Supreme Court Orders Disciplinary Proceedings Against Lower Court Judge

Justice Katju

Source : Indian Express

The Supreme Court directed the Delhi High Court Chief Justice to initiate disciplinary action against city's Additional District Judge Archana Sinha for defying an apex court's order and staying eviction proceeding against a tenant.

Though the judge herself tendered an unconditional apology in the open court and repeatedly sought "mercy", the apex court rejected her plea, saying that a stern message should go across the country against growing corruption in the subordinate judiciary.

A bench of justices Markandey Katju and Gyan Sudha Misra expressed serious concern over growing corruption in the subordinate judiciary involving judges, advocates and the litigants.

The apex court pointed out that because of growing nexus between the three sections, there is growing adverse public perception against the entire judiciary.

Though senior counsel Jayant Bhushan and other advocates appearing for the beleaguered judge pleaded with the bench to pardon her, the apex court said, "Archana Sinha had no business to over write its order."

"Archana Sinha had no business to defy our order and she has become a super Supreme Court," the bench observed.

The bench passed the order on a contempt petition filed by the landlord complaining that the judge on April 23 stayed the eviction proceedings against the tenant despite the fact that the apex court on October 6, 2010 had dismissed the tenant's appeal against the eviction order.

The tenant had also given an undertaking to vacate the premises within six months. However, instead of complying with the order, the tenant had approached the Additional District Judge Sinha and had obtained a stay on the eviction proceedings.

Gift under Muslim Law : The Concept

Justice R.M. Lodha

The Supreme Court in Hafeeza Bibi Vs. Shaikh Farid (Dead) has examined the concept of Gift under Muslim Law and its interplay with the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act and the Registartion Act. The question posed before the Supreme Court in this case was whether an unregistered Gift Deed is a valid gift and a valid conveyance of title. The relevant portions of the judgment are reproduced hereinbelow;

10. As to whether or not the High Court is right in its view that the unregistered gift deed dated February 5, 1968 is not a valid gift and conveyed no title to the defendant 2 is the question for determination in this appeal. 

11. There is divergence of opinion amongst High Courts on the question presented before us. 

12. The Privy Council in the case of Mohammad Abdul Ghani (since deceased) & Anr.v. Fakhr Jahan Begam & Ors. 1922 (49) IA 195 referred to `Mohammadan Law'; by Syed Ameer Ali and approved the statement made therein that three conditions are necessary for a valid gift by a Muslim: 

(a) manifestation of the wish to give on the part of the donor; (b) the acceptance of the donee, either impliedly or expressly; 

(c) the taking of possession of the subject-matter of the gift by the donee, either actually or constructively. 

13. In Mahboob Sahab v. Syed Ismail and others (1995) 3 SCC 693, this Court referred to the Principles of Mahomedan Law by Mulla, 19th Edition and in paragraph 5 (pp. 696-697) noticed the legal position, in relation to a gift by Muslim incorporated therein, thus : 

"5. Under Section 147 of the Principles of Mahomedan Law by Mulla, 19th Edn., edited by Chief Justice M. Hidayatullah, envisages that writing is not essential to the validity of a gift either of moveable or of immovable property. Section 148 requires that it is essential to the validity of a gift that the donor should divest himself completely of all ownership and dominion over the subject of the gift. Under Section 149, three essentials to the validity of the gift should be, (i) a declaration of gift by the donor, (ii) acceptance of the gift, express or implied, by or on behalf of the donee, and (iii) delivery of possession of the subject of the gift by the donor to the donee as mentioned in Section 150. If these conditions are complied with, the gift is complete. Section 150 specifically mentions that for a valid gift there should be delivery of possession of the subject of the gift and taking of possession of the gift by the donee, actually or constructively. Then only the gift is complete. Section 152 envisages that where the donor is in possession, a gift of immovable property of which the donor is in actual possession is not complete unless the donor physically departs from the premises with all his goods and chattels, and the donee formally enters into possession. It would, thus, be clear that though gift by a Mohammedan is not required to be in writing and consequently need not be registered under the Registration Act; for a gift to be complete, there should be a declaration of the gift by the donor; acceptance of the gift, expressed or implied, by or on behalf of the donee, and delivery of possession of the property, the subject-matter of the gift by the donor to the donee. The donee should take delivery of the possession of that property either actually or constructively. On proof of these essential conditions, the gift becomes complete and valid. In case of immovable property in the possession of the donor, he should completely divest himself physically of the subject of the gift......." 

14. Section 123 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (for short, `T.P. Act') lays down the manner in which gift of immoveable property may be effected. It reads thus : 

"S.123. Transfer how effected. -- For the purpose of making a gift of immoveable property, the transfer must be effected by a registered instrument signed by or on behalf of the donor, and attested by at least two witnesses. For the purpose of making a gift of moveable property, the transfer may be effected either by a registered instrument signed as aforesaid or by delivery. Such delivery may be made in the same way as goods sold may be delivered." 

15. However, an exception is carved out in Section 129 of the T.P. Act with regard to the gifts by a Mohammadan. It reads as follows: 

"S.129. Saving of donations mortis causa and Muhammadan Law. -- Nothing in this Chapter relates to gifts of moveable property made in contemplation of death, or shall be deemed to affect any rule of Muhammadan law." 

16. At this stage, we may also refer to Section 17 of the Registration Act, 1908 which makes registration of certain documents compulsory. Section 17 of the Registration Act, to the extent it is necessary, reads as follows : 

"S.17. Documents of which registration is compulsory. – 

(1) The following documents shall be registered, if the property to which they relate is situate in a district in which, and if they have been executed on or after the date on which, Act No. XVI of 1864, or the Indian Registration Act, 1866, or the Indian Registration Act, 1871, or the Indian Registration Act, 1877, or this Act came or comes into force, namely:-- 

(a) instruments of gift of immovable property; (b) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ; (c) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ; (d) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . ;  (e) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ." 

