Thursday, July 14, 2011

Part Performance under the Transfer of Property Act : The Law

Justice V.K. Jain
Delhi High Court
The Delhi High Court in a recent decision in Panchi Devi v. Omwati has discussed the broad principles of 'Part Performance' under S. 53 A of the Transfer of Property Act. While discussing the law and authorities on the subject, Justice V.K. Jain has held that an oral Agreement to Sell cannot be enforced under S. 53 A of the Transfer of Property Act. The relevant text of the judgment is reproduced hereunder; 


7. As regards the oral Agreement to Sell, pleaded by the defendant, the law does not protect the possession of a person who claims to have obtained it under an oral Agreement to Sell in his favour. Section 53A of Transfer of Property Act reads as under:-
"53A. Part performance - Where any person contracts to transfer for consideration any immovable property by writing signed by him or on his behalf from which the terms necessary to constitute the transfer can be ascertained with reasonable certainty, and the transferee has, in part performance of the contract, taken possession of the property or any part thereof, or the transferee, being already in possession continues in possession in part performance of the contract and has done some act in furtherance of the contract, and the transferee has performed or is willing to perform his part of the contract, then, notwithstanding that where there is an instrument of transfer, that the transfer has not been completed in the manner prescribed therefor by the law for the time being in force, the transferor or any person claiming under him shall be debarred from enforcing against the transferee has taken or continued in possession, other than a right expressly provided by the terms of the contract:
Provided that nothing in this section shall affect the rights of a transferee for consideration who has no notice of the contract or of the part performance thereof]." It would be seen that the possession of a person is protected under Section 53A of the Act only if he claims it under a written contract to transfer the property to him for consideration. Unless a written agreement is set up, the provisions of Section 53A of the Act do not come into play and consequently, the person claiming possession under the oral agreement is not entitled to defend his possession.
8. In Nathulal v. Phool Chand 1970 2SCR 854, Supreme Court while interpreting Section 53-A culled out the following conditions to be fulfilled for making out the defence of part performance to an action in ejectment by the owner, as under:-

(i) that the transferor has contracted to transfer for consideration any immovable property by writing signed by him or on his behalf from which the terms necessary to constitute the transfer can be ascertained with reasonable certainty;

(ii) that the transferee has, in part performance of the contract, taken possession of the property or any part thereof, or the transferee, being already in possession continues in possession in part performance of the contract;

(iii) that the transferee has done some act in furtherance of the contract; and

(iv) that the transferee has performed or is willing to perform his part of the contract.

In Sardar Govindrao Mahadik v. Devi Sahai 1982 2SCR 186, it was reiterated that to qualify for the protection of the doctrine of part performance it must be shown that there is an agreement to transfer of immovable property for consideration and the contract is evidenced by a writing signed by the person sought to be bound by it and from which the terms necessary to constitute the transfer can be ascertained with reasonable certainty.

Supreme Court in Rambahu Namdeo Gajre v. Narayan Bapuji (2004) 8 SCC 614, held that the doctrine of part performance aims at protecting the possession of such transferee provided certain conditions contemplated by Section 53-A are fulfilled. These conditions are: 

(i) there must be a contract for transfer for consideration of any immovable property,

(ii) the contract must be in writing, signed by the transferor or someone on his behalf,

(iii) the writing must be in such words from which the terms necessary to construe the transfer may be ascertained,

(iv) the transferee must in part performance of the contract take possession of the property, or of any part thereof,

(v) the transferee must have done some act in furtherance of the contract, and

(vi) the transferee must have performed or be willing to perform his part of the contract.

9. Thus, if the plea taken by the plaintiff is accepted, the possession of the defendant is unauthorized, her tenancy have been terminated. If the plea set up by the defendant is accepted, her possession is still unauthorized since she is not claiming a written agreement in her favour and the possession under an oral agreement is not protected by Section 53A of the Act.

