Section 115 of the Evidence Act and the doctrine of relinquishment in respect of a future share in property. Both the said principles contemplated a situation where an expectant heir conducts himself and/or performs certain acts which makes the two aforesaid principles applicable inspite of the clear concept of relinquishment as far as Mohammedan Law is concerned, as incorporated in Section 54 of Mulla's "Principles of Mahomedan Law". Great reliance has been placed by both the parties on the decision in Gulam Abbas's case (supra). 

While dealing with a similar situation, this Court watered down the concept that the chance of a Mohammedan heir apparent succeeding to an estate cannot be the subject of a valid transfer on lease and held that renunciation of an expectancy in respect of a future share in a property in a case where the concerned party himself chose to depart from the earlier views, was not only possible, but legally valid. Referring to various authorities, including Ameer Ali's "Mohammedan Law", this Court observed that "renunciation implies the yielding up of a right already vested". It was observed in the facts of that case that during the lifetime of the mother, the daughters had no right of inheritance. Citing the decision in the case of Mt. Khannum Jan vs. Mt. Jan Bibi [(1827) 4 SDA 210] it was held that renunciation implies the yielding up of a right already vested. Accordingly, renunciation during the mother's lifetime of the daughters' shares would be null and void on the ground that an inchoate right is not capable of being transferred as such right was yet to crystallise. This Court also held that "under the Muslim Law an expectant heir may, nevertheless, be part of a course of conduct which may create an estoppel against claiming the right at a time when the right of inheritance has accrued". It was observed by the learned Judges that the Contract Act and the Evidence Act would not strictly apply since they did not involve questions arising out of Mohammedan Law. This Court accordingly held that the renunciation of a supposed right, based upon an expectancy, could not, by any test be considered "prohibited". 

21. This Court ultimately held that the binding force of the renunciation of a supposed right, would depend upon the attendant circumstances and the whole course of conduct of which it formed a part. In other words, the principle of an equitable estoppel far from being opposed to any principle of Mohammedan Law, is really in complete harmony with it. 

22. On the question of family arrangement, this Court observed that though arrangements arrived at in order to avoid future disputes in the family may not technically be a settlement, a broad concept of a family settlement could not be the answer to the doctrine of spes successionis. 

23. There is little doubt that ordinarily there cannot be a transfer of spes successionis, but in the exceptions pointed out by this Court in Gulam Abbas's case (supra), the same can be avoided either by the execution of a family settlement or by accepting consideration for a future share. It could then operate as estoppel against the expectant heir to claim any share in the estate of the deceased on account of the doctrine of spes successionis. While dealing with the various decisions on the subject, which all seem to support the view taken by the learned Judges, reference was made to the decision of Chief Justice Suleman of the Allahabad High Court in the case of Latafat Hussain Vs. Hidayat Hussain [AIR 1936 All 573], where the question of arrangement between the husband and wife in the nature of a family settlement, which was binding on the parties, was held to be correct in view of the fact that a presumption would have to be drawn that if such family arrangement had not been made, the husband could not have executed a deed of Wakf if the wife had not relinquished her claim to inheritance. It is true that in the case of Mt. Khannum Jan (supra), it had been held by this Court that renunciation implied the yielding up of a right already vested or desisting from prosecuting a claim maintainable against another, and such renunciation during the lifetime of the mother of the shares of the daughters was null and void since it entailed the giving up of something which had not yet come into existence. 

24. The High Court after considering the aforesaid views of the different jurists and the decision in connection with the doctrine of relinquishment came to a finding that even if the provisions of the doctrine of spes succession is were to apply, by their very conduct the Petitioners were estopped from claiming the benefit of the said doctrine. In this context, we may refer to yet another principle of Mohammedan Law which is contained in the concept of Wills under the Mohammedan Law. Paragraph 118 of Mulla's "Principles of Mahomedan Law" embodies the concept of the limit of testamentary power by a Mohammedan. It records that a Mohammedan cannot by Will dispose of more than a third of the surplus of his estate after payment of funeral expenses and debts. Bequests in excess of one-third cannot take effect unless the heirs consent thereto after the death of the testator. The said principle of testamentary disposition of property has been the subject matter of various decisions rendered by this Court from time to time and it has been consistently stated and reaffirmed that a testamentary disposition by a Mohammedan is binding upon the heirs if the heirs consent to the disposition of the entire property and such consent could either be express or implied. Thus, a Mohammedan may also make a disposition of his entire property if all the heirs signified their consent to the same. In other words, the general principle that a Mohammedan cannot by Will dispose of more than a third of his estate after payment of funeral expenses and debts is capable of being avoided by the consent of all the heirs. In effect, the same also amounts to a right of relinquishment of future inheritance which is on the one hand forbidden and on the other accepted in the case of testamentary disposition. Having accepted the consideration for having relinquished a future claim or share in the estate of the deceased, it would be against public policy if such a claimant be allowed the benefit of the doctrine of spes successionis. In such cases, we have no doubt in our mind that the principle of estoppel would be attracted. 

25. We are, however, not inclined to accept that the methodology resorted to by Meeralava Rawther can strictly be said to be a family arrangement. A family arrangement would necessarily mean a decision arrived at jointly by the members of a family and not between two individuals belonging to the family. The five deeds of relinquishment executed by the five sons and daughters of Meeralava Rawther constitute individual agreements entered into between Meeralava Rawther and the expectant heirs. However, notwithstanding the above, as we have held hereinbefore, the doctrine of estoppel is attracted so as to prevent a person from receiving an advantage for giving up of his/her rights and yet claiming the same right subsequently. In our view, being opposed to public policy, the heir expectant would be estopped under the general law from claiming a share in the property of the deceased, as was held in Gulam Abbas's case (supra).

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New Senior Advocates Appointed in Delhi High Court

Delhi High Court Bar Association Vice President, Mr. Kirti Uppal is amongst the 7 other advocates who have been designated as Senior Advocates by the Delhi High Court.


The list includes criminal lawyer and CBI standing counsel Mr. Vikas Pahwa, Land Acquisition expert and Union of India standing counsel, Mr. Sanjay Poddar, Mr. Vibhu Bhakru, Mr. SK Rungta, Mr. Dinesh Agnani, Mr. Raman Kapur and Mr. Sanjeev Sachdeva.

The new designatons take the number of senior advocates in the Delhi High Court to 190, following the designation of 10 senior advocates in January this year. The updated list of senior advocates is available here. (does not include the present designations)