17. Section 49 of the Registration Act deals with the effect of non-registration of documents required to be registered. It reads thus: 

"S.49. Effect of non- registration of documents required to be registered.- No document required by section 17 or by any provision of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (4 of 1882), to be registered shall-- (a) affect any immovable property comprised therein or (b) confer any power to adopt, or (c) be received as evidence of any transaction affecting such property or conferring such power, unless it has been registered: Provided that an unregistered document affecting immovable property and required by this Act or the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (4 of 1882 ), to be registered may be received as evidence of a contract in a suit for specific performance under Chapter II of the Specific Relief Act, 1877 (3 of 1877 ), or as evidence of any collateral transaction not required to be effected by registered instrument." 

18. Section 17(1)(a) of the Registration Act leaves no manner of doubt that an instrument of gift of immoveable property requires registration irrespective of the value of the property. The question is about its applicability to a written gift executed by a Mohammadan in the light of Section 129 of the T.P. Act and the rule of Mohammadan Law relating to gifts. 

19. In the case of Nasib Ali v. Wajed Ali AIR 1927 Cal 197, the contention was raised before the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court that the deed of gift, not being registered under the Registration Act, is not admissible in evidence. The Calcutta High Court held that a deed of gift by a Mohammadan is not an instrument effecting, creating or making the gift but a mere piece of evidence. This is what the High Court said : 

".........The position under the Mahomedan Law is this : that a gift in order to be valid must be made in accordance with the forms stated above; and even if it is evidenced by writing, unless all the essential forms are observed, it is not valid according to law. That being so, a deed of gift executed by a Mahomedan is not the instrument effecting, creating or making the gift but a mere piece of evidence. It may so happen after a lapse of time that the evidence of the observance of the above forms might not be forthcoming, so it is sometimes thought prudent; to reduce the fact that a gift has been made into writing. Such writing is not a document of title but is a piece of evidence. 

3. The law with regard to the gift being complete by declaration and delivery of possession is so clear that in a case before their Lordships of the Judicial Committee Kamarunnissa Bibi v. Hussaini Bibi [1880] 3 All. 266, where a gift was said to have been made in lieu of dower, their Lordships held that the requisite forms having been observed it was not necessary to enquire whether there was any consideration for the gift or whether there was any dower due. The case of Karam Ilahi v. Sharfuddin [1916] 38 All. 212 is similar in principle to the present case. There also a deed relating to the gift was executed. The learned Judge held that if the gift was valid under the Mahomedan Law it was none the less valid because there was a deed of gift which, owing to some defect, was invalid under Section 123, Transfer of Property Act, and could not be used in evidence. 

4. The next, question that calls for consideration is whether a document like the present one executed by a Mahomedan donor after he made a gift to show that he had made it in favour of the donee is compulsorily registrable under the Registration Act. Under Section 17 of the Registration Act an instrument of gift must be registered. By the expression 'instrument of gift of immovable property' I understand an instrument or deed which creates, makes or completes the gift, thereby transferring the ownership of the property from the executant to the person in whose favour it is executed. In order to affect the immovable property, the document must be a document of transfer; and if it is a document of transfer it must be registered under the provisions of the Registration Act. 

5. The present document does not affect immovable property. It does not transfer the immovable property from the donor to the donee. It only affords evidence of the fact that the donor has observed the formalities under the Mahomedan Law in making the gift to the donee. I am prepared to go so far as to hold that a document like the present one is not compulsorily registrable under the Registration Act, or the Registration Act does not apply to a so-called deed of gift executed by a Mahomedan. But for purposes of the present case it is not necessary to go so far because I hold that this document is only a piece of evidence, and conceding that it should, have been registered, the effect of its non-registration is to make it inadmissible in evidence under Section 49 of the Registration Act........." 

20. In Sankesula Chinna Budde Saheb v. Raja Subbamma 1954 2 MLJ 113, the Andhra Pradesh High Court, after noticing the three essentials of a gift under the Mohammadan Law, held that if a gift was reduced to writing, it required registration under Section 17(1)(a) of the Registration Act. It went on to hold that even if by virtue of Section 129 of the T.P. Act, a deed of gift executed by Mohammadan was not required to comply with the provisions of Section 123 of the T.P. Act, still it had to be registered under Section 17(1)(a) of the Registration Act when the gift related to immoveable property. 

21. A Full Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in the case of Inspector General of Registration and Stamps, Govt. of Hyderabad v. Smt. Tayyaba Begum AIR 1962 Andhra Pradesh 199, was called upon to decide on a reference made by the Board of Revenue under Section 55 of the Hyderabad Stamp Act whether the document under consideration therein was a gift deed or it merely evidenced a past transaction. The High Court applied the test - whether the parties regarded the instrument to be a receptacle and appropriate evidence of the transaction; was it intended to constitute the gift or was it to serve as a record of a past event - and held as under : 

"12. We have to examine the document in question in the light of these rules. No doubt, there was recitals therein which relate to past transaction. But that is not decisive of the matter. What is the purpose which it was designed to serve? That the executant did not treat it as a memorandum of a completed hiba is evident from some of the sentences. In the deed, such as "I deemed it necessary to execute a deed also making a declaration in favour of my son...in accordance with the Muslim law", and the last portion of the document. The anxiety of the donor to free the title of the donee to the property from all doubts and to save him from future litigation is clearly exhibited in the last sentence. "I pray that no one may have any kind of doubt regarding the ownership of Syed Ehasan Hussain and that if per chance any doubt at all should arise, this deed of Ekrarnama may prove sufficient." This sentence is expressive of her intention to silence all doubts regarding the ownership of the property with the aid of this document. She did not want anyone to challenge the title of the donee to the house in question. This object could be attained only if it is regarded as a conveyance, a document which effected the transfer by its own force. If, on the other hand, if it is a mere record of a past transaction, that would not have the desired effect. There is one circumstance which gives some indication as to the intention of the executant of the document. The document is attested by two witnesses as required by Section 123 of the Transfer of Property Act. No doubt, this is not conclusive of the matter. But it is indicative of the desire of the executant that it should serve as evidence of the gift and not as a memorandum of a past transaction." 