Joint Possession of Property & Court Fees : The Law

Justice V.K. Jain of the Delhi High Court in Anu v. Suresh Verma has recently reiterated the legal position that in cases where joint possession is claimed by the Plaintiff, he would be liable to pay fixed court fees. However, in cases where the Plaintiff pleads or the plaint otherwise reveals that the Plaintiff has been completely ousted from possession, the Plaintiff would have to pay ad-voleram court fees on the market value of the property. The relevant extracts of the judgment are reproduced hereunder;


5. Section 8 of the Suits Valuation Act, 1887 provides that where other than those referred to in the Court-fees Act, 1870 Section 7, paragraph v, vi and ix, and paragraph x, clause (d), Court-fees are payable ad valorem under the Court-fees Act, 1870, the value as determinable for the computation of court-fees and the value for purposes of jurisdiction shall be the same. Section 9 of the above- referred Act provides that when the subject-matter of suits of any class, other than suits mentioned in the Court-fees Act, 1870, Section 7, paragraph v and vi, and paragraph x, clause (d) is such that in the opinion of the High Court it does not admit of being satisfactorily valued, the High Court may with the previous sanction of the State Government, direct that suits of that class shall, for the purposes of the Court-fees Act, 1870, and of this Act and any other enactment for the time being in force, be treated as if their subject-matter were of such value as the High Court thinks fit to specify in this behalf.

In exercise of powers conferred by Section 9 of Suits Valuation Act, Punjab High Court made rules which are applicable to Delhi.

Suits for partition of property--

Court-fee--(a) as determined by the Court-fees Act, 1870 Value--(b) For the purpose of the Suit Valuation Act, 1887, and the Punjab Court Act, 1918 the value of the whole of the property as determined by Sections 3, 8 and 9 of the Suits Valuation Act, 1887.

It would thus be seen that in view of the rules framed by Punjab High Court under Section 9 of Suits Valuation Act, which admittedly are applicable to Delhi, there can be separate valuations for the purpose of Court fee and jurisdiction. The valuation for the purpose of jurisdiction has to be the value of the whole of the properties subject matter of partition, whereas valuation for the purpose of Court fee would be such as is provided by the Court-fees Act.

Section 7(iv)(b) of Court Fees Act, provides that in a suit to enforce the right to share in any property on the ground that it is a joint family property, the amount of fee payable under Court-fee Act, shall be computed according to the amount at which the relief sought is valued in the plaint or memorandum of appeal. It further provides that in all such suits the plaintiff shall state the amount at which he values the relief sought by him. Article 17(vi) of Schedule II of Court-fees Act provides for payment of a fixed Court fee in a suit where it is not possible to estimate at a money value the subject matter in dispute, and which is not otherwise provided for by this Act.

6. After examining the decision of Supreme Court in S.Rm. Ar. S. Sp. Sathappa Chettiar v. S. Rm. Ar. Rm. Ramanathan Chettiar AIR 1958 SC 245, Neelavathi & Ors. v. N. Natarajan & Ors. AIR1980 SC 691, Jagannath Amin v. Seetharama (dead) by LRs & Ors. 2007(1) SCC 674 and Commercial Aviation and Travel Co. v. Vimla Panna Lal AIR 1988 SC 1636 this Court in CS(OS) No. 2642/2008 and IA No. 10367/2010 decided on 4th March, 2011 summarized the legal position in this regard as under: (ii) If the plaintiff claims to be in joint possession of the suit property, he has to pay a fixed Court fee in terms of Article 17(vi) of Court-fees Act. (iii) If the averments made in the plaint show that the plaintiff has been completely ousted from possession and is not in possession of any part of the suit property, he is required to claim possession and also pay ad valorem Court fee on the market value of his share in the suit property.

7. In my view, in order to constitute joint possession, it is not necessary that the plaintiff should claim to be in joint possession of each of the properties in respect of which partition is sought by him/her. If she claims to be in joint possession of even one of the properties either wholly or partly, that would be sufficient to bring the case within the ambit of Article 7(iv) of Court-fees Act, because what is relevant is joint possession of the estate in respect of which partition is sought. The plaintiff is seeking partition not with respect to any one property, but with respect to all the properties which were owned by her late parents. If partition is sought in respect of more than one property and one of the co-owners possesses one property or a part of it and the other co-owners possess the remaining properties, all of them will be deemed to be in joint possession of the properties subject matter of partition. In this regard, the following observations made by this Court in Sudershan Kumar Seth vs. Pawan Kumar Seth & Ors. 124 (2005) DLT 305:

"It is settled that in order to decide as to what relief has been claimed by the plaintiff, the whole of the plaint has to be read. From the perusal of the plaint if it can be inferred that the plaintiff is in possession of the any of properties to be partitioned, then the court fees shall be payable under Article 17 (6) of Schedule II of the Court fees Act i.e. fixed court fees at the time of institution of the suit but if the conclusion is that the plaintiff is not in possession of any part of the properties then the plaintiff has to pay Court fees under section 7(iv)(b) of the Court fees Act i.e. on the value of plaintiff's share."