22. In Makku Rawther's Children: Assan Ravther and others v. Manahapara Charayil, V.R. Krishna Iyer, J. (as His Lordship then 6 AIR 1972 Kerala 27 was) did not agree with the test applied by the Full Bench of Andhra Pradesh High Court and the reasoning given in Tayyaba Begum5 . He held in paragraphs 8 and 9 of the report thus : 

"8. I regret my inability to agree with the reasoning in these decisions. In the context of Section 17, a document is the same as an instrument and to draw nice distinctions between the two only serves to baffle, not to ill mine. Mulla says: 

"The words `document' and `instrument' are used interchangeable in the Act". 

An instrument of gift is one whereby a gift is made. Where in law a gift cannot be effected by a registered deed as such, it cannot be an instrument of gift. The legal position is well-settled. A Muslim gift may be valid even without a registered deed and may be invalid even with a registered deed. Registration being irrelevant to its legal force, a deed setting out Muslim gift cannot be regarded as constitutive of the gift and is not compulsorily registerable." 

9. Against this argument counsel invoked the authority of the Andhra Pradesh Full Bench. One may respect the ruling but still reiect the reasoning. The Calcutta Bench in AIR 1927 Cal 197 has discussed the issue from the angle I have presented. The logic of the law matters more than the judicial numbers behind a view. The Calcutta Bench argued: 

"The essentials of a gift under the Mahomedan law are ..... A simple gift can only be made by going through the above formalities and no written instrument is required. In fact no writing is necessary to validate a gift; and if a gift is made by a written instrument without delivery of possession, it is invalid in law ..... That being so, a deed of gift executed by a Mahomedan is not the instrument effecting, creating or making the gift but a mere piece of evidence ..... Under Section 17 of the Registration Act an instrument of gift must be registered. By the expression 'instrument of gift of immovable property' I understand an instrument or deed which creates, makes or completes the gift thereby transferring the ownership of the property ..... The present document does not affect immovable property. It does not transfer an immovable property from the donor to the donee which only affords evidence of the fact that the donor has observed the formalities under the Mahomedan law in making the gift ..... I am prepared to go so far as to hold that a document like the present one is not compulsorily registrable under the Registration Act, or the Registration Act does not apply to a so-called deed of gift executed by a Mahomedan." 

These observations of Suhrawardy, J. have my respectful concurrence. So confining myself to this contention for the nonce, I am inclined to hold that Ext. B1 is admissible notwithstanding Ss. 17 and 49 of the Indian Registration Act. This conclusion, however, is little premature if I may anticipate my opinion on the operation of Section 129 of the Transfer of Property Act expressed later in this judgment. Indeed, in the light of my interpretation of Section 129, Ext. B1 needs to be registered. For the present I indicate my conclusion, if the law of gifts for Muslims were not to be governed by Section 129." 

23. The Full Bench of Jammu and Kashmir High Court in Ghulam Ahmad Sofi v. Mohd. Sidiq Dareel and others AIR 1974 Jammu & Kashmir 59 had an occasion to consider the question whether in view of the provisions of Sections 123 and 129 of the T.P. Act, the rule of gifts in Mohammadan Law stands superseded; and whether it is necessary that there should be a registered instrument as required by Sections 123 and 138 of the T.P. Act in the case of gifts made under that Law. The Full Bench noticed the statutory provisions and also decisions of different High Courts including the decision of Calcutta High Court in the case of Nasib Ali3. The Full Bench held as follows : 

"14. The ratio of the above cited authorities is therefore in favour of the proposition that an oral gift made under the Muslim law would not be affected by Section 123 of the Transfer of Property Act and the gift if it has otherwise all the attributes of a valid gift under the Muslim Law would not become invalid because there is no instrument in writing and registered. Therefore the answer to the question formulated would be in the negative i.e. that Sections 123 and 129 of the Transfer of Property Act do not supersede the Muslim law on matters relating to making of oral gifts, that it is not essential that there should be a registered instrument as required by Sections 123 and 138 of the Transfer of Property Act in such cases. But if there is executed an instrument and its execution is contemporaneous with the making of the gift then in that case the instrument must be registered as provided under Section 17 of the Registration Act. If, however, the making of the gift is an antecedent act and a deed is executed afterwards as evidencing the said transaction that does not require registration as it is an instrument made after the gift is made and does not therefore create, make or complete the gift thereby transferring the ownership of the property from the executant to the person in whose favour it is executed." 

24. The Single Judge of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in the case of Chota Uddandu Sahib v. Masthan Bi (died) and others AIR 1975 Andhra Pradesh 271, was concerned with the question about the gift by Mohammadan. The Single Judge referred to some of the decisions noticed above and few other decisions and held in paragraph 10 of the report thus : 

"10. Under Section 129 of the Transfer of Property Act, nothing in Chapter VII relates to gifts of movable property made in contemplation of death or shall be deemed to affect any rule of Mohammadan Law. According to the Mohammedan Law, there can be a valid gift, if three essentials of the gift are satisfied. (1) a declaration of the gift by the donor, (2) the acceptance of the gift express or implied by or on behalf of the donee and (3) delivery of possession of the subject of gift by the donor to the donee. If these conditions are complied with the gift is complete. According to Muslim law it is not necessary that there should be a deed of gift in order to make it a valid gift, but of course, if there is a deed it should be registered. But if the deed is merely a memoranda of an already effected gift, then it stands on a separate footing. In view of this specific provision of Muslim Law, which is saved by Section 129, it cannot be held that the gifts amongst muslims also should satisfy the provisions of Chapter VII. . . . . . . . . . . . Hence if all the formalities, as prescribed by Muslim Law, regarding the making of gifts are satisfied, the gift is valid notwithstanding the fact that it is oral and without any instrument. If there is a contemporaneous document it should be registered. But if the gift is antecedent and the deed is subsequent merely evidencing the past transaction, it does not require registration, because it does not by itself make or complete the gift. . . . . . . . . ." 