Saturday, July 9, 2011

Law Relating to Protection of Domain Names : The Law

Justice Manmohan Singh of the Delhi High Court, in Arun Jaitley v. Network Solutions Pvt. Ltd. & Ors., has spelt out the law relating to the protection of domain names under the Indian Trademark law. While discussing various judicial precedents on the subject, the Delhi High Court held as under;


23. At this stage, let me now discuss the law relating to protection of domain names which is worth noting. The domain name is usually an address given to the website so that the person intending to visit the same may visit the website of the identified person.

a) This function of giving names to the addresses of the website has undergone magnificient change whereby the companies, firms, eminent individuals have been able to name the web addresses after their own names and/ or trade mark. This performs dual functions, firstly, the domain name does not merely remain as an address but rather performs the function of a trade mark as the prospective customers or other known persons visit the webpage and are able to immediately connect with the source and identify the same with the particular company or the individual.

b) Secondly, so far as individual persons or eminent personalities/ popular companies are concerned, their identity is established in the virtual world of internet. In other words, the popularity or the fame of any individual or the company will be no different on the computer (or internet) than the reality.

c) Therefore, it becomes incumbent to protect the domain names so that the identified names of companies and individuals which are distinct at the market place may not go at the hands of individuals who are nowhere concerned with those names and have obtained them just because they are better conversant with the computer techniques and usage of the internet. To simplify, in order to prevent the cyber squatting or trafficking or trading in domain names or the marks, the trade mark law has been stretched to the extent that it may cover the field of internet and domain names may be protected just like the trade marks.

24. The trade mark law protects names from its inception. Rather, the specific provision which trade mark Act 1999 has in relation to trade name was not earlier present in the Trade & Merchandise Marks Act 1958. Even in earlier trade mark act of 1958, the names were given ample protection on the principles of passing off. It would be appropriate at this stage to reiterate the basic principle of passing off law under which the names were protected which has been articulated by Narayanan in his book :

"25. 104 Law of passing off applicable to trade names - Apart from a trade mark in the strict sense of term, a trader may use a name to indicate his business or goods. The definition of a mark includes a name. A trade name can therefore serve the purpose of a trade mark. Where the business is such that no sale of any goods is involved, it is carried on invariably under a trading name or style. Individuals, firms or companies rendering certain professional services comes under this category.

....... The law is that no man is entitled to carry on his business in such a way as to represent that if it is business of another or is in any way connected with the business of another. The general principles of the law applicable to cases where a person uses a name or intends to use a name which is like to deceive and thereby divert the business of the plaintiff to the defendant or cause confusion between two businesses are analogous to the principles which are applicable to ordinary cases of passing off relating to sale of goods." (Emphasis supplied)

25. Likewise, the definition of trade mark includes the name being an inclusive definition was also extended to include domain names. This was done so as to give ample protection to domain names as the domain names was not included as a specific subject under the trade mark law regime. Therefore, the recourse was taken by expansive interpretation of the definition of the trade mark which is sought to include domain names so that the law of passing off may sufficiently subsume the same.

26. The interplay between the trade mark act as well as the domain names on the basis of the trade mark includes name and in turn the domain name was for first witnessed by this court in the case of Yahoo Inc v. Akash Arora, 1999 PTC (19) 201 wherein this court accorded protection of domain names after going through the objects of the trade mark law as well as the definition of the trade mark.

27. Further, the same proposition was laid down by the Bombay High Court in Rediff Communication Ltd. v. Cyberbooth and Anr, AIR 2000 Bom 27 wherein the court has held that the domain names are worthy of the protection under the passing off regime.