25. In the case of Amirkhan v. Ghouse Khan (1985) 2 MLJ 136, one of the questions that arose for consideration before the Madras High Court was : whether the gift of the immoveable property by Mohammadan, if reduced to writing, required registration. The Single Judge of the Madras High Court concluded that though a Mohammadan could create a valid gift orally, if he should reduce the same in writing, the gift will not be valid unless it is duly registered. 

26. In the case of Md. Hesabuddin and others v. Md. Hesaruddin and others AIR 1984 Gauhati 41, the question with regard to gift of immoveable property written on ordinary unstamped paper arose before the Gauhati High Court. That was a case where a Mohammadan mother made a gift of land in favour of her son by a gift deed written on ordinary unstamped paper. The Single Judge of the High Court relying upon an earlier decision of that Court in Jubeda Khatoon v. Moksed Ali, AIR 1973 Gauhati 105 held as under: 

"..... But it cannot be taken as sine qua non in all cases that wherever there is a writing about a Mahomedan gift of immovable property, there must be registration thereof. The facts and circumstances of each case have to be taken into consideration before finding whether the writing requires registration or not. The essential requirements, as said before, to make a Mahomedan gift valid are declaration by the donor, acceptance by the donee and delivery of possession to the donee. It was held in Jubeda Khatoon v. Moksed Ali, AIR 1973 Gau 105 (at p. 106)- 

"Under the Mahomedan Law three things are necessary for creation of a gift. They are (i) declaration of gift by the donor, (ii) acceptance of the gift express or implied by or on behalf of the donee and (iii) delivery of possession of the subject of the gift by the donor to the donee. The deed of gift is immaterial for creation of gift under the Mahomedan Law. A gift under the Mahomedan Law is not valid if the above mentioned essentials are not fulfilled, even if there be a deed of gift or even a registered deed of gift. In other words even if there be a declaration of acceptance of the gift, there will be no valid gift under the Mahomedan Law if there be no delivery of possession, even though there may be registered deed of gift." In that case there was a deed of gift which was not produced during trial. Still it was found in that case that had the defendants produced the deed of gift, at best it would have proved a declaration of the gift by the donor and acceptance thereof by the donee. It was further held that despite this the defendants would have to lead independent oral evidence to prove delivery of possession in order to prove a valid gift. Therefore it was found in that case that deed of gift under the Mahomedan Law does not create a disposition of property. Relying on this it cannot be said that whenever there is a writing with regard to a gift executed by the donor, it must be proved as a basic instrument of gift before deciding the gift to be valid. In the instant case a mere writing in the plain paper as aforesaid containing the declaration of gift cannot tantamount to a formal instrument of gift. Ext. A (2) has in the circumstances of the present case to be taken as a form of declaration of the donor. In every case the intention of the donor, the background of the alleged gift and the relation of the donor and the donee as well as the purpose or motive of the gift all have to be taken into consideration. In the present case, it is recited in the said writings that the 3rd defendant has been maintaining and looking after the donor and that the other children of the donor were neglecting her. The gift was from a mother to a son and it was based on love and affection for the son in whose favour the gift was made. Therefore, it cannot be held that because a declaration is contained in the paper Ext. A (2) the latter must have been registered in order to render the gift valid. Admittedly, the 3rd defendant has been possessing the land and got his name mutated in the revenue records with respect to the land. It is therefore implied that there was acceptance on behalf of the donee and also that the possession of the property was delivered to the donee by the donor. It should be remembered that unless there was possession on behalf of the 3rd defendant, no mutation would have taken place with regard to the property. It may be repeated that Ext. A (2) has to be taken in the present case as a mere declaration of the donor in presence of the witnesses who are said to have attested the writing." 

27. The position is well settled, which has been stated and restated time and again, that the three essentials of a gift under Mohammadan Law are; (i) declaration of the gift by the donor; (2) acceptance of the gift by the donee and (3) delivery of possession. Though, the rules of Mohammadan Law do not make writing essential to the validity of a gift; an oral gift fulfilling all the three essentials make the gift complete and irrevocable. However, the donor may record the transaction of gift in writing. Asaf A. A. Fyzee in Outlines of Muhammadan Law, Fifth Edition (edited and revised by Tahir Mahmood) at page 182 states in this regard that writing may be of two kinds : (i) it may merely recite the fact of a prior gift; such a writing need not be registered. On the other hand, (ii) it may itself be the instrument of gift; such a writing in certain circumstances requires registration. He further says that if there is a declaration, acceptance and delivery of possession coupled with the formal instrument of a gift, it must be registered. Conversely, the author says that registration, however, by itself without the other necessary conditions, is not sufficient. 

28. Mulla, Principles of Mahomedan Law (19th Edition), Page 120, states the legal position in the following words : 

"Under the Mahomedan law the three essential requisites to make a gift valid : (1) declaration of the gift by the donor: (2) acceptance of the gift by the donee expressly or impliedly and (3) delivery of possession to and taking possession thereof by the donee actually or constructively. No written document is required in such a case. Section 129 Transfer of Property Act, excludes the rule of Mahomedan law from the purview of Section 123 which mandates that the gift of immovable property must be effected by a registered instrument as stated therein. But it cannot be taken as a sine qua non in all cases that whenever there is a writing about a Mahomedan gift of immovable property there must be registration thereof. Whether the writing requires registration or not depends on the facts and circumstances of each case." 

29. In our opinion, merely because the gift is reduced to writing by a Mohammadan instead of it having been made orally, such writing does not become a formal document or instrument of gift. When a gift could be made by Mohammadan orally, its nature and character is not changed because of it having been made by a written document. What is important for a valid gift under Mohammadan Law is that three essential requisites must be fulfilled. The form is immaterial. If all the three essential requisites are satisfied constituting valid gift, the transaction of gift would not be rendered invalid because it has been written on a plain piece of paper. The distinction that if a written deed of gift recites the factum of prior gift then such deed is not required to be registered but when the writing is contemporaneous with the making of the gift, it must be registered, is inappropriate and does not seem to us to be in conformity with the rule of gifts in Mohammadan Law. 

30. In considering what is the Mohammadan Law on the subject of gifts inter vivos, the Privy Council in Mohammad Abdul Ghani1 stated that when the old and authoritative texts of Mohammadan Law were promulgated there were not in contemplation of any one any Transfer of Property Acts, any Registration Acts, any Revenue Courts to record transfers of possession of land, and that could not have been intended to lay down for all time what should alone be the evidence that titles to lands had passed. 

31. Section 129 of T.P. Act preserves the rule of Mohammadan Law and excludes the applicability of Section 123 of T.P. Act to a gift of an immovable property by a Mohammadan. We find ourselves in express agreement with the statement of law reproduced above from Mulla, Principles of Mahomedan Law (19th Edition), page 120. In other words, it is not the requirement that in all cases where the gift deed is contemporaneous to the making of the gift then such deed must be registered under Section 17 of the Registration Act. Each case would depend on its own facts. 

32. We are unable to concur with the view of the Full Bench of Andhra Pradesh High Court in the case of Tayyaba Begum. We approve the view of the Calcutta High Court in Nasib Ali3 that a deed of gift executed by a Mohammadan is not the instrument effecting, creating or making the gift but a mere piece of evidence, such writing is not a document of title but is a piece of evidence. 

33. We also approve the view of the Gauhati High Court in the case of Md. Hesabuddin. The judgments to the contrary by Andhra Pradesh High Court, Jammu and Kashmir High Court and Madras High Court do not lay down the correct law.

The Stage has been set - Merger Regulations under the Competition Act

By Zerick Dastur, Senior Associate of J. Sagar & Associates, Advocates & Solicitors

The merger regulations under the Competition Act of 2002 will finally come into effect from June 1, 2011. This was done after a long wait and amidst opposition from various factions of the industry. Though the Competition Act was enacted in 2002, the provisions relating to anti competitive agreements and abuse of dominance were notified to take effect only in May 2009 and finally in March 2011 it has been announced that the provisions of the Act dealing with combination regulation will be brought into force.

Mergers, acquisitions, private equity investments and other like transactions which cross the prescribed thresholds of assets and turnover as provided under the Act will require prior approval of the Competition Commission of India. This includes transactions which are in progress, but are yet to be completed. The thresholds of assets and turnover have been enhanced by 50 percent. However, the general impression that the thresholds prescribed are perhaps on the lower side continues. In order to further facilitate the process, it has been decided that enterprises whose shares, assets or voting rights are being acquired, having assets and turnover of less than Rs. 250 crore and Rs. 750 crore respectively are exempted from the requirement of obtaining the prior approval of the Commission.

The draft combination regulations which prescribe the details relating to filings for approvals and the forms to be filled at the time of filing have been uploaded on the website of the Commission. It has been announced that these regulations may soon be amended. Comments and suggestions from various stakeholders have been invited and are being considered by the Commission. Further, to widen the scope of the consultative process, the Commission is in the process of organizing consultative meetings with various stakeholders which include the apex industry bodies and leading law firms dealing with competition law related matters. This is a step in the right direction which will enable the Commission to get on board the views of all concerned and address the concerns of all those who will be directly affected by the regulations coming into force. The process may also throw light on some of the prevailing ambiguities in the interpretation of the law.

One of the major grievances of all interested parties has always been the outer limit of, as long as 210 days - that the Commission may take to finally approve a combination. Though the Commission has expressed that it will endeavor for an expedited disposal in most cases, the statutory timeframe cannot be ignored. Other areas of concern include the calculation of assets and turnover which act as a triggering event for Commission to exercise discretion and the treatment of joint ventures. Further, the draft regulations provide for certain transactions which require the filing to be made with the Commission in terms of Form I. These include acquisition of shares upto 15 percent, acquisition of shares where the acquirer already controls the target enterprise, acquisitions made solely as investments and intra group acquisitions. All other transactions not covered in the category above are to be filed in terms of Form II which is more detailed. However it appears that Form I, in itself is much too detailed and calls for information which is substantially more than what is called upon for similar transactions in other jurisdictions. All these issues may be brought up at the time of the consultation process and hopefully a mutually acceptable solution is devised.

The draft regulations also provide for informal verbal consultations seeking clarifications about filing of notices. Such consultations shall be kept confidential and the views expressed during the consultation process shall not be binding on the commission. This process may indeed facilitate resolution of uncertainties of filing in certain cases and avoid unnecessary cost and expense. A similar process has been prescribed even for other regulators like the Securities and Exchange Board of India, the countries securities market regulator.

All that can be said is that the law is in its nascent stage and will continue to develop with experience and judicial precedents interpreting the various provisions of law. The right approach would be for the industry and the regulator to work closely and coordinate with each other to fill in every lacuna that presents itself and to jointly face the challenges that lay ahead in an effort to give effect the laudable objects that underline the anti trust regime. 

Zerick Dastur is a Senior Associate of J. Sagar & Associates, Advocates & Solicitors. He is a part of the Firms Competition Law practice and specializes in Corporate, Commercial & Securities Law

Power of High Courts under Article 227 of the Constitution : Broad Principles

Justice R.C. Lahoti

The Supreme Court in Surya Devi Rai v. Ram Chander Rai & Ors. has examined the scope of Article 227 of the Constitution vis-a-vis Article 226. The Supreme Court has laid down broad principles outlining the difference between a writ of certiorari and Article 227 of the Constitution. The Supreme Court also examined the effect of the introduction of S. 115 of the Code of CIvil Procedure and its effect on the powers of the High Court under Article 227. While examining various judicial pronouncements on the subject, the Court held as under;

Supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227

Article 227 of the Constitution confers on every High Court the power of superintendence over all courts and tribunals throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction excepting any court or tribunal constituted by or under any law relating to the armed forces. Without prejudice to the generality of such power the High Court has been conferred with certain specific powers by sub-Articles (2) and (3) of Article 227 with which we are not concerned hereat. It is well-settled that the power of superintendence so conferred on the High Court is administrative as well as judicial, and is capable of being invoked at the instance of any person aggrieved or may even be exercised suo motu. The paramount consideration behind vesting such wide power of superintendence in the High Court is paving the path of justice and removing any obstacles therein. The power under Article 227 is wider than the one conferred on the High Court by Article 226 in the sense that the power of superintendence is not subject to those technicalities of procedure or traditional fetters which are to be found in certiorari jurisdiction. Else the parameters invoking the exercise of power are almost similar.