Finally, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Satyam Infoway Ltd. Vs.Sifynet Solutions Pvt. Ltd, (2004) 6 SCC145 has extensively discussed the law on the subject and also discussed the place of the domain names under the law of passing off. Some of the paragraphs of Apex court‟s decision are worth noting which can be reproduced herein after:

"7. A "trade mark" has been defined in section 2 (zb) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 (hereafter referred to as 'the Act') as meaning :

"trade mark' means a mark capable of being represented graphically and which is capable of distinguishing the goods or services of one person from those of others and may include shape of goods, their packaging and combination of colours".

8. Therefore a distinctive mark in respect of goods or services is a 'Trade mark'.

9. A "mark" has been defined in Section 2(m) as including "a device, brand, heading, label, ticket, name, signature, word, letter, numeral, shape of goods, packaging or combination of colours or any combination thereof" and a 'name' includes any abbreviation of a name (s. 2k).

10. "Goods" have been defined in Section 2(j) as meaning "anything" which is the subject of trade or manufacture, and "Services" has been defined in section 2 (z) as meaning:

"service of any description which is made available to potential users and includes the provision of services in connection with business of any industrial or commercial matters such as banking, communication, education, financing, insurance, chit funds, real estate, transport, storage, material treatment, processing, supply of electrical or other energy, boarding, lodging, entertainment, amusement, construction, repair, conveying of news or information and advertising."

11. Analysing and cumulatively paraphrasing the relevant parts of the aforesaid definitions, the question which is apposite is whether a domain name can be said to be a word or name which is capable of distinguishing the subject of trade or service made available to potential users of the internet?

12. The original role of a domain name was no doubt to provide an address for computers on the internet . But the internet has developed from a mere means of communication to a mode of carrying on commercial activity. With the increase of commercial activity on the internet, a domain name is also used as a business identifier.

Therefore, the domain name not only serves as an address for internet communication but also identifies the specific internet site. In the commercial field, each domain name owner provides information/services which are associated with such domain name. Thus a domain name may pertain to provision of services within the meaning of Section 2 (z). A domain name is easy to remember and use, and is chosen as an instrument of commercial enterprise not only because it facilitates the ability of consumers to navigate the Internet to find websites they are looking for, but also at the same time, serves to identify and distinguish the business itself, or its goods or services, and to specify its corresponding online Internet location. Consequently a domain name as an address must, of necessity, be peculiar and unique and where a domain name is used in connection with a business, the value of maintaining an exclusive identity becomes critical. "As more and more commercial enterprises trade or advertise their presence on the web, domain names have become more and more valuable and the potential for dispute is high. Whereas a large number of trademarks containing the same name can comfortably co-exist because they are associated with different products, belong to business in different jurisdictions etc, the distinctive nature of the domain name providing global exclusivity is much sought after. The fact that many consumers searching for a particular site are likely, in the first place, to try and guess its domain name has further enhanced this value" . The answer to the question posed in the preceding paragraph is therefore an affirmative.

13. The next question is would the principles of trade mark law and in particular those relating to passing off apply? An action for passing off, as the phrase "passing off" itself suggests, is to restrain the defendant from passing off its goods or services to the public as that of the plaintiff's. It is an action not only to preserve the reputation of the plaintiff but also to safeguard the public. The defendant must have sold its goods or offered its services in a manner which has deceived or would be likely to deceive the public into thinking that the defendant's goods or services are the plaintiff's. The action is normally available to the owner of a distinctive trademark and the person who, if the word or name is an invented one, invents and uses it. If two trade rivals claim to have individually invented the same mark, then the trader who is able to establish prior user will succeed. The question is, as has been aptly put, who gets these first? It is not essential for the plaintiff to prove long user to establish reputation in a passing off action. It would depend upon the volume of sales and extent of advertisement.