The history of supervisory jurisdiction exercised by the High Court, and how the jurisdiction has culminated into its present shape under Article 227 of the Constitution, was traced in Waryam Singh & Anr. Vs. Amarnath & Anr. (1954) SCR 565. The jurisdiction can be traced back to Section 15 of High Courts Act 1861 which gave a power of judicial superintendence to the High Court apart from and independently of the provisions of other laws conferring revisionsal jurisdiction on the High Court. Section 107 of the Government of India Act 1915 and then Section 224 of the Government of India Act 1935, were similarly worded and reproduced the predecessor provision. However, sub-section (2) was added in Section 224 which confined the jurisdiction of the High Court to such judgments of the inferior courts which were not otherwise subject to appeal or revision. That restriction has not been carried forward in Article 227 of the Constitution. In that sense Article 227 of the Constitution has width and vigour unprecedented.

Difference between a writ of certiorari under Article 226 and supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227.

The difference between Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution was well brought out in Umaji Keshao Meshram and Ors. Vs. Smt. Radhikabai and Anr., (1986) Supp. SCC 401. Proceedings under Article 226 are in exercise of the original jurisdiction of the High Court while proceedings under Article 227 of the Constitution are not original but only supervisory. Article 227 substantially reproduces the provisions of Section 107 of the Government of India Act, 1915 excepting that the power of superintendence has been extended by this Article to tribunals as well. Though the power is akin to that of an ordinary court of appeal, yet the power under Article 227 is intended to be used sparingly and only in appropriate cases for the purpose of keeping the subordinate courts and tribunals within the bounds of their authority and not for correcting mere errors. The power may be exercised in cases occasioning grave injustice or failure of justice such as when (i) the court or tribunal has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have, (ii) has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have, such failure occasioning a failure of justice, and (iii) the jurisdiction though available is being exercised in a manner which tantamounts to overstepping the limits of jurisdiction.

Upon a review of decided cases and a survey of the occasions wherein the High Courts have exercised jurisdiction to command a writ of certiorari or to exercise supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 in the given facts and circumstances in a variety of cases, it seems that the distinction between the two jurisdictions stands almost obliterated in practice. Probably, this is the reason why it has become customary with the lawyers labeling their petitions as one common under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution, though such practice has been deprecated in some judicial pronouncement. Without entering into niceties and technicality of the subject, we venture to state the broad general difference between the two jurisdictions. Firstly, the writ of certiorari is an exercise of its original jurisdiction by the High Court; exercise of supervisory jurisdiction is not an original jurisdiction and in this sense it is akin to appellate revisional or corrective jurisdiction. Secondly, in a writ of certiorari, the record of the proceedings having been certified and sent up by the inferior court or tribunal to the High Court, the High Court if inclined to exercise its jurisdiction, may simply annul or quash the proceedings and then do no more. In exercise of supervisory jurisdiction the High Court may not only quash or set aside the impugned proceedings, judgment or order but it may also make such directions as the facts and circumstances of the case may warrant, may be by way of guiding the inferior court or tribunal as to the manner in which it would now proceed further or afresh as commended to or guided by the High Court. In appropriate cases the High Court, while exercising supervisory jurisdiction, may substitute such a decision of its own in place of the impugned decision, as the inferior court or tribunal should have made. Lastly, the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution is capable of being exercised on a prayer made by or on behalf of the party aggrieved; the supervisory jurisdiction is capable of being exercised suo motu as well.

In order to safeguard against a mere appellate or revisional jurisdiction being exercised in the garb of exercise of supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution, the courts have devised self-imposed rules of discipline on their power. Supervisory jurisdiction may be refused to be exercised when an alternative efficacious remedy by way of appeal or revision is available to the person aggrieved. The High Court may have regard to legislative policy formulated on experience and expressed by enactments where the Legislature in exercise of its wisdom has deliberately chosen certain orders and proceedings to be kept away from exercise of appellate and revisional jurisdiction in the hope of accelerating the conclusion of the proceedings and avoiding delay and procrastination which is occasioned by subjecting every order at every stage of proceedings to judicial review by way of appeal or revision. So long as an error is capable of being corrected by a superior court in exercise of appellate or revisional jurisdiction though available to be exercised only at the conclusion of the proceedings, it would be sound exercise of discretion on the part of the High Court to refuse to exercise power of superintendence during the pendency of the proceedings. However, there may be cases where but for invoking the supervisory jurisdiction, the jurisdictional error committed by the inferior court or tribunal would be incapable of being remedied once the proceedings have concluded.

In Chandrasekhar Singh & Ors. Vs. Siva Ram Singh & Ors., (1979) 3 SCC 118, the scope of jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution came up for the consideration of this Court in the context of Sections 435 and 439 of the Criminal Procedure Code which prohibits a second revision to the High Court against decision in first revision rendered by the Sessions Judge. On a review of earlier decisions, the three-Judges Bench summed up the position of law as under :-

(i) that the powers conferred on the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution cannot, in any way, be curtailed by the provisions of the Code of Criminal procedure;

(ii) the scope of interference by the High Court under Article 227 is restricted. The power of superintendence conferred by Article 227 is to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases in order to keep the subordinate Courts within the bounds of their authority and not for correcting mere errors;

(iii) that the power of judicial interference under Article 227 of the Constitution is not greater than the power under Article 226 of the Constitution;

(iv) that the power of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution cannot be invoked to correct an error of fact which only a superior Court can do in exercise of its statutory power as the Court of Appeal; the High Court cannot, in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 227, convert itself into a Court of Appeal.

Later, a two-judge Bench of this Court in Baby Vs. Travancore Devaswom Board & Ors., (1998) 8 SCC 310, clarified that in spite of the revisional jurisdiction being not available to the High Court, it still had powers under Article 227 of the Constitution of India to quash the orders passed by the Tribunals if the findings of fact had been arrived at by non-consideration of the relevant and material documents, the consideration of which could have led to an opposite conclusion. This power of the High Court under the Constitution of India is always in addition to the revisional jurisdiction conferred on it.

Does the amendment in Section 115 of C.P.C have any impact on jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227?

The Constitution Bench in L. Chandra Kumar Vs. Union of India & Ors., (1997) 3 SCC 261, dealt with the nature of power of judicial review conferred by Article 226 of the Constitution and the power of superintendence conferred by Article 227. It was held that the jurisdiction conferred on the Supreme Court under Article 32 of the Constitution and on the High Courts under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution is part of the basic structure of the Constitution, forming its integral and essential feature, which cannot be tampered with much less taken away even by constitutional amendment, not to speak of a parliamentary legislation. A recent Division Bench decision by Delhi High Court (Dalveer Bhandari and H.R. Malhotra, JJ) in Criminal Writ Petition NO.s.758, 917 and 1295 of 2002 Govind Vs. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) decided on April 7, 2003 (reported as [2003] 6 ILD 468 makes an indepth survey of decided cases including almost all the leading decisions by this Court and holds "The power of the High Court under Article 226 cannot be whittled down, nullified, curtailed, abrogated, diluted or taken either by judicial pronouncement or by the legislative enactment or even by the amendment of the Constitution. The power of judicial review is an inherent part of the basic structure and it cannot be abrogated without affecting the basic structure of the Constitution." The essence of constitutional and legal principles, relevant to the issue at hand, has been correctly summed up by the Division Bench of the High Court and we record our approval of the same.

It is interesting to recall two landmark decisions delivered by High Courts and adorning the judicial archives. In Balkrishna Hari Phansalkar Vs. Emperor, AIR 1933 Bombay 1, the question arose before a Special Bench: whether the power of superintendence conferred on the High Court by Section 107 of Government of India Act 1915 can be controlled by the Governor-General exercising his power to legislate. The occasion arose because of the resistance offered by the State Government to the High Court exercising its power of superintendence over the Courts of Magistrates established under Emergency Powers Ordinance, 1932. Chief Justice Beaumont held that even if power of revision is taken away, the power of superintendence over the courts constituted by the ordinance was still available. The Governor-General cannot control the powers conferred on the High Court by an Act of Imperial Parliament. However, speaking of the care and caution to be observed while exercising the power of superintendence though possessed by the High Court, the learned Chief Justice held that the power of superintendence is not the same thing as the hearing of an appeal. An illegal conviction may be set aside under power of superintendence but - "we must exercise our discretion on judicial grounds, and only interfere if considerations of justice require us to do so."

In Manmatha Nath Biswas Vs. Emperor, (1932-33) 37 C.W.N. 201, a conviction based on no legal reason and unsustainable in law came up for the scrutiny of the High Court under the power of superintendence in spite of right of appeal having been allowed to lapse. Speaking of the nature of power of superintendence, the Division Bench, speaking through Chief Justice Rankin, held that the power of superintendence vesting in the High Court under Section 107 of the Government of India Act, 1915, is not a limitless power available to be exercised for removing hardship of particular decisions. The power of superintendence is a power of known and well- recognised character and should be exercised on those judicial principles which give it its character. The mere misconception on a point of law or a wrong decision on facts or a failure to mention by the Courts in its judgment every element of the offence, would not allow the order of the Magistrate being interfered with in exercise of the power of superintendence but the High Court can and should see that no man is convicted without a legal reason. A defect of jurisdiction or fraud on the part of the prosecutor or error on the "face of the proceedings" as understood in Indian practice, provides a ground for the exercise of the power of superintendence. The line between the two classes of case must be, however, kept clear and straight. In general words, the High Court's power of superintendence is a power to keep subordinate Courts within the bounds of their authority, to see that they do what their duty requires and that they do it in a legal manner.

The principles deducible, well-settled as they are, have been well summed up and stated by a two-judges Bench of this Court recently in State, through Special Cell, New Delhi Vs. Navjot Sandhu @ Afshan Guru and Ors., JT 2003 (4) SC 605, para 28. This Court held :

(i) the jurisdiction under Article 227 cannot be limited or fettered by any Act of the state Legislature;

(ii) the supervisory jurisdiction is wide and can be used to meet the ends of justice, also to interfere even with interlocutory order;

(iii) the power must be exercised sparingly, only to move subordinate courts and Tribunals within the bounds of their authority to see that they obey the law. The power is not available to be exercised to correct mere errors (whether on the facts or laws) and also cannot be exercised "as the cloak of an appeal in disguise".

In Shiv Shakti Coop. Housing Society, Nagpur Vs. M/s. Swaraj Developers & Ors., (2003) 4 Scale 241, another two-Judges bench of this Court dealt with Section 115 of the C.P.C. The Court at the end of its judgment noted the submission of the learned counsel for a party that even if the revisional applications are held to be not maintainable, there should not be a bar on a challenge being made under Article 227 of the Constitution for which an opportunity was prayed to be allowed. The Court observed "If any remedy is available to a party, no liberty is necessary to be granted for availing the same."

We are of the opinion that the curtailment of revisional jurisdiction of the High Court does not take away and could not have taken away - the constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court to issue a writ of certiorari to a civil court nor the power of superintendence conferred on the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution is taken away or whittled down. The power exists, untrammelled by the amendment in Section 115 of the CPC, and is available to be exercised subject to rules of self discipline and practice which are well settled.