14. The second element that must be established by a plaintiff in a passing off action is misrepresentation by the defendant to the public. The word misrepresentation does not mean that the plaintiff has to prove any malafide intention on the part of the defendant. Of course, if the misrepresentation is intentional, it might lead to an inference that the reputation of the plaintiff is such that it is worth the defendant's while to cash in on it. An innocent misrepresentation would be relevant only on the question of the ultimate relief which would be granted to plaintiff. CADBURY SCEHWEPPES v. PUB SQUASH, 1981 rpc 429, ERVEN WARNINK VS. TOWNEND 1980 RPC

31 What has to be established is the likelihood of confusion in the minds of the public, (the word "public" being understood to mean actual or potential customers or users) that the goods or services offered by the defendant are the goods or the services of the plaintiff. In assessing the likelihood of such confusion the courts must allow for the "imperfect recollection of a person of ordinary memory" ARISTOC VS. RYSTA, 1945 AC 68

15. The third element of a passing off action is loss or the likelihood of it.

16. The use of the same or similar domain name may lead to a diversion of users which could result from such users mistakenly accessing one domain name instead of another. This may occur in e- commerce with its rapid progress and instant (and theoretically limitless) accessibility to users and potential customers and particularly so in areas of specific overlap. Ordinary consumers/users seeking to locate the functions available under one domain name may be confused if they accidentally arrived at a different but similar web site which offers no such services. Such users could well conclude that the first domain name owner had mis-represented its goods or services through its promotional activities and the first domain owner would thereby lose their custom. It is apparent therefore that a domain name may have all the characteristics of a trademark and could found an action for passing off."

28. From the above discussion, it is clear that the domain names are protected under the law of passing off with a personal name being no exception. Rather it would not be out of place to say that the entitlement to use one‟s own name stands on a higher footing than the entitlement to use the trade mark. This is so due to the reason that the right to use ones own name is a personal right as against the right to use a trade mark which is merely a commercial right. This can be discerned after carefully analyzing the scheme of the trade mark law wherein Section 35 of the Trade Marks Act 1999 provides right to use the personal name as a valid defence or an exception to the infringement of the mark. A necessary corollary which follows is that the right to use a personal name is superior than that of the commercial right of using the trade mark and thus the entitlement to use it as a trade mark or domain name vests with the person having its personal name. Afortiori it can be conveniently stated that the name which besides being a personal name is also distinctive due to its inherent distinctiveness and also by virtue of the popularity of the person specific also fulfils the criterion of trade mark.

29. In the present case it is clear from a visit to the WHOIS that; 

(i) There is no natural person who claims rights in the domain name www.arunjaitley.com;

(ii) There is no corporate entity claiming rights in the same except unknown Registering authorities;

30. Therefore, the entitlement to restrain the use of the popular or well known personal names accrues to a person on both the counts, first on the satisfaction of the principles of well known marks envisaged under the trade mark law and second in view of his personal right and entitlement to use his personal name. However, there is no absolute right to use personal name and whenever there are common names or common surnames, or names of the sect which cannot attain distinctiveness, the right and entitlement to use the same varies and tests become different as in those cases no exclusivity can be maintained by a single person and equal rights subsist to each of the persons using the common names unless high degree of distinctive character is established. The said principles can be hold to be good for the purposes for deciding the cases involving personal names which can also qualify the tests of the trade mark.

Justice B. Sudershan Reddy of the Supreme Court Retires

Source : Newsleaks.in

Two days after delivering a judgment against use of tribals as special police officers (SPOs) in anti-Maoist operations in Chhattisgarh, Supreme Court’s Justice B. Sudershan Reddy retired Thursday.

In his judgment directing the disarming of the SPOs, Justice Reddy gave words to his anguish on the state policy, saying that on “one hand the state subsidises the private sector, giving it tax break after tax break, while simultaneously citing lack of revenues as the primary reason for not fulfilling its obligations to provide adequate cover to the poor through social welfare measures”.

Justice Reddy, 65, said that while the state was accommodating the rich and the powerful, it sought to arm the youngsters amongst the poor with guns to combat the anger and unrest amongst the poor (arising out of their desperate conditions).

Born July 8, 1946, Justice Reddy was elevated to the apex court Jan 12, 2007. Till then, he was the chief justice of the Gauhati High Court.

Six more apex court judges will retire in the next four months. Justice R.V. Raveendran will be the last of the six to retire Oct 15.

Others who will retire before him are Justice V.S. Sirpurkar Aug 22, Justice H.S. Bedi Sep 5, Justice Mukundakam Sharma Sep 18, Justice Markandey Katju Sep 20, and Justice J.M. Panchal Oct 6.

Though the sanctioned strength of apex court is 31 judges, including Chief Justice S.H. Kapadia, it is short of three judges

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