We have carefully perused the Full Bench decision of the Allahabad High Court in Ganga Saran's case relied on by the learned counsel for respondent and referred to in the impugned order of the High Court. We do not think that the decision of the Full Bench has been correctly read. Rather, vide para 11, the Full Bench has itself held that where the order of the Civil Court suffers from patent error of law and further causes manifest injustice to the party aggrieved then the same can be subjected to writ of certiorari. The Full Bench added that every interlocutory order passed in a civil suit is not subject to review under Article 226 of the Constitution but if it is found from the order impugned that fundamental principle of law has been violated and further such an order causes substantial injustice to the party aggrieved the jurisdiction of the High Court to issue a writ of certiorari is not precluded. However, the following sentence occurs in the judgment of the Full Bench:-

"where an aggrieved party approaches the High Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution against an order passed in civil suit refusing to issue injunction to a private individual who is not under statutory duty to perform public duty or vacating an order of injunction, the main relief is for issue of a writ of mandamus to a private individual and such a writ petition under Art.226 of the Constitution would not be maintainable."

It seems that the High Court in its decision impugned herein formed an impression from the above-quoted passage that a prayer for issuance of injunction having been refused by trial court as well as the appellate court, both being subordinate to High Court and the dispute being between two private parties, issuance of injunction by High Court amounts to issuance of a mandamus against a private party which is not permissible in law.

The above quoted sentence from Ganga Saran's case cannot be read torn out of the context. All that the Full Bench has said is that while exercising certiorari jurisdiction over a decision of the court below refusing to issue an order of injunction, the High Court would not, while issuing a writ of certiorari, also issue a mandamus against a private party. Article 227 of the Constitution has not been referred to by the Full Bench. Earlier in this judgment we have already pointed out the distinction between Article 226 and Article 227 of the Constitution and we need not reiterate the same. In this context, we may quote the Constitution Bench decision in T.C. Basappa Vs. T. Nagappa and Anr., (1955) 1 SCR 250 and Province of Bombay Vs. Khushaldas S. Advani (dead) by Lrs., 1950 SCR 621, as also a three-Judge Bench decision in Dwarka Nath Vs. Income-tax Officer, Special Circle, D Ward, Kanpur and Anr., (1965) 3 SCR 536, which have held in no uncertain terms, as the law has always been, that a writ of certiorari is issued against the acts or proceedings of a judicial or quasi-judicial body conferred with power to determine questions affecting the rights of subjects and obliged to act judicially. We are therefore of the opinion that the writ of certiorari is directed against the act, order of proceedings of the subordinate Court, it can issue even if the lis is between two private parties.

Such like matters frequently arise before the High Courts. We sum up our conclusions in a nutshell, even at the risk of repetition and state the same as hereunder:-

(1) Amendment by Act No.46 of 1999 with effect from 01.07.2002 in Section 115 of Code of Civil Procedure cannot and does not affect in any manner the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution.

(2) Interlocutory orders, passed by the courts subordinate to the High Court, against which remedy of revision has been excluded by the CPC Amendment Act No. 46 of 1999 are nevertheless open to challenge in, and continue to be subject to, certiorari and supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court.

(3) Certiorari, under Article 226 of the Constitution, is issued for correcting gross errors of jurisdiction, i.e., when a subordinate court is found to have acted (i) without jurisdiction - by assuming jurisdiction where there exists none, or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified, and thereby occasioning failure of justice.

(4) Supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is exercised for keeping the subordinate courts within the bounds of their jurisdiction. When the subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction.

(5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied : (i) the error is manifest and apparent on the face of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law, and (iii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby.

(6) A patent error is an error which is self-evident, i.e., which can be perceived or demonstrated without involving into any lengthy or complicated argument or a long-drawn process of reasoning. Where two inferences are reasonably possible and the subordinate court has chosen to take one view the error cannot be called gross or patent.

(7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. Care, caution and circumspection need to be exercised, when any of the abovesaid two jurisdictions is sought to be invoked during the pendency of any suit or proceedings in a subordinate court and the error though calling for correction is yet capable of being corrected at the conclusion of the proceedings in an appeal or revision preferred there against and entertaining a petition invoking certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction of High Court would obstruct the smooth flow and/or early disposal of the suit or proceedings. The High Court may feel inclined to intervene where the error is such, as, if not corrected at that very moment, may become incapable of correction at a later stage and refusal to intervene would result in travesty of justice or where such refusal itself would result in prolonging of the lis.

(8) The High Court in exercise of certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction will not covert itself into a Court of Appeal and indulge in re-appreciation or evaluation of evidence or correct errors in drawing inferences or correct errors of mere formal or technical character.

(9) In practice, the parameters for exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari and those calling for exercise of supervisory jurisdiction are almost similar and the width of jurisdiction exercised by the High Courts in India unlike English courts has almost obliterated the distinction between the two jurisdictions. While exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari the High Court may annul or set aside the act, order or proceedings of the subordinate courts but cannot substitute its own decision in place thereof. In exercise of supervisory jurisdiction the High Court may not only give suitable directions so as to guide the subordinate court as to the manner in which it would act or proceed thereafter or afresh, the High Court may in appropriate cases itself make an order in supersession or substitution of the order of the subordinate court as the court should have made in the facts and circumstances of the case.

Though we have tried to lay down broad principles and working rules, the fact remains that the parameters for exercise of jurisdiction under Articles 226 or 227 of the Constitution cannot be tied down in a straitjacket formula or rigid rules. Not less than often the High Court would be faced with dilemma. If it intervenes in pending proceedings there is bound to be delay in termination of proceedings. If it does not intervene, the error of the moment may earn immunity from correction. The facts and circumstances of a given case may make it more appropriate for the High Court to exercise self-restraint and not to intervene because the error of jurisdiction though committed is yet capable of being taken care of and corrected at a later stage and the wrong done, if any, would be set right and rights and equities adjusted in appeal or revision preferred at the conclusion of the proceedings. But there may be cases where 'a stitch in time would save nine'. At the end, we may sum up by saying that the power is there but the exercise is discretionary which will be governed solely by the dictates of judicial conscience enriched by judicial experience and practical wisdom of the Judge.